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Model Business Corporation Act as Adopted in 
Louisiana 
Glenn G. Morris* 
INTRODUCTION 
Effective January 1, 2015, Louisiana adopted a customized 
version of the Model Business Corporation Act.1 The new Act 
replaces the former Louisiana Business Corporation Law (LBCL)2 
and makes several coordinating changes in other areas of the law.3 
The author served as the Reporter and Chair of the Corporations 
Committee of the Louisiana State Law Institute, the Committee that 
considered and modified the Model Act for adoption in Louisiana. 
Louisiana’s modifications to the Model Act were designed to do 
three things: (1) to adapt the Model Act to Louisiana’s legal system 
and terminology, (2) to retain some of the desirable features of 
existing law, and (3) to make what the Committee judged to be 
corrections or improvements in the Model Act provisions.  
This Article summarizes the ways in which the new Act changes 
the law as well as those in which the law remains largely unchanged. 
This Article also points out the areas in which the Louisiana version 
of the Act differs from the Model Act, either by retaining the earlier 
Louisiana law on the subject, or by offering some new solution to 
the problem.  
Louisiana’s adoption of the Model Act returns it to the 
mainstream of American corporation law, much as the LBCL did 
when it was adopted in 1968.4 The Model Act is the foundation of 
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  J. Dawson Gasquet Professor of Law and Vinson & Elkins Professor of 
Law, LSU Paul M. Hebert Law Center. 
 1. Act No. 328, §§ 1, 7, 2014 La. Acts. 
 2. Id. § 5. 
 3. The other changes affected provisions concerning the prescriptive periods 
applicable to business organizations, see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1501–1502 
(Supp. 2015); the conversion of business organizations, id. §§ 12:1601–1604; 
filing methods and secretary-of-state-records provisions, id. §§ 12:1701–1704; 
filing fees chargeable by the secretary of state, id. § 49:222; and the derivative 
action provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 611 
(2015).  
 4. As one of my Committee colleagues noted, Louisiana’s corporation law 
has been designed to fit into the mainstream of American corporate law since at 
least 1928. Louisiana’s 1928 corporation statute was based on a then-proposed 
Uniform Business Corporation Act, which influenced the Model Business 
Corporation Act that later took its place. The 1968 statute was designed to 
combine the best features of the 1928 statute with the best features of the 
corporate laws of many other states, and it included some provisions from the 
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the corporation law of 30 other states, including all southern states 
east of the Mississippi River.5 The Model Act is the product of the 
Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Business Law of 
the American Bar Association and is subject to continuous revision 
by that body to deal with developments in corporate law and 
practice as they occur.6 
The new Act goes a step further in the direction of mainstream 
law than did the LBCL. Unlike the LBCL, the new Act adopts not 
just the substance of mainstream American corporation law, but 
the leading mainstream law itself, by name.7 This approach should 
make it easier to explain Louisiana’s position on corporation law to 
lawyers and business executives in other states. Louisiana is not just 
similar in its corporate law to a Model Act state; it is a Model Act 
state. This simple point should save Louisiana lawyers and business 
owners many hours of detailed explanation and reassurance to their 
out-of-state colleagues and clients. Of course, some differences will 
still exist between Louisiana’s version of the Model Act and the 
versions enacted in other states. However, these differences will 
operate as exceptions rather than the rule.  
Louisiana’s adoption of the Model Act will also make it easier 
to find persuasive authority on interpretive issues that have not yet 
been addressed by Louisiana courts and to keep up with future 
developments in the law.8 When Louisiana had its own unique 
corporation statute, the corporate law decisions rendered in other 
states were less likely to be relevant. Earlier efforts to update the 
LBCL by inserting Model Act provisions sometimes created 
                                                                                                             
 
Model Act as it existed at the time. See Richard P. Wolfe, The Fiduciary Duty of 
Directors and Officers Under the Louisiana Business Corporation Act of 2014, 
60 LOY. L. REV. 523, 528–30 (2014).  
 5. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ix (2011). Including the District of Columbia, 
the count is 31 other jurisdictions. Of those 31 jurisdictions, Alaska, New 
Mexico, and the District of Columbia have statutes based on the 1969 version of 
the Model Act, rather than the more modern version that was first promulgated 
in 1984. Id. at n.2. 
 6. Id. at ix–x. 
 7. Ironically, the last time that Louisiana took that step, when it adopted 
the Uniform Business Corporation Act in 1928, it was apparently too far ahead 
of the curve in modernizing its law. Only two other states adopted the Uniform 
Act. Id. at xi. 
 8. The Reporter for the Committee on Corporate Laws oversees the 
publication of an annotated version of the Model Act, and the Committee has 
appointed state liaisons that report regularly on corporate law developments in 
their state. At the time this article was written, the author was serving as the 
liaison for Louisiana.  
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unintended technical problems and interpretative issues.9 That will 
no longer be true. When the Model Act is amended at the national 
level, Louisiana will be able to easily adopt those changes in a way 
that works technically with its existing corporation statute.  
The Committee that worked on the new Act included 
representatives of the secretary of state’s office,10 corporate law 
practitioners from various regions of the state,11 and four law 
professors in the field of corporation law, one from each of the 
state’s four law schools.12 Working with the Committee was one of 
the highlights of the author’s professional career. Committee 
members knew the existing law, took great care in reviewing the 
proposed new law, expressed their views candidly but also 
respectfully and fairly, and worked cooperatively to find 
constructive solutions to the problems at hand. 
The Committee did not expect its work to be perfect or final. 
Drafting errors are nearly inevitable in a statute as long and complex 
as the new Act, and the legal issues faced by corporations will almost 
surely continue to evolve. Hence, the Committee plans to remain 
active and make proposals for corrections and improvements to the 
new Act as needed. 
The remainder of this Article provides a summarized comparison 
between the new Act and the LBCL, taking up issues in the order in 
which they are covered in the new Act.  
                                                                                                             
 9. Louisiana copied an Indiana anti-takeover provision in the late 1980s 
that utilized an important Model Act term, “voting group,” that had no meaning 
under the Louisiana statute. See GLENN G. MORRIS & WENDELL H. HOLMES, 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 39.04, in 8 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 365 
n.29 (West 1999). In 2005, modified versions of the share certificate provisions 
of the Model Act were enacted but in a way that combined a limited Louisiana 
version of the Model Act rule with another, unmodified, Model Act provision 
that effectively undercut the effects of the earlier, limited provision. Id. § 10.13, 
at 30 n.1. The certificate provisions also failed to take account of the fact that 
Louisiana law, unlike the Model Act, still retained the par-value system of 
corporate capital. Id. at n.3. 
 10. Steve Windham served when Jay Dardenne was Secretary of State. He 
was replaced on the committee by Carla Bonaventure after Tom Schedler 
became Secretary of State. The Committee was assisted by two other staff 
members in the secretary’s office, Steve Hawkland and Mandy Hamilton.  
 11. The practitioners were Virginia Boulet, James C. Crigler, Jr., Joshua A. 
Decuir, Maureen Brennan Gershanik, Regina N. Hamilton, Lee Kantrow, Rick J. 
Norman, Robert M. Walmsley, Jr., Charles S. Weems, III, and Richard P. 
Wolfe. 
 12. The professors were Onnig Dombalagian, of Tulane University Law 
School; Lloyd “Trey” Drury, III, of Loyola University New Orleans College of 
Law; Glenn G. Morris, of the LSU Paul M. Hebert Law Center; and Roederick 
White, of the Southern University Law Center. 
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GENERAL FILING RULES 
The new Act (or “Louisiana’s Act”) provides a unified set of 
rules for the execution, filing, and effective dates of all documents 
that the Act requires or permits to be filed with the secretary of 
state.13 It will no longer be necessary to consult separate sets of 
execution and filing rules for each type of filing-eligible document 
covered by the new Act. All may be executed and filed in the same 
way; they will differ only in their required content. However, if the 
secretary of state’s office prescribes a particular form for a 
document (and the Act gives only limited authority for such forms, 
such as the annual report14), the document must be in or on the 
prescribed form.15 
The requirements for dual signatures or for the signatures of 
specified officers on some of the documents filed under the LBCL16 
are eliminated by the new Act. Just one signature, by the chairman 
of the board of directors or by any officer of the corporation, is 
required for all documents.17 Still, contrary to the Model Act, 
Louisiana did retain the requirement that this signature be 
acknowledged or that the document be executed by authentic act,18 
unless the document is to be filed electronically or in person at the 
secretary of state’s office.19  
As under the LBCL, if the secretary of state files a document, 
the document (and the act or transaction that the document is being 
filed to carry out) generally becomes effective as of the time that the 
secretary’s office indicates that it was received for filing.20 That 
general rule is subject to two exceptions that are similar, but not 
identical, to the analogous exceptions in the LBCL. The first 
                                                                                                             
 13. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-120 (Supp. 2015). 
 14. Id. § 12:1-121. 
 15. Id. § 12:1-120(I). 
 16. See, e.g., former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:112(D), 113(A)(2) 
(repealed 2015).  
 17. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-120(F) (Supp. 2015). The dual-signature 
requirement was retained, however, for share certificates. Id. § 12:1-625(D). The 
Model Act says only that the certificates are to be signed by two officers designated 
in the bylaws or by the board of directors. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.25(d) 
(2011). While Louisiana follows the Model Act’s lead in permitting the bylaws 
or board to designate any two officers, it also specifies two officers (the 
president and secretary) whose signatures will suffice in the event that no such 
designation is made. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-625(D) cmt. d (Supp. 
2015). 
 18. Id. § 12:1-120(H).  
 19. See id.; see also id § 12:1701 (discussing filing methods).  
 20. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1-123(A)(1), 1-123(D), 1-125(B) 
(Supp. 2015), with, e.g., former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:25(C), 12:32(B), 
12:114(A) (repealed 2015).  
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exception is for a delayed effective date, as specified in the filed 
document. Like the LBCL, the new Act permits the effective date of 
the document to be delayed as specified, but the permissible period 
of delay has been extended from 30 days under the LBCL21 to 90 
days under the new Act, measured from the time that the document 
is received by the secretary of state.22  
The second exception is based on the five-day grace period that 
the LBCL made available for most filed documents.23 Under that 
exception, a document became effective upon its proper execution, 
ahead of its filing, as long as it was received for filing24 by the 
secretary of state within five days, excluding legal holidays, of the 
date that it was executed. The new Act retains the five-day grace 
period only for a corporation’s initial articles of incorporation; it 
eliminates the period for all other filed documents.25 The grace 
period was eliminated for the other documents to allow third parties 
to rely on a corporation’s filed documents as stating a corporation’s 
legally operative provisions accurately, without the risk that unfiled 
changes in those provisions had already taken effect. Because initial 
articles of incorporation do not pose that danger, and because the 
immediate creation of a new corporation may be useful in allocating 
the risks involved in a new business venture or transaction, the grace 
period for that one type of document was retained.26  
                                                                                                             
 21. See, e.g., former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:25(A)(3) (repealed 2015); 
id. § 12:32(B). 
 22. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-123(C) (Supp. 2015). 
 23. The Model Act contains no such grace period. See MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT § 1.23 (2011). 
 24. The “received-for-filing” phrase is using the terminology of the new 
Act. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-123(A)(1), (B)(1) (Supp. 2015). Under the 
LBCL, the term for this event was “filed with the secretary.” See, e.g., former 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:25(C) (repealed 2015). But the new Act does not use 
the word “filed” in the same sense at it was used under the LBCL. Under the 
new Act, the “filing” of a document is something that only the secretary of 
state’s office is empowered to do. The term refers to the act of recording the 
document as “filed” in the records of the secretary of state, which ordinarily 
occurs only after the secretary’s staff (or the office’s computer programming) 
determines that the document complies with the requirements for filing it. See 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1-123(D), 1-125(B) (Supp. 2015). Until this 
recordation by the secretary occurs, the document may be “delivered for filing” 
to the secretary, and the secretary may “receive” the document for filing, but the 
document is not “filed” as that term is used in the new Act.  
 25. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:123(B) (Supp. 2015).  
 26. Id. § 12:1-123 cmt. a.  
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INCORPORATION 
As under the LBCL, any one or more persons capable of 
contracting may act as incorporators.27 An incorporator’s principal 
role is to execute and file the required incorporation documents, 
and to appoint the corporation’s initial directors.28 If a corporation 
has not yet named initial directors or issued shares, an incorporator 
may also approve an amendment to the articles of incorporation29 
or authorize the termination of the corporation.30 However, 
Louisiana rejected a Model Act rule that would have empowered 
an incorporator to adopt bylaws and appoint officers at a required 
organizational meeting for a new corporation.31 Louisiana’s Act 
requires the incorporators to appoint initial directors to complete 
the organization of the corporation.32  
Under the LBCL, three documents had to be filed to create a 
new corporation:33 articles of incorporation, an initial report, and a 
notarized affidavit of acceptance by the person named in the initial 
report as the corporation’s registered agent.34 Following the 
approach of the Model Act, the new Act eliminates the initial 
report as one of the required documents and so reduces the number 
of required documents to two.35 The items that were previously 
                                                                                                             
 27. Compare former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:21 (repealed 2015), with LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-201 (Supp. 2015). Revision Comment (a) to section 
12:1-201 explains that the “capable-of-contracting” requirement was retained to 
prevent unemancipated minors and others without capacity from acting as 
incorporators, but was not intended to suggest that the incorporators became 
parties to a contract by virtue of executing and filing the incorporation 
documents.  
 28. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1-201, 1-202(B)(1), 1-205(A)(2) (Supp. 
2015).  
 29. Id. § 12:1-1002. 
 30. Id. § 12:1-1441(B). 
 31. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.05(a)(1) (2011). 
 32. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-205(A)(2) (Supp. 2015). The initial 
directors are not required to adopt bylaws, however, as the new Act retains the 
earlier Louisiana rule making bylaws optional. Id. §§ 12:1-206(A), 1-1020(B). 
 33. It was possible to combine two of the documents, such as the initial 
report and the registered agent’s affidavit of acceptance, into a single physical 
document, so the number of physical documents could vary. The text is treating 
the documents as separate because they were subject to different content and 
execution requirements.  
 34. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:25(A)(1) (repealed 2015).  
 35. The registered agent’s acceptance of appointment is now called a 
“statement of acceptance” rather than a “notarized affidavit of acceptance.” 
Whether the statement must be notarized (through an acknowledgement or 
execution of the statement by authentic act) is covered by the same rule that 
applies to the execution formalities imposed on all filed documents under the 
new Act. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-120 (Supp. 2015). 
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covered by the initial report,36 such as the registered office and 
registered agent,37 are now made part of the initial articles of 
incorporation.38  
The required content of a corporation’s articles of incorporation 
has been changed. In addition to the initial-report types of items 
mentioned above, the articles must also state whether the corporation 
accepts, limits, or rejects the protection against monetary liability that 
is now provided by statutory default to the officers and directors of 
the corporation.39 But the articles need not state either the purpose of 
the corporation or the par value of its shares as required under prior 
law.40 Those items are dropped because the new Act itself provides 
the “all-lawful-purposes” rule by default,41 and, like the Model 
Act, eliminates the traditional par-value-based rules of corporate 
capital.42 The new Act also formally eliminates the “required” 
                                                                                                             
 36. The general statement in the text concerning the coverage of initial 
report items by the articles of incorporation is subject to one theoretical 
exception: the new Act, like the Model Act, treats the naming of a corporation’s 
initial directors as an optional item in a corporation’s initial articles of 
incorporation. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-202(B)(1) (Supp. 2015). Under the 
LBCL, the initial directors were supposed to be named either in the initial report or 
in a supplemental report filed as soon as they had been selected. Former LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 12:25(A)(2) (repealed 2015). But this theoretical requirement was 
not enforced in practice. The only enforcement mechanism available was a 
monetary penalty, collectible by the Attorney General, that could be triggered by 
the secretary of state sending a written request that the supplemental report be 
filed. See id. § 12:172(A). This author has confirmed with a knowledgeable staff 
member in the secretary’s office that no such requests were sent in at least the 
last 25 years of the LBCL’s reign.  
 37. The new Act, like the Model Act, adds a new type of office, the 
“principal office,” to the list of items that are to be covered in a corporation’s 
initial filing, at least if the principal office is different from the registered office. 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-202(A)(3) (Supp. 2015). The principal office is the 
office designated in a corporation’s annual report (or in its articles until an 
annual report is filed) where the principal executive offices of the corporation 
are located. Id. § 12:1-140(17).  
 38. The articles contain only the initial designations of those items. The 
initial designations may be changed without any amendment to the articles, by 
the simple filing of an annual report or change form with the secretary of state, 
or, in the case of initial directors, by means of a subsequent election of new 
directors by the shareholders. Id. §§ 12:1-502 (change report), 1-805(A) 
(election of new directors), 1-1621(A) (annual report). Once those changes have 
been made, the board of directors may amend the articles, without any vote by 
shareholders, to formally delete the initial statements concerning those items. Id. 
§ 12:1-1005(2)–(3).  
 39. Id. § 12:1-202(A)(5). 
 40. Id. § 12:1-202(A). See former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:24(B)(2), (5) 
(repealed 2015) (stating earlier requirements).  
 41. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-301(A) (Supp. 2015). 
 42. Id. § 12:1-621(A)–(D); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.21 cmt. (2011). 
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statement of the corporation’s taxpayer identification number, 
which was already optional in practice anyway.43 
The new Act is unlikely to change the fact that most closely held 
corporations will use standardized forms of articles that vary from 
company to company by little more than the name chosen for the 
new corporation. So, the naming rules will continue to receive much 
of the attention devoted to the formation of a new corporation. The 
new Act continues most of the naming rules contained in the former 
LBCL,44 including the requirement that a new name be 
“distinguishable” from other business entity and trade names.45 That 
requirement is potentially more demanding than the Model Act 
standard, which requires only that a new name be distinguishable 
“upon the records” of the secretary of state.46  
The secretary of state has interpreted Louisiana’s broader 
distinguishability standard to require a name to be distinguishable 
not only on the secretary’s records, but also in pronunciation. So, for 
example, while “B.C. Corporation” would be distinguishable from 
“Bee See Corporation” on the records of the secretary, the two 
names would be pronounced in the same way and so would not be 
treated as distinguishable by the Louisiana Secretary of State’s 
office.47 The Official Comment to the retained distinguishability 
provision explicitly acknowledges this practice and says that the 
retention of the existing standard is designed to allow that practice to 
continue.48  
However, the Comment explains that the principal function of 
the distinguishability standard is still to promote accuracy in record-
keeping, not to resolve trade name disputes.49 Like the Model Act, 
                                                                                                             
 43. The failure to include the number did not invalidate the articles or give 
the secretary of state grounds to reject them. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
12:24(B)(8) (repealed 2015). 
 44. Those rules include the required designation of corporate status, the 
prohibition of the use of listed words that suggest the corporation will operate 
some kind of financial or insurance business, the prohibition on language falsely 
suggesting a charitable, nonprofit or governmental character, and the requirement 
of prior approval from a state licensing body for the use of words suggesting a 
financial, engineering or architectural function. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-
401(A), (F), (G), (H) (Supp. 2015).  
 45. Id. § 12:1-401(B).  
 46. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 4.01(b) (2011). The Official Comment to this 
provision explains that the stated standard is designed principally to avoid 
confusion in the secretary of state’s records, and to provide for accuracy in the 
naming and serving of corporate defendants in litigation. Thus, the appropriate 
test for distinguishability is “confusion in an absolute or linguistic sense.” Id. 
cmt. 2. 
 47. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-401 cmts. e, f (Supp. 2015). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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the new Act in Louisiana provides that the Act “does not control 
the use of fictitious, assumed, or trade names.”50 Indeed, the new Act 
narrows each reference in the Model Act to the “use” of a corporate 
name to a use of the name “in [the corporation’s] filings with the 
secretary of state.”51 The narrower phrase is designed to avoid any 
suggestion that the “use” mentioned in the statute relates to the use of 
a name in a corporation’s business dealings.52 Moreover, the new 
rules eliminate the availability under the corporate statute of an 
injunction against the use of a name that does not satisfy the 
distinguishability standard.53 The Comments explain that competing 
claims to the use of the same or a similar name in business dealings 
are governed by trade name and unfair competition law, not 
corporation law.54  
Certificates of incorporation are not issued under the Act. Rather, 
the secretary returns a copy of the articles of incorporation, stamped 
with the filing date to show that it has been filed.55 The filing itself is 
conclusive proof that the corporation is duly incorporated.56 The new 
Act eliminates the requirement under former law that a multiple 
original or a certified copy of the incorporation documents be filed 
with the recorder of mortgages in the parish where the corporation’s 
registered office is located.57 However, the new Act retains the 
provision in former law58 that makes a corporation’s existence 
retroactive to the date that immovable property is acquired in the 
name of the corporation, subject to the interests of third persons 
acquired in the interim between the acquisition of the property and the 
date that the corporation is duly incorporated.59 The new Act also 
continues the approach of the former law60 to issues of de facto 
corporations and estoppel-to-deny-corporate-existence arguments.61 
                                                                                                             
 50. Id. § 12:1-401(E); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 4.01(e) (2011). 
 51. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1-401(C)–(D), 1-402(A) (Supp. 2015). 
 52. Id. § 12:1-401 cmt. g. 
 53. Id. § 12:1-401(A)(4), cmt. h. 
 54. Id. § 12:1-401 cmt. f. 
 55. Id. § 12:1-125(B). If a certificate is needed, any person may apply to the 
secretary of state to obtain a certificate of corporate existence and good standing. 
Id. § 12:1-128(A). That certificate operates as conclusive evidence that the 
corporation is in existence and, if the certificate so states, that the corporation is in 
good standing. Id. § 12:1-128(C).  
 56. Id. § 12:1-203(B). 
 57. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:25(D) (repealed 2015). 
 58. See id. § 12:25.1 (formerly governing relationship between retroactive 
existence of corporation and acquisition of immovable property).  
 59. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-203(C) (Supp. 2015). The Revision 
Comments attribute the source of section 12:1-203 to former Louisiana Revised 
Statute section 12:25.1. See id. § 12:1-203 cmt.  
 60. See former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:26 cmt. (repealed 2015). 
 61. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-204 cmt. (Supp. 2015). 
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Unlike the former law, the new Act explicitly requires that the 
initial directors of the corporation hold an organizational meeting for 
the new corporation at which officers are appointed and any other 
business brought before the meeting is carried out.62 Despite the 
reference to a “meeting” in the relevant provision, directors actually 
may take the contemplated actions (or any other action that would 
otherwise require a meeting) by means of unanimous written 
consent in lieu of a meeting, unless the articles of incorporation or 
bylaws provide otherwise.63 Among the other business that would 
typically be taken up in an organizational meeting (or in the 
equivalent written consents) would be the issuance of shares and the 
adoption of bylaws. But bylaws are not actually required, because 
the new Act, like the former law,64 makes bylaws optional.65 
PURPOSES AND POWERS; EMERGENCY POWERS 
The provisions of the new Act concerning a corporation’s 
purposes and powers, and the effects of the ultra vires doctrine, are 
essentially the same as those in the former law. The former law 
required that a statement of purposes be included in the articles of 
incorporation, but then suggested the “all lawful purposes” phrase 
that was most commonly used: to engage in any activity for which 
a corporation could be formed under the LBCL.66 The new Act 
makes a similar “all lawful business or activity” rule apply by default. 
Thus, the new Act requires a statement of purpose in the articles of 
incorporation only if the incorporators (or the shareholders through a 
later amendment) wish to impose some limitation on the broad 
purposes authorized by the default rule.67  
                                                                                                             
 62. Id. § 12:1-205(A)(1). If initial directors are not named in the articles of 
incorporation, the incorporators are required to call an organizational meeting at 
which a board of directors is elected, and that board is then required to complete 
the organization of the corporation. Id. § 12:1-205(A)(2). 
 63. Id. § 12:1-821(A). No similar rule of general applicability applies to 
actions by incorporators, so the provision on the organizational meeting itself 
allows the incorporators to elect the board of directors by unanimous written 
consent in lieu of a meeting. Id. § 12:1-205(B).  
 64. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:28 (repealed 2015) (noting that 
“board of directors may make and alter” bylaws). 
 65. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1-206, 1-1020(B) (Supp. 2015) (noting that 
board of directors “may” adopt bylaws).  
 66. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:24(B)(2) (repealed 2015).  
 67. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-301(A) (Supp. 2015). The source provision 
in the Model Act refers only to any lawful business, without mentioning 
activities. The Louisiana drafters added the word “activity” to the provision to 
make it consistent with the existing rule, and to recognize that a business 
corporation could be used for purposes, such as holding assets, that might not be 
considered a “business” in the usual sense of that term. Id. § 12:1-301(A) cmt. 
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The new Act also supplies an “all powers” clause and a non-
exclusive listing of specific powers that are intended to supply the 
corporation with all powers “necessary or convenient” to carry out 
its business and affairs.68 The new Act omits a provision from the 
former law that recognized the power of a corporation to provide 
inter-corporate guarantees among a parent corporation and its 
wholly-owned subsidiaries.69 But a Revision Comment explains 
that the earlier rule was dropped to avoid the unintended negative 
implication that a corporation possesses the power to issue inter-
corporate guarantees in that setting only.70  
The new Act covers emergency powers differently from the 
former law. The former law merely empowered the board of directors 
to adopt emergency bylaws and focused on emergencies arising from 
such Cold War concerns as an attack upon the United States or an 
atomic or nuclear disaster.71 The new Act contains self-operative 
provisions that certainly could be triggered by a nuclear disaster, but 
the new provisions were drafted in the aftermath of Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita and are thus more focused on the disruptive effects 
of those more familiar types of disasters.  
The new provisions make no attempt to predict the types of 
actions that the management of a corporation may need to take in 
response to an emergency.72 Instead, the emergency rules are 
designed to overcome the communication and transportation 
difficulties that often arise in connection with catastrophic events, 
and empower the board to take action with as much compliance 
with the usual notification and quorum rules as it is practicable to 
achieve under the circumstances. Moreover, in view of the 
relatively short-term nature of the communication disruptions 
caused even by major hurricanes, the new rules are designed to 
                                                                                                             
 68. Id. § 12:1-302. 
 69. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:41(C) (repealed 2015). 
 70. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-302 cmt. f (Supp. 2015). 
 71. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:28(C) (repealed 2015). The former 
provision did include a more general reference to “any catastrophe or other 
similar emergency condition,” but it specifically listed only the Cold War types 
of events as examples of the emergencies it contemplated. Id. 
 72. Subsection (a) of the source Model Act provision does appear to address 
particular steps the board may wish to take, such as relocating the corporation’s 
principal office, but those are steps that the board could take without regard to 
whether an emergency existed. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02(a) (2011). 
Although the provisions of model subsection (a) seemed unnecessary, they also 
seemed harmless, so they were retained as part of the new Act in Louisiana, both 
to harmonize the Louisiana law with the Model Act and to avoid any implication 
that the listed steps were being rejected in some way. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
12:1-302(A) (Supp. 2015). The rules that really do make a difference in the 
event of an emergency are provided in subsections (B) and (C) of section 1-302. 
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work only when and for as long as they are needed, to minimize 
the risk that an emergency might be used as an excuse to usurp 
control over a corporation that was actually capable of managing 
its affairs under the normal rules.  
SHARES—PERMISSIBLE TERMS, ISSUANCE, 
TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS 
The new Act is permissive and enabling in its approach to the 
terms that may be included as part of an investor’s share contract 
with the corporation. Among the permitted terms for shares under 
the Act are those that deny, limit, or provide special forms of 
voting rights;73 entitle the holder to distributions that are calculated 
in any manner and with preference over any other class or series;74 
or make the shares redeemable or convertible at the option of the 
corporation, the shareholder, or another person.75 And like the 
LBCL, the new Act authorizes what are sometimes called “blank” 
shares or “blank check” shares, i.e., shares with terms that may be 
established by the board under a special rule that allows the board 
to adopt the appropriate amendment of the articles of incorporation 
on its own without a vote of the corporation’s existing 
shareholders.76  
The closest that this part of the Act comes to mandatory rules 
are its requirements (1) that any differences in the otherwise 
identical rights of shares be stated in the articles of incorporation 
before any shares of the affected class or series are issued,77 (2) 
that a distinguishing designation (such as Class A and Class B, or 
common and preferred) be stated in the articles if the corporation 
does choose to authorize the issuance of shares with differing 
rights,78 and (3) that the articles of incorporation authorize shares 
                                                                                                             
 73. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-601(C)(1) (Supp. 2015). The denial of 
voting rights by the terms of the articles of incorporation is overridden in some 
cases by statutory rules that provide voting rights for certain decisions even if 
the affected shares are otherwise not entitled to vote. For example, if a proposed 
amendment of the articles of incorporation would change the rights or 
preference of a class or series of shares, the amendment would require the 
approval of that class or series, voting as a separate voting group, even if the 
shares of that class held no voting rights under the terms of the articles of 
incorporation. Id. § 12:1-1004(A)(3), (D). 
 74. Id. § 12:1-601(C)(3)–(4). 
 75. Id. § 12:1-601(C)(2). 
 76. Id. § 12:1-602. 
 77. Id. § 12:1-601(A). 
 78. Id. 
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that, taken together, hold unlimited voting rights and the right to 
receive the net assets of the corporation upon dissolution.79  
The first two rules are mandatory only in the sense that they 
state what must be done to change the default rule that would 
otherwise provide identical rights to all shares. The third rule is 
arguably mandatory in the more normal sense of imposing a duty 
on the corporation.80 Still, it is difficult to see how the rule actually 
could be enforced in practice,81 except as a rule of construction that 
would operate similarly to the first two rules. To the extent that 
any voting or distributional rights were left unassigned as a formal 
matter, the rights would be allocated identically, by the default 
rule, among those shares that were not excluded from participation 
in the relevant rights by the applicable terms of the articles of 
incorporation. 
The new Act is similar to the LBCL in giving the board of 
directors the power to determine when, to whom, and for what 
consideration to issue the corporation’s shares.82 In most other 
                                                                                                             
 79. Id. § 12:1-601(B). 
 80. The Official Comment to this provision in the Model Act appears to 
treat the provision as mandatory. The Comment says that the provision 
“requires” every corporation to comply with it, and that the provision “ensures 
that there is always in existence one or more classes or series of shares which 
share in the ultimate residual interests in the corporation and which are entitled 
to elect a board of directors and make other fundamental decisions with respect 
to the corporation.” MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.01 cmt. 2 (2011). 
 81. Although it is theoretically possible that the secretary of state’s office 
could reject the filing of articles that did not allocate a corporation’s voting and 
distributional rights in the exhaustive way required by the statute, it is nearly 
inconceivable that it would ever do so. The issue would arise only in the context 
of a corporation with classified share provisions that were so complicated that 
the drafting lawyers had mistakenly failed to allocate all rights exhaustively. To 
trigger a rejection, the clerical employees in the secretary’s office who were 
processing the filing of the document would first have to engage in a substantive 
interpretation of the document (something they could not reasonably be 
expected to do), and then catch the error that the drafting lawyers had missed. 
Alternatively, a shareholder in the corporation might attempt to obtain a writ of 
mandamus that ordered the corporation to engage in the allocation of rights 
required by the statute. But again, it is nearly inconceivable that a court would 
order the board of directors and the shareholders of a corporation to adopt 
amendments of the corporation’s articles of incorporation that would allocate 
formally undistributed rights in some fashion for which no legal standard of 
allocation exists, except for the identical rights rule. And if the identical rights 
rule were the controlling standard, the court would be far more likely to resolve 
the issue by interpreting the existing articles and the statute in accordance with 
that rule than to issue a writ that would order the board and shareholders to 
implement the default rule by means of a formal amendment of the articles.  
 82. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-621 (Supp. 2015). The shareholders hold 
the share issuance power only if it is reserved to them in the articles of 
incorporation. Id. § 12:1-621(A). The LBCL provided similar rules in former 
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respects, however, the share-issuance rules in the new Act differ 
markedly from those in the LBCL. The board is no longer required, as 
it was under the LBCL, to issue shares for at least their par value,83 to 
state a dollar value for the consideration received,84 to allocate the 
consideration received between the required stated capital and capital 
surplus accounts,85 or to reject consideration consisting of promissory 
notes or contracts for future services.86 Under the new Act, the 
board may authorize the issuance of shares in exchange for any 
form of property or benefit to the corporation, explicitly including 
the promissory notes and contracts for future services that were 
unlawful forms of consideration under earlier corporation law.87 
The board is required only to determine that the consideration to be 
received for the shares is “adequate.”88 Once the board-approved 
consideration is received by the corporation, the shares are 
considered to be fully paid and nonassessable.89 
Unless prohibited by the articles of incorporation, the board of 
directors may also issue shares without any consideration as part of 
a share dividend in which shares are issued pro rata to the 
corporation’s existing shareholders.90 If the shares being issued as 
a dividend are of a different class or series from those held by the 
shareholder receiving the shares, then the dividend must be 
                                                                                                             
 
Revised Statutes section 12:52(A). See former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:52 
(repealed 2015). In one type of share-issuance transaction, the new Act does add 
a shareholder-approval requirement that did not exist under the LBCL. 
Shareholders are required to approve an issuance transaction if shares, or other 
securities convertible into or exercisable for shares, are to be issued in exchange 
for something other than cash or cash equivalents and if the shares or securities 
to be issued (assuming full conversion or exercise of the non-share securities) 
will comprise more than 20% of the voting power of the shares that were 
outstanding immediately prior to the transaction. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-
621(F) (Supp. 2015). 
 83. See former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:52(A) (repealed 2015).  
 84. Id. 
 85. See id. § 12:61(A). 
 86. See id. § 12:52(C). 
 87. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-621(B) (Supp. 2015).  
 88. Id. § 12:1-621(C). 
 89. Id. § 12:1-621(D). 
 90. Id. § 12:1-623(A). Although this type of pro-rata share issuance is 
ordinarily called a “share dividend,” it is not subject to the legal requirements 
applicable to what the new Act calls a “distribution,” i.e., a dividend of cash or 
property or a share repurchase. The term “distribution” is defined to exclude a 
transfer by a corporation of its own shares. Id. § 12:1-140(6). This is a change in 
the law. Under the LBCL, because of the need under the par-value-based system 
to allocate consideration to the stated capital account for all issued shares, a 
dividend of shares was subjected to the same rules as were dividends of cash or 
property. See former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:63(A) (repealed 2015).  
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approved by shareholders of the class or series to be distributed, 
unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise or unless no 
shares of that class or series are outstanding at the time of the 
dividend.91  
In one respect, the new share-issuance rules are more restrictive 
than those in the LBCL. Under prior law, it was possible for the 
board to issue authorized shares without shareholder approval even 
in a transaction that would result in a change of control of the 
company. A smaller company, for example, could act as the nominal 
buyer of a larger company’s assets, issuing shares to the selling 
company in exchange for the seller’s assets. The nominal seller in 
this transaction could end up receiving enough shares to give it 
control over the nominal buyer, as it would be contributing a 
majority of the value to the combined firm.92 In economic reality, 
the nominal seller would be acquiring the smaller company, but the 
smaller company’s shareholders would not have been entitled to 
vote on the transaction under the LBCL.93 The new Act gives 
shareholders the right to vote in this and other similar types of 
transactions. Shareholders are entitled to vote on the issuance of 
shares94 if the shares are to be issued in exchange for something 
other than cash or cash equivalents and if the number of shares to be 
issued in the transaction95 is greater than 20% of the shares that 
were outstanding immediately before the transaction.96  
                                                                                                             
 91. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-623(B) (Supp. 2015).  
 92. Consider this example: Buyer Corporation, with a total net worth of $5 
million, agrees to buy substantially all of the assets (and to assume substantially 
all of the liabilities) of Seller Corporation, which has a total net worth of $15 
million. Buyer Corporation pays for the assets of Seller Corporation through the 
issuance of Buyer Corporation shares worth $15 million. When this transaction 
is carried out, Seller Corporation will own three times as many shares in Buyer 
Corporation as all of Buyer’s other shareholders, thus making Buyer a 75% 
owned subsidiary of Seller.  
 93. If the selling company was selling substantially all of its assets, its own 
shareholders would have been entitled to vote. But shareholders were entitled to 
vote in this type of transaction only if their company was acting as a seller, not 
buyer. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:121(B) (repealed 2015). This difference 
in voting rights made it a simple matter to deny voting rights to shareholders in the 
smaller firm, simply by treating it as the buyer in the transaction. Some states 
recognize a de facto merger doctrine that would preclude that result. See, e.g., 
Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 143 A.2d 25, 31 (Pa. 1958). Delaware, by contrast, has 
rejected the use of the de facto merger theory for that purpose. See, e.g., Hariton v. 
Arco Elecs., Inc., 188 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. 1963). Louisiana courts have not ruled 
on the question.  
 94. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-621(F)(1) (Supp. 2015). The same rule is 
triggered by the issuance of other types of securities that are convertible into or 
exercisable for voting shares. Id. 
 95. The rule also applies to a series of integrated transactions. Id. § 12:1-
621(F)(1). A series of transactions is integrated if consummation of one 
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The new Act deals with preemptive rights97 in much the same 
way as did the LBCL, but the new Act changes a few details and adds 
a few new rules to deal with issues on which the former law was 
silent. The rights continue to be “opt in,” i.e., available only if the 
articles of incorporation provide for them.98 And corporations formed 
before January 1, 1969—when the law provided automatically for 
preemptive rights unless a company’s articles rejected them—
continue to be covered by a grandfathering provision that deems the 
articles of pre-1969 companies to provide for preemptive rights.99 
Under the default statutory rules, the rights apply only to shares issued 
for money.100 If the rights apply, they require existing shareholders to 
be given a brief period within which to purchase the shares, and 
then allow the corporation to sell any shares not purchased by the 
shareholders at the same or a higher price for a one-year period 
after the shares were offered to the shareholders.101  
However, the preemptive period provided under the new Act 
will generally be longer than the 15-day period specified in the 
LBCL.102 Under the new Act, the corporation must provide a “fair 
and reasonable opportunity” to the shareholders to exercise their 
                                                                                                             
 
transaction is made contingent on the consummation of one or more other 
transactions. Id. § 12:1-621(F)(2)(b). 
 96. Id. § 12:1-621(F)(1)(b). 
 97. Preemptive rights entitle existing shareholders to the first opportunity to 
purchase a proportionate part of a new issue of shares. See id. § 12:1-630(B)(1).  
 98. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-630(A) (Supp. 2015), with former 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:72(A) (repealed 2015). 
 99. The placement of the relevant provision differs. In the new Act, it is 
placed in the provision dealing with preemptive rights themselves, and not, as in 
the LBCL, in a provision dealing generally with permissible provisions in a 
corporation’s articles of incorporation. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-
630(A) (Supp. 2015), with LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:24(C)(1) (repealed 2015). 
The change in placement was designed to make it more likely that the relevant 
provision would be found.  
 100. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-630(B)(3)(d) (Supp. 2015), with 
former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:72(A)(2)(a) (repealed 2015). Both the new 
and former laws provided other exceptions, such as shares issued as 
compensation for services and shares issued upon conversion of another 
security, but the additional exceptions just provided specific examples of the 
more general principle that limited preemptive rights to shares not issued for 
cash. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-630(B)(3) (Supp. 2015), with 
former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:72(A)(2) (repealed 2015). 
 101. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-630(B)(6) (Supp. 2015), with 
former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:72(A)(3) (repealed 2015).  
 102. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:72(A)(1) (repealed 2015). Because 
common shares typically do have voting power and preferred shares often do 
not, the former voting shares rule could have had some effect on cross-class 
preemptive rights.  
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preemptive rights, subject to a safe-harbor rule that deems a period of 
at least 45 days to satisfy the statutory standard.103 The new Act also 
deals with what might be called “cross-class” preemptive rights with 
greater detail than the LBCL. Under the LBCL, preemptive rights 
were held only by the owners of voting shares, and they applied only 
to the issuance of voting shares.104 The new Act effectively grants 
preemptive rights only to holders of common shares and then only for 
other common shares. Common shareholders are denied preemptive 
rights on preferred shares (unless the preferred shares are convertible 
into common shares),105 and preferred shareholders are denied 
preemptive rights altogether.106 The new Act also adopts new (and 
shorter) prescriptive and peremptive periods for preemptive rights.107  
The new Act largely retains the share-certificate and transfer-
restriction provisions from the LBCL, as the LBCL was itself 
amended in 2005108 to adopt a modified version of the Model Act 
provisions that were adopted again as part of the new Act.109 
                                                                                                             
 103. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-630(B)(1) (Supp. 2015). An official 
Revision Comment explains that the corporation would bear the burden of 
proving that a period shorter than 45 days did provide a fair and reasonable 
opportunity to the shareholders to exercise their preemptive rights. Id. cmt. b.  
 104. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:72(A)(1) (repealed 2015). 
 105. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-630(B)(5) (Supp. 2015). 
 106. Id. § 12:1-630(B)(4). The new Act avoids the use of the terms 
“common” and “preferred” shares, because of the large variation that may exist 
in the contractual rights of shares denominated either way in practice. MODEL 
BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.01 cmt. (2011). The text is using the term “common” shares 
to mean shares that are described in the relevant preemptive rights provision as 
holding general voting rights, but no preferential rights to distributions or assets. 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-630(B)(5) (Supp. 2015). The term “preferred” 
shares is used to refer to shares without general voting rights, but with 
preferential rights to distributions or assets. Id. § 12:1-630(B)(4). 
 107. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-630(D) (Supp. 2015). The new periods 
become effective on January 1, 2016. Id.  
 108. See Act No. 97, 2005 La. Acts 1109.  
 109. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:57, 58 (repealed 2015). The LBCL 
contained a technical error that created a conflict between subsections (A) and 
(G) of former section 12:57. Unlike its counterpart in the Model Act, subsection 
(A) of the Louisiana provision dropped the traditional requirement of share 
certificates only for corporations that were participants in the Direct Registration 
System, or its successor, the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation 
(essentially, publicly traded corporations using a book-entry system of share 
ownership documentation). Compare MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.26 (2011), 
with former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:57(A) (repealed 2015). But subsection 
(G) overlooked the limitation of subsection (A), and simply provided without 
limitation that a corporation’s board of directors could issue some shares with 
certificates and other shares without certificates. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
12:57(G) (repealed 2015). Subsection (G) was a virtual copy of section 626 of 
the Model Act, which was designed simply to make the point in the Model Act 
that the corporation was not required to make the same choice about share 
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Louisiana’s version of the Model Act provisions imposes a 
limitation that is not present in the Model Act. The Model Act 
allows all corporations to choose whether to utilize share certificates 
to represent their issued shares,110 but the analogous Louisiana 
provisions provide this choice only to corporations that are 
participants in the Direct Registration System of the Depository 
Trust & Clearing Corporation, or in a similar book entry system 
used in the trading of shares of public corporations.111  
Because most Louisiana corporations are closely held, the 
practical effect of this limitation on the Model Act rule is to require 
most Louisiana corporations to continue to issue certificates for their 
shares. The certificate requirement was retained for closely held 
corporations because the certificates provide a convenient and 
reliable means of perfecting security interests in the shares and of 
notifying third parties of any transfer restrictions applicable to the 
shares.112 However, the Revision Comments point out that the 
statutory requirement of share certificates is a duty imposed by law 
on the corporation, not a defense that may be asserted by the 
corporation against a person who genuinely owns shares for which 
the corporation has failed to issue a certificate.113 
DISTRIBUTIONS—DIVIDENDS AND SHARE REPURCHASES 
Like most corporation statutes adopted before 1980, the LBCL 
imposed financial restrictions both on the payment of dividends 
and on the repurchase of shares that were based in major part on 
the par-value-based system of corporate capital. Under that system, 
                                                                                                             
 
certificates for all of its shares; some shares could be represented by certificates 
while others were not. Compare MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.26 (2011), with 
former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:57(G) (repealed 2015). The lack of any 
restriction on the application of this freedom-of-choice rule in the Model Act 
provision was consistent with the Model Act approach, which allowed all 
corporations to issue shares without certificates, but inconsistent with 
Louisiana’s decision to limit this freedom of choice to certain publicly traded 
corporations. The new Act corrects this error by limiting the operation of the 
analogous new provision to those corporations that are eligible to issue shares 
without certificates. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-626(A) (Supp. 2015). 
Language was also modified to change the reference to a possible “successor” 
registration system to a “similar” registration system, to prevent the rule from 
being technically narrower than was justified by the underlying purpose of the 
rule. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-625(A) (Supp. 2015).  
 110. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.25(a) (2011). 
 111. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-625(A) (Supp. 2015). 
 112. Id. cmt. b. 
 113. Id. cmt. c. 
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a statement about par value was required in a corporation’s articles 
of incorporation,114 par value shares could not be sold for less than 
par value (paid in an acceptable form of consideration),115 and the 
aggregate of the par value of all issued shares had to be included in 
a statutorily required stated capital account.116 The stated capital 
account then restricted the amount a corporation could lawfully 
pay to shareholders either in dividends or in share repurchases. 
Payments of that kind were lawful only to the extent that the 
payments did not cause the net worth of the company to become 
less than the amount of its stated capital account.117 In effect, a 
corporation could pay a dividend only to the extent that its net 
worth exceeded the aggregate of the par value of its issued shares. 
In early practice, when shares were generally sold at par value, 
the effect of the par-value-based system was to prevent shareholders 
from taking back any of the capital that they had invested in the 
corporation through the payments they made for their shares.118 The 
share payments created an “equity cushion” for the benefit of 
creditors: If the corporation lost money, it was the shareholders’ 
                                                                                                             
 114. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:24(B)(5) (repealed 2015). The 
statement did not have to establish a par value; it could say that the corporation’s 
shares were “without par value.” Id. But that approach did not avoid application 
of the par-value-based system of corporate capital. When shares without par 
value were issued, the board was required to allocate some part of the 
consideration to the stated capital account, in much the same way that the sale of 
par value shares would result in the allocation of the par value portion of the 
consideration received to the stated capital account. Id. § 12:61(A). Nominal par 
was the better approach, practically speaking, as it eliminated the risk that the 
board would overlook the need to allocate at least a minuscule portion of the 
issuance price to stated capital. The use of no-par shares did eliminate the need 
to meet a minimum price requirement (par value) on the issuance of the shares. 
But nominal par would set the minimum price so low—say, at a penny—that the 
minimum price was practically irrelevant. 
 115. Id. § 12:52(A), (C). 
 116. Id. §§ 12:1(B), 12:1(T), 12:61(A). 
 117. Dividends could be paid only out of “surplus.” Id. § 12:63(A). “Surplus” 
was defined as assets minus the sum of liabilities and stated capital. Id. § 
12:1(V). Assets minus liabilities alone would have produced total net worth. 
Subtracting stated capital as well made that part of the corporation’s total net 
worth unavailable for dividends. In addition to the surplus requirement, the 
corporation was also required to comply with a cash-flow solvency test: after 
taking the dividend or share repurchase into account, the corporation had to be 
able to pay its debts as they became due in the usual course of business. Id. §§ 
12:1(L), 12:63(A). 
 118. The stated capital account did not assure creditors that the corporation 
actually had a net worth at least as large as that account. The corporation 
certainly could suffer losses in its operations that resulted in the corporation’s 
having a negative net worth. The stated capital account merely restricted the 
ability of shareholders to take money out of the corporation in the form of 
dividends and share repurchases.  
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money that was lost first. Whatever was left of the shareholders’ 
investments after those losses would still be available to pay the 
creditors’ claims.  
However, corporations eventually came to realize that they 
could avoid the restrictions imposed by the par value system by 
issuing shares with only nominal par values—say, $0.01 per share, 
for shares that were sold for $100 each. The same rules still 
applied, but they applied to amounts of money that were so small 
that the rules became economically meaningless. 
The widespread adoption of nominal-par-value shares led to the 
Model Act’s elimination of the mandatory par value system in 
1980.119 Corporations were no longer required to state a par value 
for their shares, to maintain a stated capital account, or to limit 
dividends or share repurchase transactions to the amount by which 
the company’s net worth exceeded the amount in the stated capital 
account. Corporations were also permitted to accept promissory 
notes and contracts for future services in exchange for their shares.  
The new Act in Louisiana adopts all of those Model Act 
changes. The traditional dual-solvency test (requiring both cash-
flow and net worth solvency) still applies but now without any 
adjustment of the net worth, or “balance sheet,” part of the test to 
take account of stated capital. If a corporation is able to pay its 
debts as they become due in the usual course of business, after 
taking the dividend or share repurchase into account,120 then it may 
lawfully make those payments to the full extent of its net worth.121 
For corporations with nominal-par shares,122 this change will make 
                                                                                                             
 119. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.21 cmt. (2011). 
 120. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-640(C)(1) (Supp. 2015). 
 121. Id. § 12:1-640(C)(2). If the corporation has preferred shares outstanding, 
i.e., shares with preferential rights to distributions upon dissolution, the dividend 
or share repurchases are subject to an additional limitation that is designed to 
protect the liquidation preferences of the preferred shares in much the same way 
that the normal net worth test protects the interests of creditors. The 
corporation’s net worth available for dividends is calculated by subtracting from 
the value of the corporation’s assets both liabilities and the liquidation 
preferences owed to any class of shares whose preferences are senior to those of 
the class receiving the distribution. In effect, the liquidation preferences are 
treated as liabilities for purposes of calculating the net worth available for 
distribution to more junior classes of shares. Id. The LBCL provided a similar 
rule in the case of share repurchases, but, curiously, not in the case of dividends. 
See former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:55(A), 12:63(A) (repealed 2015). 
Because the new Act treats both dividends and share repurchases as 
“distributions” that are subject to the same financial restrictions, the new Act 
applies the liquidation preference rule to both forms of payment. See LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1-140(6), 1-640(C) (Supp. 2015).  
 122. If the articles of a corporation stated that its shares were without par 
value, the board was still required to allocate some part of the purchase price to 
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little financial difference, as it makes only a nominal amount of 
additional money available for dividends. But that is the very 
reason that the Model Act abolished the par value system: The old 
system required careful attention to a number of complicated 
statutory rules that served little to no practical purpose.123 Under 
the Model Act approach, which is now adopted in Louisiana, most 
corporations will achieve about the same result as under the old 
rules, but in a far simpler fashion.  
The new approach also abolishes the need to deal with 
“treasury shares” and “nimble dividends.” Treasury shares were 
issued shares that had been repurchased by the corporation but not 
cancelled.124 When shares were cancelled, stated capital was 
reduced by the par value of the cancelled shares, and the shares 
returned to unissued status.125 Because cancelled shares became 
unissued, when the corporation sold them again, it was considered 
to be “issuing” the shares and thus had to comply with the 
minimum-price and form-of-consideration rules that applied to that 
kind of transaction.126 In contrast, when a corporation resold 
uncancelled “treasury shares,” it was not issuing the shares—
treasury shares retained their status as issued shares and their par 
value was already reflected in the stated capital account—so the 
corporation could “dispose” of the shares for any consideration 
fixed from time to time by the board of directors.127 Because the 
Model Act abolishes the par value and form-of-consideration rules 
that led to the need to distinguish treasury shares from repurchased 
and cancelled shares, it also eliminates treasury shares. Under the 
new Act, all repurchased shares will become unissued shares.128  
                                                                                                             
 
stated capital. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:61(A) (repealed 2015). In that 
case, the statement in the text would apply in any case in which only a nominal 
portion of the purchase price for the shares was allocated to stated capital.  
 123. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.21 cmt. (2011) (“Practitioners and legal 
scholars have long recognized that the statutory structure embodying ‘par value’ 
and ‘legal capital’ concepts is not only complex and confusing but also fails to 
serve the original purpose of protecting creditors and senior security holders 
from payments to junior security holders. Indeed, to the extent security holders 
are led to believe that it provides this protection, these provisions may be 
affirmatively misleading.”). 
 124. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1(X) (repealed 2015).  
 125. Id. §§ 12:61(D), 12:55(D).  
 126. Id. § 12:52(A), (C).  
 127. Id. § 12:52(A).  
 128. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-631(A) (Supp. 2015). If the articles of 
incorporation prohibit the reissuance of repurchased shares, the number of 
authorized shares is reduced by the number of shares that were repurchased. Id. 
§ 12:1-631(B). 
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Although the statute did not use the term “nimble dividends,” 
that term was commonly used to describe dividends that could be 
made out of current or recent earnings despite the lack of sufficient 
surplus.129 But even nimble dividends could be paid only to the 
extent of the corporation’s positive net worth.130 So, in effect, what 
was special about nimble dividends was that they operated as an 
exception to the normal rule that dividends could not be paid if 
such a payment would “invade” or “impair” stated capital, i.e., 
cause the corporation’s net worth to fall below the amount in its 
stated capital account (or further reduce net worth that was already 
below that amount). Because the new Act makes no attempt to 
create or protect a stated capital account, and because dividends 
are always permissible to the full extent of the corporation’s net 
worth (assuming the cash flow and preferred share rules are also 
satisfied),131 the new Act contains nothing like the old nimble 
dividend rule. 
The new Act makes two other important changes to the dividend 
and share-repurchase rules. First, the Act explicitly permits 
something that was at least questionable under traditional corporate 
capital rules: to make a decision about the lawfulness of a dividend 
on the basis of something other than the corporation’s accounting 
statements. The new Act permits the board to determine the 
corporation’s compliance with the statutory dividend restrictions 
based either on financial statements that are prepared using 
reasonable accounting practices and principles,132 or on a “fair 
valuation or other method that is reasonable in the 
                                                                                                             
 129. See MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 9, § 25.06, at 641–42. 
 130. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:63(B) (repealed 2015). Nimble 
dividends were also subject to a rule protecting the liquidation preference of 
preferred shares, something that otherwise applied only to share repurchases, not 
ordinary dividends. Id.  
 131. The payment is also subject to the cash-flow solvency test and to the 
protection of the liquidation preferences of preferred shares, if any. LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 12:1-640(C) (Supp. 2015).  
 132. The “reasonableness” standard is designed not to require that the 
statements be prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles, or “GAAP.” The Official Comment to the source provision in the 
Model Act explains that GAAP statements are always “reasonable in the 
circumstances,” and that boards of directors should “in all circumstances” be 
entitled to rely upon GAAP financial statements. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40 
cmt. 4(A) (2011). However, the comment notes that many smaller and closely 
held corporations do not prepare GAAP financial statements, and that the 
statutory standard of reasonableness is designed to provide “a reasonable degree 
of flexibility and to accommodate the needs of the many different types of 
business corporations which might be subject to [the dividend] provisions, 
including in particular closely held corporations.” Id. 
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circumstances.”133 The effect of the “fair valuation” approach is to 
break the connection between a corporation’s net worth for 
dividend purposes from the “historic cost” approach taken to the 
recordation of asset values under most accounting principles. The 
Model Act approach, which is now adopted in Louisiana, permits 
the use of appraisal and current-value methods to determine the 
amount available for distribution.134  
The second of the two changes is the provision concerning the 
time at which the compliance of a distribution with the statutory 
net worth and cash flow solvency tests is to be determined. In most 
cases, when a dividend is paid shortly after it is authorized by the 
board, the timing question will not matter; the corporation’s 
financial condition will be substantially the same at both the time 
of payment and the time of authorization. However, recall that a 
repurchase of shares is subject to the same financial restrictions as 
a dividend. In the case of a share repurchase, particularly of a large 
percentage interest in a closely held corporation, the corporation 
may not have the cash available to make an immediate payment in 
full for the repurchased shares. In that situation, the shareholder 
may agree to sell his shares in exchange for a promissory note that 
calls for installment payments to be made over the course of 
several years.  
The question then can arise whether the dividend tests to be 
applied when the share-repurchase note is first issued, or each time 
that any payment under the note is made. If the tests apply to each 
payment, the selling shareholder-turned-creditor may find that the 
corporation has a statutory defense to the enforcement of the note. 
The shareholder’s interest as creditor of the corporation may be 
automatically (and surprisingly) subordinated to the claims of all 
other corporate creditors. 
Unfortunately for selling shareholders, the limited jurisprudence 
on this issue that was decided under the LBCL held that the 
dividend tests were indeed to be applied to each payment.135 The 
new Act, like the Model Act, rejects that approach. Under the new 
Act, when indebtedness is issued in a share repurchase transaction, 
                                                                                                             
 133. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-640(D) (Supp. 2015). The Official 
Comment to the source provision in the Model Act makes it clear that the board 
is entitled to rely upon reasonably current financial statements prepared using 
generally accepted accounting principles in making its determination. MODEL 
BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40 cmt. 4(A) (2011). 
 134. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40 cmt. 4(B) (2011). 
 135. See Sec. Ctr. Prot. Servs., Inc. v. All-Pro Sec., Inc., 650 So. 2d 1206, 
1212 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Collins v. Universal Parts Co., 260 So. 2d 702, 705 
(La. Ct. App. 1972); In re La. Indus. Coatings, Inc., 31 B.R. 688, 693–94 
(Bankr. E.D. La. 1983).  
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the compliance of that distribution with the statute’s financial 
standards is determined at the earlier of the time that the 
indebtedness is distributed or the time that the shareholder ceases to 
be a shareholder of the acquired shares.136 Moreover, the 
indebtedness distributed to the shareholder in such a transaction is 
declared to be “at parity” with the corporation’s other general, 
unsecured debt, except to the extent that it is subordinated by 
agreement.137 
SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY 
The LBCL organized its liability rules for various kinds of 
corporate participants—shareholders, directors, and officers—into a 
separate section devoted specifically to liability rules.138 Like the 
Model Act, the new Act addresses the liability of each type of 
participant in the part of the Act that addresses that type of actor. The 
rules concerning shareholder liability are provided in section 1-622.139  
The most important of the shareholder liability rules, of course, is 
the basic rule against shareholder liability. The new Act expresses this 
rule simply and without exception: A shareholder is not personally 
liable for the acts or debts of the corporation.140 The simplicity of this 
statement was designed to avoid the enormous confusion and 
uncertainty that has been created by the non-liability provisions of the 
limited liability company law.141 The drafters of the LLC statute 
attempted to draft an all-encompassing non-liability rule for all types 
of LLC participants—not just owners—that has ended up backfiring 
and actually weakening the protections provided by the LLC 
statute.142  
The Louisiana version of the non-liability rule deletes two phrases 
from the source Model Act provision. The first would have made the 
non-liability rule subject to contrary provisions in the articles of 
incorporation. Louisiana deleted this phrase because it also deleted 
the provision that permits personal liability to be undertaken by 
                                                                                                             
 136. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-640(E)(1) (Supp. 2015). A similar rule 
applies to a distribution of indebtedness as a dividend, i.e., without any 
surrender by the recipients of shares, except that only one date applies: the date 
that the debt is distributed. Id. § 12:1-640(E)(2). 
 137. Id. § 12:1-640(F).  
 138. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:91–96 (repealed 2015). 
 139. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-622 (Supp. 2015). 
 140. Id. § 12:1-622(A). 
 141. Id. § 12:1320. See Ogea v. Merritt, 130 So. 3d 888 (La. 2013); see also 
Thomas Bourgeois, Comment, Mirror, Mirror: Amending Louisiana’s LLC 
Statutes Related to Personal Liability of Members to Match Corporate 
Couterparts after Ogea v. Merritt, 76 LA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).  
 142. See, e.g., Ogea, 130 So. 3d 888; see also Bourgeois, supra note 141.  
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shareholders through provisions in the articles of incorporation.143 
The drafting committee recognized that the shareholders of a closely 
held corporation often do undertake personal liability for their 
corporation’s debts, through personal guarantees, but they did not 
want to create the risk that this type of liability could be assumed 
inadvertently through unusual provisions in the corporation’s articles 
of incorporation.144  
The second phrase deleted from the Model Act provision would 
have stated an “exception” to the general rule of non-liability.145 The 
exception stated that a shareholder could become liable by reason of 
his own acts or conduct.146 That phrase was deleted to avoid the 
confusion about personal liability that has arisen as a result of similar 
language in Louisiana’s LLC statute. The Revision Comments 
explain that the deletion of the phrase was not intended to reject the 
idea that a shareholder could become personally liable in connection 
with acts carried out in operating the corporation’s business.147 
However, that liability would not arise from the imposition of the 
corporation’s debt on the shareholder. Rather, the liability would arise 
from personal duties imposed under other bodies of law, such as tort 
law and contract law, and so would not operate as an exception to the 
simple corporate law rule that a shareholder is not personally liable 
for the debts of the corporation.148 
SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS AND CONSENTS 
The provisions of the new Act concerning shareholder 
meetings, or written consents in lieu of a meeting, make few 
                                                                                                             
 143. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-622 cmt. b (Supp. 2015). 
 144. Id. § 12:1-202 cmt. b.  
 145. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22(b) (2011). 
 146. Id.  
 147. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-622 cmt. c (Supp. 2015). 
 148. Id. This distinction is not a matter of theoretical nitpicking. The 
rejection of the personal conduct “exception” is designed to make it clear that a 
shareholder may be held liable for his or her own personal conduct only if that 
liability could be imposed, based on the same conduct, on someone who was not 
a corporate shareholder. To recover under this approach, a claimant should be 
required to prove all of the elements of a legal claim against the defendant, 
entirely outside of corporate law, and without relying on the misguided notion 
that the corporation statute itself imposes personal liability on a corporate 
shareholder merely because the shareholder has engaged in “personal conduct” 
in operating the corporation’s business. If the corporation statute were to impose 
liability in that vague and open-ended fashion, only passive investors really 
could count on the statute’s “normal” rule against shareholder liability. The 
more typical, actively engaged owner/manager of a closely held corporation 
would be exposed to personal liability fairly routinely, in connection with all of 
the corporate acts and debts in which his personal conduct had played some role.  
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changes to the substance of the former law. Shareholders must 
make their collective decisions either through properly convened149 
and properly noticed150 meetings at which a quorum of shareholders 
is present in person or by proxy,151 or through properly executed and 
submitted written consents,152 which must be unanimous unless the 
articles of incorporation provide otherwise.153 Unless directors are 
elected by written consent in lieu of an annual meeting, the 
corporation must hold an annual meeting each year for the election 
of directors.154 If an annual meeting is not held for a period of 18 
months or more, any shareholder may require that such a meeting be 
conducted.155 Shareholders may also require a special meeting to be 
called if they own a sufficient percentage of the corporation’s 
shares, but the new Act reduces the percentage required from 20% 
of total voting power156 to 10% of the votes entitled to be cast on the 
issue proposed to be considered at the special meeting.157 
The new Act does introduce a new term—“voting group”—that 
was not used in the LBCL. The new term is used to deal with what 
the LBCL called “class voting.” The chief difference between class 
voting under the LBCL and the new voting group approach is how 
                                                                                                             
 149. Compare former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:73(A)–(B) (repealed 2015), 
with LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1-701(A), 1-702(A) (Supp. 2015).  
 150. Compare former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:73(D) (repealed 2015), with 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-705 (Supp. 2015). 
 151. Compare former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:74 (repealed 2015), with 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-725 (Supp. 2015).  
 152. Compare former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:76 (repealed 2015), with 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-704 (Supp. 2015). The new Act does add a formal 
requirement to the written consents that were not part of the LBCL: the consents 
must not only be signed, but also dated. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-704(A) 
(Supp. 2015). The dating requirement is tied to a new rule that is designed to 
prevent the gathering of written consents over an excessively long time. An 
action by written consent is ineffective unless the required number of consents is 
delivered to the corporation no later than 60 days after the date that the first-
delivered consent was signed. Id. § 12:1-704(C). 
 153. Compare former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:76(A)–(B) (repealed 2015), 
with LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-704(A)–(B) (Supp. 2015).  
 154. Compare former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:73(A) (repealed 2015), with 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1-701(A), 1-805(B) (Supp. 2015).  
 155. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-701(D) (Supp. 2015). The LBCL 
allowed any shareholder to call this meeting, to be held at the corporation’s 
registered office, but did not say how the shareholder was supposed to satisfy 
the requirement that notice of the meeting be sent to all shareholders. See former 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:73(A) (repealed 2015). The new Act changes the 
direct-call rule to a rule that allows a shareholder to demand that the secretary of 
the corporation call the meeting and send the required notices. LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 12:1-701(D) (Supp. 2015).  
 156. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:73(B) (repealed 2015).  
 157. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-702(A)(2) (Supp. 2015). 
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the lines are drawn between the various classes of stock and the 
various voting groups entitled to vote separately on some proposed 
corporate action. Under the LBCL, several classes with 
substantially the same interests in a proposed corporate action might 
have been entitled to several separate votes, thus giving each 
similarly situated class the power to veto a proposal that was favored 
by a majority of the shares of the larger, similarly situated group. 
Under the new Act, all shares that are entitled to vote generally on a 
given matter—even those denominated with differing class or series 
designations—are for purposes of that matter a single voting 
group.158 In dealing with amendments of the articles of 
incorporation in particular, the Act provides that all classes and 
series of shares that would be affected in substantially the same way 
by a proposed amendment must be treated as a single voting 
group.159 
The new Act also adds some new provisions that lend statutory 
support for several widely accepted practices in conducting 
shareholder meetings. A chair must be selected to preside at each 
meeting of shareholders, as provided in the bylaws or by the board 
of directors.160 This chair is empowered to determine the order of 
business and to establish rules for the conduct of the meeting.161 
The rules must be fair to shareholders.162  
Rules are also provided to allow the corporation to resolve issues 
concerning the corporation’s acceptance or rejection of votes 
represented by signatures on a vote, consent, waiver, or proxy 
appointment. If the name signed on the document corresponds to the 
name of the shareholder, the corporation is entitled, in good faith, to 
accept it.163 However, the corporation is also entitled to reject a vote, 
                                                                                                             
 158. The language of the new Act should not be interpreted to prohibit the 
articles of incorporation from specifying that a particular class or series is to 
have the right to be treated as a separate voting group for one or more described 
issues, as that feature of the shares would itself distinguish the rights of that 
class from other classes that were otherwise similar. But the simple provision of 
voting power on some matter to a particular class or series would not by itself 
cause that class or series to be treated as a separate voting group from other 
classes or series having substantially the same voting rights with respect to that 
matter.  
 159. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-1004(C) (Supp. 2015). The rule concerning 
amendments of the articles also applies to other types of transactions, such as 
mergers, that propose an amendment of the articles of incorporation of the 
surviving corporation that would require approval by a separate voting group 
under section 1-1004. See, e.g., id. § 12:1-1104 (6)(a)(ii).  
 160. Id. § 12:1-708(A). 
 161. Id. § 12:1-708(B).  
 162. Id. § 12:1-708(C). 
 163. Id. § 12:1-724(A). If the name does not correspond, but purports to be 
that of someone with the power to exercise the shareholder’s vote, the 
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consent, waiver, or proxy appointment if the secretary or other 
corporate agent authorized to tabulate votes, acting in good faith, 
has reasonable basis to doubt the validity of the signature on the 
document or the signatory’s authority to sign for the shareholder.164 
Finally, all corporations are authorized (and public corporations are 
required) to appoint one or more inspectors of election to tabulate 
votes on the corporation’s behalf.165  
The new Act changes some of the details governing shareholder 
proxies. The first change is in the terminology used. The Official 
Comments to the Model Act explain that the term “proxy” can be 
used to refer to three distinct things: the grant of authority to 
exercise a vote, the document through which the authority is 
granted, and the person who holds that authority.166 Like the Model 
Act, the new Act in Louisiana uses the term “proxy” to refer strictly 
to the person holding the voting authority.167 The terms 
“appointment form” and “electronic transmission” are used to refer 
to the document, or its electronic equivalent, through which the 
authority is granted.168 And finally, the word “appointment” is 
used to describe the grant of authority itself.169  
The new Act retains the LCBL’s default term of eleven months 
for a proxy appointment, but it eliminates the old maximum term 
limit of three years.170 The new Act also replaces the old rule that 
made all proxy appointments revocable at will “unless otherwise 
validly provided”171 with a new rule that states more clearly when 
irrevocability can indeed be validly provided. Under that new rule, a 
proxy appointment can be made irrevocable by a statement to that 
effect in the appointment document or transmission, if the 
appointment is “coupled with an interest.”172 The Act then lists five 
appointments that would be deemed to qualify for irrevocability, 
                                                                                                             
 
corporation is entitled to accept the vote or consent involved in good faith in a 
number of common, statutorily described situations, and to require in many of 
those cases that evidence be provided of the signing person’s authority to 
exercise the vote. Id. § 12:1-724(B). 
 164. Id. § 12:1-724(C). 
 165. Id. § 12:1-729.  
 166. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.22 cmt. 1 (2011). 
 167. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-722 (Supp. 2015).  
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-722(C) (Supp. 2015), with former 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:75 (C)(3) (repealed 2015).  
 171. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:75(C)(3) (repealed 2015). 
 172. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-722(D) (Supp. 2015). An appointment that 
is validly made irrevocable under this provision is revoked by operation of law 
when the interest with which it is coupled is extinguished. Id. § 12:1-722(F). 
2015] MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT 1011 
 
 
 
including the appointment of a pledgee or creditor who extended 
credit under terms requiring the appointment.173 Considered 
together, the new Act’s greater clarity concerning the types of proxy 
appointments that may be made irrevocable, and its abolition of the 
old three-year term limit on appointments, should make proxy 
appointments a more valuable and reliable tool in facilitating 
business and financial transactions.  
VOTING AGREEMENTS, VOTING TRUSTS AND UNANIMOUS 
GOVERNANCE AGREEMENTS 
The LBCL was silent on the subject of voting agreements 
among shareholders and provided rules concerning voting trusts 
that reflected the traditional mistrust of those types of devices. In 
contrast, the new Act explicitly authorizes agreements among 
shareholders concerning the manner in which they will vote their 
shares, makes them specifically enforceable, and provides that 
such an agreement does not constitute a voting trust, rejecting an 
old Delaware case174 to the contrary.175 It also eliminates the 
traditional term limits on voting trusts176 and leaves the terms of the 
trust to the participating shareholders, without the relatively detailed 
set of governing rules contained in the LBCL.177  
More important, however, is the new Act’s provision concerning 
a new form of governance document, which it defines and calls a 
“unanimous governance agreement.”178 This provision makes a 
major change in the law. The LBCL had been interpreted not to 
change the early jurisprudential rule that invalidated on public 
policy grounds any agreement among shareholders that interfered 
with the unfettered discretion of the board of directors to manage 
the corporation as the board saw fit.179 In sharp contrast, the new 
                                                                                                             
 173. Id. § 12:1-722(D). 
 174. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling, 53 
A.2d 441 (Del. 1947). 
 175. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-731 (Supp. 2015).  
 176. Compare former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:78(A) (repealed 2015) 
(limiting voting trust term to one fifteen-year term, plus one ten-year extension), 
with LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-730(C) (Supp. 2015) (placing limit on duration 
of trust controlled by terms in the voting trust, but a transition rule preserves the 
term limits for voting trusts executed before the January 1, 2015 effective date 
of the new Act). 
 177. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:78(B)–(G) (repealed 2015).  
 178. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-732(A) (Supp. 2015). 
 179. The leading case nationally on the subject was the 1934 decision of the 
Court of Appeals of New York in McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234 (N.Y. 
1934). The Supreme Court of Louisiana issued a similar decision in 1937. See 
Williams v. Fredericks, 175 So. 642 (La. 1937). Section 29 of the LBCL 
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Act explicitly permits a unanimous governance agreement to 
govern the kinds of decisions normally left to the board, such as 
distribution decisions, and even allows the board of directors to be 
eliminated altogether.  
Indeed, a unanimous governance agreement can do what no 
other governance document can do, not even the articles of 
incorporation: It can override rules in the new Act that would 
otherwise be considered mandatory.180 Unanimous governance 
agreements are to be enforced in accordance with the principle of 
freedom of contract. The only limitation imposed on this freedom is 
that of public policy. This vague limitation might seem susceptible 
to the same sort of circular argument that limited shareholder 
agreements under the LBCL.181 But the statute plainly rejects the 
foundation of that argument—the notion that public policy requires 
all corporations, even closely held ones, to be managed by a board 
of directors. The new Act explicitly allows a unanimous governance 
agreement to call for a corporation to be managed by “one or more 
shareholders or other persons.”182  
                                                                                                             
 
allowed “any lawful provision regulating the affairs of a corporation [that was 
not required to be placed in the articles of incorporation]” to be placed in an 
agreement among all of the shareholders who would be entitled to vote on such 
a provision if placed into the articles of incorporation. Former LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 12:29(A) (repealed 2015). Such agreements were declared “binding” on 
all persons who were then shareholders or who later became shareholders of the 
corporation. Id. Unfortunately, one of the members of the committee who had 
worked on drafting the LBCL published an article in the Louisiana Bar Journal 
that explained that the new section 29 agreement recognized only “lawful” 
provisions, and that provisions that interfered with directorial discretion were 
not lawful. He even suggested that Louisiana was a “particularly hostile 
jurisdiction” toward such agreements. His views on the subject were quoted with 
approval in Goldblum v. Boyd, 341 So. 2d 436, 446 (La. Ct. App. 1976), thus 
raising serious doubts whether a shareholders’ agreement under section 29 could 
lawfully provide for such things as dividend policies and the identities and 
compensation of the corporation’s officers. 
 180. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-732(B) (Supp. 2015). 
 181. Although the language of the former provision seemed to provide 
expansive powers to shareholder agreements to regulate the affairs of the 
corporation by “any lawful provision”—suggesting that they could indeed 
encroach on matters that would otherwise be left to the discretion of the board of 
directors—a provision was considered not be “lawful” within the meaning of 
this rule if it interfered with the directors’ managerial power or discretion. The 
reason? Because, as everyone who understood corporate law knew, it was 
against public policy to let shareholders interfere with the directors’ managerial 
power and discretion. See former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:29 (repealed 2015); 
Goldblum, 341 So. 2d at 448.  
 182. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-732(B)(6) (Supp. 2015). 
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What, then, is the intended meaning of the public policy 
limitation? Certainly, it means at least the same thing for unanimous 
governance agreements as it does for any other kind of contract. So, 
for example, a provision in a unanimous governance agreement that 
required the corporation to supply illegal drugs to its shareholders 
would certainly be void as against public policy. But the more 
difficult question is whether the law should recognize some implied 
public policy in corporate law itself that would invalidate an 
otherwise lawful provision in a unanimous governance agreement.  
The Official Comment to the source provision in the Model Act 
explains that its listing of seven specifically approved types of 
departures from the statutory norm is intended to be illustrative, and 
that the public policy limitation in the catch-all provision on “other 
provisions” should be interpreted in accordance with the ejusdem 
generis rule of construction.183 Hence, the “other provisions” clause 
is not intended to validate all forms of other provisions, but only 
those that are similar in some way to the provisions validated by the 
seven specific clauses.184 So, the Comment explains, an effort to 
eliminate a director’s duties of care and loyalty would probably not 
be sufficiently similar to the seven illustrative provisions to be 
included as a permissible “other provision” under the catch-all 
rule.185 Similarly, an effort to exculpate a director more broadly than 
statutorily allowed would not “likely” be allowed because of the 
serious public policy concerns underlying the limitations on 
exculpation.186 
Not all of the Model Act’s Official Comments on this subject 
are relevant to the language adopted in Louisiana. The freedom of 
contract principal expressed in the Louisiana provision is not part 
of the Model Act. It was borrowed deliberately from Louisiana’s 
LLC statute to provide to corporate shareholders, acting through a 
unanimous governance agreement, as much freedom of contract in 
governing their corporation’s affairs as LLC members enjoy in 
governing their LLC’s affairs.187 Moreover, Louisiana’s opt-out rule 
on the protection of directors188 from monetary liability expresses a 
more director-protecting policy than that expressed through the 
                                                                                                             
 183. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32 cmt. 1 (2011). 
 184. Id.  
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-732(B) (Supp. 2015), with id. § 
12:1367(B) (1994).  
 188. Officers are protected also, but the text is comparing the Model Act rule 
on directors to the analogous rule in Louisiana. 
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Model Act.189 Hence, it is difficult to say that an elimination of the 
duty of care through a unanimous governance agreement would be 
ineffective, based either on public policy or an ejusdem generis 
construction of the list of permissible provisions, insofar as the 
elimination of the duty affected only shareholders.  
Still, the Comments to the Model Act are not entirely inapposite 
to the interpretation of the Louisiana provision. It does seem 
unlikely that a unanimous governance agreement could eliminate a 
director’s duty of care in determining whether a distribution to 
shareholders complies with the statutory requirements of cash-flow 
and net-worth solvency. Those requirements are imposed for the 
protection of creditors, not shareholders. The shareholders’ freedom 
of contract should not extend to contracting away the statutory rights 
of nonconsenting creditors. Less clear is whether shareholders should 
be entitled to give up their own rights to enforce a director’s duty of 
loyalty. As I have written elsewhere, the issue is controversial and is 
not well-suited to an abstract, across-the-board position.190 But it is at 
least questionable whether such a provision could be enforced, 
especially against an unsophisticated shareholder who had no actual 
knowledge of the provision191 or who lacked the sophistication or 
experience to understand the provision in any case. 
In addition to its differences on the freedom-of-contract issue, 
the Louisiana provision on unanimous governance agreements 
differs from the Model Act source provision in another important 
way. Under the Model Act, no name is given to the extraordinary 
form of governance device that Louisiana calls a unanimous 
governance agreement; the Model Act refers to such a device as an 
agreement that complies with the requirements of the relevant 
                                                                                                             
 189. The rule applies unless it is varied by provisions in the articles of 
incorporation, the reverse of the opt-in approach taken in the Model Act, and, 
unlike the Model Act, it explicitly rejects the Delaware rule that egregious forms 
of carelessness may amount to disloyalty that is not subject to exculpation. LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-832(A), (C), cmts. a, d (Supp. 2015).  
 190. MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 9, § 2.17, at 97–99. 
 191. Although a unanimous governance agreement must be approved by all 
shareholders, or in the absence of shareholders, by all incorporators, at the time 
the agreement is executed, that does not mean that everyone who becomes a 
shareholder of the corporation actually will have agreed to the nominally 
unanimous terms. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-732 (A), (G) (Supp. 2015). 
The share certificates of a corporation must contain a statement that discloses 
the existence of the unanimous governance agreement, and purchasers of shares 
represented by certificates without such a statement may rescind their purchases 
during a brief rescission period. But the agreement is enforceable against 
shareholders, subject only to the brief right of rescission, even if they were 
actually unaware of it when they purchased their shares. Id. § 12:1-732(C).  
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provision.192 Indeed, under the Model Act, such an agreement might 
actually be deemed to exist based either on a separate written 
agreement signed by all of the persons who were shareholders at the 
time, or on the corporation’s articles of incorporation or bylaws, 
provided that the pertinent provisions in the articles or bylaws were 
adopted unanimously by the shareholders at the time.193  
The treatment of articles of incorporation and bylaws as possible 
unanimous agreements was especially troubling to the Louisiana 
drafting committee. Closely held corporations are typically managed 
both informally and by consensus, making it possible to claim that 
many provisions in the company’s articles and bylaws constitute 
unanimous agreements that are not governed by the ordinary rules of 
corporation law. The shareholders may not intend that result, or even 
recognize it when it occurs. Moreover, someone who was reviewing a 
company’s articles and bylaws might have no practical means of 
knowing which provisions had been approved unanimously (or would 
be alleged to have been so approved).194 That would mean that the 
reviewing person would have no practical means of knowing which 
of the provisions under review were ordinary articles and bylaws, and 
which had been transformed into super-provisions, capable of 
overriding the usual rules, and subject to an entirely separate set of 
rules on how the provisions were to be changed, terminated and 
disclosed.195  
The Louisiana provision on unanimous governance agreements 
gives the agreements that distinctive name and defines the term in a 
way that makes it virtually impossible to trigger the special rules 
inadvertently. It also specifically excludes the possibility that 
provisions in a corporation’s articles of incorporation or bylaws could 
qualify as a unanimous governance agreement. A unanimous 
governance agreement is defined as a written agreement—other than 
                                                                                                             
 192. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32(a) (2011). 
 193. Id. § 7.32(b).  
 194. At a minimum, the reviewer would need to review the minutes of all 
meetings at which the provisions were approved to determine whether they have 
been approved unanimously. If the minutes were silent on whether the approval 
had been unanimous, the reviewer would be subject to the risk of factual 
disputes on that point. 
 195. An agreement that met the requirements of the unanimous shareholder 
agreement provision could be amended only with the approval of all persons 
who were shareholders at the time of the agreement. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 
7.32(b)(2) (2011). Note that the unanimity requirement for an amendment of a 
unanimous governance agreement in Louisiana is merely a default rule. LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-732(I)(3) (Supp. 2015). But if it were possible to 
construe a provision in the articles as subject, inadvertently, to the special 
unanimous agreement rule, it is unlikely that the default statutory rule on 
unanimous amendments would have been considered, much less amended.  
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the articles of incorporation or bylaws—that governs the management 
of the business and affairs of the corporation, that is approved in one 
or more writings, signed by all persons who are shareholders at the 
time of the agreement, and states either that it is a unanimous 
governance agreement or that it is governed by the provision on 
unanimous governance agreements.  
As the Revision Comments explain, this distinctive-definition 
approach allows a deliberate choice to be exercised about the 
placement of various customized governance provisions.196 Those 
provisions that vary what are otherwise mandatory statutory 
provisions will work only if placed in a unanimous governance 
agreement, while those changing merely suppletive rules may be 
placed either in the normal governance documents, if the rules 
governing those documents seem appropriate, or in a unanimous 
governance agreement, if the rules governing those types of 
documents are preferred.  
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
The new Act changes the law governing shareholder derivative 
actions, which are now called “derivative proceedings.”197 The 
changes are relevant mainly to derivative proceedings brought 
against the management of public corporations. The new rules are 
unlikely to make major substantive changes in the approach taken 
by Louisiana courts to derivative litigation in closely held 
corporations.  
Louisiana state courts have not considered the power of a so-
called “special” or “independent” litigation committee to have a 
derivative suit dismissed on grounds that the committee has 
determined the suit not to be in the best interests of the corporation. 
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
has predicted that the Supreme Court of Louisiana would follow the 
lead of most other states on this issue and recognize this kind of 
litigation-committee power in the context of a derivative suit filed 
on behalf of a publicly traded corporation.198 The Fifth Circuit 
decision distinguished the Louisiana decisions that seemed hostile to 
the exercise of this kind of managerial power on grounds that those 
decisions involved derivative suits filed on behalf of closely held 
corporations, where all shareholders were named parties to the 
                                                                                                             
 196. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-732 cmts. b, e (Supp. 2015).  
 197. Id. § 12:1-740(1). 
 198. Atkins v. Hibernia Corp., 182 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 1999). 
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litigation, either as plaintiffs seeking the recovery or as defendants 
against whom the recovery was sought.199 
The new Act effectively adopts through legislation what the 
Fifth Circuit predicted the Louisiana Supreme Court would rule if 
presented with the question in a public-corporation suit. Under the 
new Act, a court is required to dismiss a derivative proceeding on 
motion by the corporation if a “qualified” group of directors has 
determined in good faith, after conducting a reasonable inquiry 
upon which its conclusions are based, that the maintenance of the 
proceeding is not in the best interests of the corporation.200 This 
rule is not limited by its terms to publicly traded corporations, but 
it is only in the publicly traded corporation that a board is likely to 
have a sufficient number of “qualified” directors to satisfy the 
requirements of the rule.201 
To be qualified to recommend dismissal as contemplated by the 
new Act, a director cannot have either a “material interest” in the 
decision to seek dismissal or a “material relationship” with someone 
else who has such an interest.202 A “material interest” is defined as 
any actual or potential benefit or detriment, distinct from those of 
the corporation or shareholders generally, that would reasonably be 
expected to impair the objectivity of the director’s judgment 
concerning the decision to be made.203 A “material relationship” is 
any kind of relationship, whether familial, financial, professional, 
employment, or “other,” that reasonably would be expected to 
impair the objectivity of the director’s judgment in making the 
relevant decision.204  
Most derivative actions filed on behalf of closely held 
corporations are filed by minority shareholders on grounds that the 
                                                                                                             
 199. Id. at 324–25.  
 200. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-744(A) (Supp. 2015).  
 201. In theory, a similar motion to dismiss could be filed by a panel of one or 
more individuals appointed by the court. Id. § 12:1-744(E). But then the 
defendant directors would not be choosing their own judges by appointing their 
fellow directors and friends to a litigation committee. Instead, they would be 
allowing the court to appoint someone with a role similar to that of a special 
master or hearing officer. It seems unlikely that many directors will see enough 
value in that approach to pursue it. True, there is some value, theoretically—the 
panel, unlike the court, could recommend dismissal even of a legally meritorious 
suit if it determined the suit was not in the best interests of the corporation. But 
the odds that a court-appointed panel really would recommend dismissal of a 
legally meritorious action seems so small that this theoretical advantage would 
seldom justify the added delay, expense, and unpredictability of the panels’ 
investigative approach—which might not be constrained by ordinary rules of 
procedure, discovery, and evidence.  
 202. Id. § 12:1-143(A)(1).  
 203. Id. § 12:1-143(B)(2). 
 204. Id. § 12:1-143(B)(1). 
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controlling shareholders are causing the corporation to overpay them 
for their services. Louisiana courts have not yet considered whether 
this type of personal interest is sufficient to disqualify a director 
from controlling the disposition of a derivative suit. But that is only 
because the courts have been disqualifying directors on much 
simpler, less compelling grounds, based on nothing more than their 
status as defendants in the suit. As one court has explained, “the fact 
that the directors being sued constitute a majority of the 
[corporation’s] board of directors is dispositive.”205  
The new Act abrogates that aspect of the Louisiana jurisprudence. 
The simple fact that a director is named as a defendant in a derivative 
action, or approved the conduct being challenged in the suit, is not 
enough by itself to cause the director to become disqualified to decide 
whether the corporation should move to dismiss the suit.206 However, 
a direct, personal, financial self-interest in the transaction under attack 
in the suit is considered sufficient to disqualify a director under the 
Model Act,207 and it is even sufficient under Delaware’s decidedly 
pro-management approach to the issue.208 There seems little doubt 
that Louisiana courts, which have sarcastically rejected the very 
idea that any director named as a defendant in a derivative suit could 
ever be entrusted with the decision whether to let the suit proceed,209 
would be willing to endorse the widely accepted idea that a director 
who held a personal financial stake in the transaction that is the 
subject of a derivative action is not qualified to decide for the 
corporation whether the suit should be dismissed. Hence, in the 
typical derivative suit filed in the context of an excessive 
compensation claim against most or all of the directors of the 
corporation, it is unlikely that the corporation will be able to satisfy 
the minimum statutory requirement that at least two “qualified” 
                                                                                                             
 205. Robinson v. Snell’s Limbs & Braces, 538 So. 2d 1045, 1047 (La. Ct. 
App. 1989). The Robinson court was considering the question in the context of 
the so-called “demand futility” issue, not a litigation committee, but it seems 
unlikely that a court would allow the defendant directors to do through a 
litigation committee what it would not let them do through the demand rule. The 
new Act does away with the demand futility issue, as it always requires demand 
to be made. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-742 cmt. (Supp. 2015). The 
qualification of directors to make a controlling decision about a derivative action 
will no longer be made in the context of a demand futility argument, but rather 
in the context of a motion to dismiss filed under section 1-744.  
 206. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-143(C)(3) (Supp. 2015).  
 207. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 1.43 cmt. 1 (2011). 
 208. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).  
 209. See Smith v. Wembley Indus., Inc., 490 So. 2d 1107, 1108 (La. Ct. App. 
1986) (characterizing defendant’s position as an argument that the plaintiffs 
should be required to ask the defendants for an “‘independent, disinterested, and 
impartial’ decision to sue themselves”). 
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directors approve the corporation’s filing of a motion to dismiss the 
suit.210  
It is possible that a board could work around the disqualification 
of most or all of the directors serving at the outset of an excessive 
compensation derivative action by amending the bylaws to increase 
the number of directors by two and then filling the vacancies so 
created with two new outside directors. The two new outside 
directors could then be appointed to a litigation committee that 
would engage in the required inquiry and make the decision on the 
corporation’s behalf to dismiss the suit. That approach would make 
the disqualification of the new directors less obvious, at least if 
Delaware’s strong rejection of the so-called “structural bias 
argument” is accepted.  
But Delaware’s approach (along with the approach of the Model 
Act) must be understood in the context of derivative litigation 
against the management of publicly traded corporations.211 
Louisiana courts have been wise not to apply this approach in the 
context of derivative litigation in closely held corporations, 212 and 
they should continue to reject it under the new Act. The technical 
grounds for their decision will now need to change, from 
consideration of demand to consideration of director qualification to 
act for the corporation in filing a motion to dismiss. But a director 
may be found not to be qualified under the new Act if he has a 
relationship of any kind with a conflicted, unqualified director that 
would reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity of the new 
director’s judgment about the suit.213  
                                                                                                             
 210. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-744(B) (Supp. 2015). As mentioned earlier, 
the motion to dismiss could also be filed based on the decision of a court-
appointed panel, but it is unlikely that the directors will request the appointment 
of such a panel. See supra note 201. 
 211. Glenn G. Morris, Shareholder Derivative Suits: Louisiana Law, 56 LA. 
L. REV. 583, 621–24, 629–30, 633–35 (1986). 
 212. Robinson v. Snell’s Limbs & Braces, 538 So. 2d 1045, 1047 (La. Ct. 
App. 1989); Smith v. Wembley Indus., Inc., 490 So. 2d 1107, 1108 (La. Ct. 
App. 1986). 
 213. It is true that the mere appointment of the new director by the 
disqualified director is not enough by itself to disqualify the new director. LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-143(C)(1) (Supp. 2015). But the kinds of personal and 
familial relationships likely to exist among the directors of closely held 
businesses are different from those among the outside directors of publicly 
traded corporations, making it more likely that the appointment itself will not be 
the only kind of relationship that would call the appointee’s objectivity into 
question. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 1.43 cmt. 2 (2011) (citing Delaware 
Supreme Court decision rejecting mere casual social acquaintance as a material 
relationship, in case involving a publicly traded corporation, Martha Omnimedia, 
Inc., in which the CEO of Sears was accepted as disinterested despite his alleged 
personal friendship with controlling shareholder Martha Stewart). Moreover, the 
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The new Act’s greatest impact on derivative litigation involving 
closely held corporations in Louisiana is likely to come not from its 
derivative litigation provisions but from its new withdrawal remedy 
for shareholder oppression. Under prior law, minority shareholders 
had virtually no prospect of having a court order the payment of 
dividends, or the employment of the plaintiff, or the buying out of the 
plaintiff’s interest in the corporation. Hence, a shareholder who 
wished to put pressure on the controlling shareholders to buy his 
shares would have to resort to a suit alleging that the controlling 
shareholders were causing the corporation to pay them excessive 
compensation. The plaintiff could not recover this amount personally, 
of course, because it was the corporation, not the plaintiff, that paid 
the allegedly excessive compensation. Still, this kind of suit might 
make sense if it helped to persuade the controlling shareholders to 
eliminate this kind of litigation, once and for all, by buying out the 
plaintiff’s shares in the corporation.  
Now that the new Act provides a direct right to a minority 
shareholder214 to be paid the full, undiscounted value of his shares 
if he proves oppression, it seems likely that much of the energy 
formerly devoted to excessive compensation suits is going to be 
directed instead at oppression litigation. Nevertheless, the derivative 
suit will remain available to address alleged misconduct that does 
not rise to the level of oppression. 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS—POWERS, COMPOSITION, 
ELECTION & REMOVAL 
The new Act retains most of the substance of the LBCL 
concerning a corporation’s board of directors. A corporation is 
required to have a board of directors215 that consists of one or more 
individuals.216 All corporate powers must be exercised by or under 
                                                                                                             
 
“appointment-alone” rule is designed to let the board of a public corporation find 
new outside directors to deal with litigation brought against the existing board 
where it is likely that the new outside directors will better represent the interests of 
the corporation’s thousands of passive shareholders than will the plaintiff’s 
lawyer. See id. § 1.43 cmt. 3. In the closely held corporation setting, where all 
shareholders typically are named parties to the litigation, there is no more reason 
to let the defendants’ appointed colleagues dismiss the suit over the plaintiff’s 
objection than to let the defendants themselves do so. 
 214. The remedy is not limited to minority shareholders, but controlling 
shareholders seldom oppress themselves. 
 215. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-801(A) (Supp. 2015). 
 216. Id. § 12:1-803(A). The LBCL used the term “natural person” rather than 
individual. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:81(A) (repealed 2015). But the 
term “individual” is defined by the new Act to mean a natural person. LA. REV. 
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the authority of the board, and the corporation must be managed by or 
under the supervision and oversight of the board.217 Except for the 
initial directors named in the corporation’s articles of incorporation or 
elected by its incorporators,218 directors are elected by shareholders at 
their first annual meeting and at each annual meeting thereafter.219 
Cumulative and separate classified share voting for directors is 
permitted only as provided in the articles of incorporation.220 
Directors are elected by plurality vote221 and may be removed with or 
without cause222 at a special meeting of shareholders called for that 
purpose.223 The vote required for removal is a majority of the 
shares entitled to be cast in the election of directors, 224 or, in the 
                                                                                                             
 
STAT. ANN. § 12:1-140(13) (Supp. 2015). Note that corporation law differs from 
LLC and partnership law in its requirement that the persons holding managerial 
power must be individuals. General partners hold managerial power in a 
partnership, and any person, natural or juridical, may be a partner. LA. CIV. 
CODE arts. 2801, 2807, 2814 (2015). Similarly, members of an LLC ordinarily 
hold managerial powers in an LLC, and any person may be a member of an 
LLC. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1301(A)(13) (Supp. 2015); id. §§ 12:1311–
1312. Moreover, even if the LLC is managed by managers, the LLC law does 
not require the managers to be individuals. Id. §§ 12:1301(A)(12), 1312. 
 217. Id. § 12:1-801(B). The language of the new Act concerning the board’s 
role does acknowledge and approve of something that was well-understood in 
practice, but not explicitly covered by the LBCL: the fact that the board’s role in 
exercising corporate powers and managing the corporation may be indirect. 
Corporate powers need not be exercised, or managerial decisions made, directly 
by the board. Officers, agents, and employees may manage the corporation and 
exercise corporate powers under the authority, supervision, and oversight of the 
board of directors. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 cmt. (2011). The new Act 
also includes a Model Act provision that describes the oversight responsibilities 
of the board of directors of a public corporation. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-
801(C) (Supp. 2015). 
 218. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-205(A) (Supp. 2015). 
 219. Id. § 12:1-803(C). The terms of the initial directors expire at the first 
shareholders’ meeting at which directors are elected. Id. § 12:1-805(A).  
 220. Id. §§ 12:1-728, 1-804. 
 221. Id. § 12:1-728(A). 
 222. The “with or without cause” rule is subject to a provision in the articles 
of incorporation that allows a director to be removed only for cause. Id. § 12:1-
808(A). Louisiana rejected a Model Act provision that would have allowed 
directors to be removed from office by a court, as that kind of remedy seemed 
better suited to publicly traded corporations than to the types of closely held 
businesses that dominate corporate practice in Louisiana. MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT § 8.09 (2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-809 (Supp. 2015) (indicating 
that section number as “reserved”). 
 223. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-808(D) (Supp. 2015). The notice of the 
meeting must state that a purpose of the meeting is to remove the director. Id.  
 224. Id. § 12:1-808(C). The Model Act rule would have allowed removal 
based on a majority of the votes cast on the issue. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 
8.08(C) (2011).  
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case of directors elected by classified share or cumulative voting, by a 
vote that reflects that different form of voting.225 
The LBCL rules concerning the determination of the number of 
directors were retained in the new Act.226 However, the new Act 
effectively changes the maximum term of a director from five years227 
to three years228 and allows terms longer than one year229 only if the 
articles of incorporation provide for the staggering of the directors’ 
terms.230 The new Act also contains what is sometimes called a 
“holdover director” provision, similar to that in the LBCL.231 This 
kind of provision allows a director to serve even after the expiration 
of the director’s term until either the director’s successor is elected 
and qualifies or there is a decrease in the number of directors.232  
BOARD DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES 
As with the composition, powers, and election of the board, the 
new Act retains most of the substance of the LBCL concerning the 
                                                                                                             
 225. If the director to be removed was elected by a separate voting group of 
shares, then only the shares in that voting group may participate in the removal 
vote. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-808(B) (Supp. 2015). If directors are elected 
by cumulative voting, a director may not be removed if the number of votes to 
elect that director cumulatively is voted against removal. Id. § 12:1-808(C). 
 226. Compare id. § 12:803(A), with former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:81(A) 
(repealed 2015). The order in which the number is determined (with sources 
earlier in the list controlling over those later in the list) first from the articles, 
then the bylaws, then the number elected from time to time by the shareholders, 
and, finally, to the number named in the articles of incorporation (or, formerly, 
in the initial report). 
 227. See former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:81(A) (repealed 2015). 
 228. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-805(B) (Supp. 2015). 
 229. Technically, the term of a director is not exactly one year. Rather, a 
director’s term lasts until the next annual meeting of shareholders. Id. § 12:1-
805(B). 
 230. See id. §§ 12:1-805(B), 1-806. 
 231. See former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:81(A) (repealed 2015). 
 232. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-805(E) (Supp. 2015). The basic 
statement of a term of a director effectively has a holdover rule built into it, but 
the effect of this new term statement is to extend the term itself rather than to 
rely on the holdover rule. Under the LBCL, the normal term of a director was 
one year. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:81(A) (repealed 2015). That rule 
caused a director’s term to expire before the next annual meeting if the next 
meeting was held more than one year after the one before. In that case, the 
director remained a director only by virtue of the holdover rule. Under the new 
Act, the basic term statement is tied to annual meeting itself, so there is less 
need to resort to the holdover rule. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-805(B) (Supp. 
2015). This basic term rule also contains an exception that the LBCL did not. 
This exception allows the corporation to have a bylaw that effectively forces a 
director out of office, thus creating a vacancy, if the director receives more votes 
against than for his re-election. Id. §§ 12:1-805(E), 1-1022.  
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procedures through which a board of directors takes action. A board 
acts either through the affirmative vote of a majority of directors 
present at a regular233 or properly noticed special meeting234 where a 
quorum235 exists236 or by means of unanimous written consent.237 
Unless the articles or bylaws say otherwise, a board may conduct a 
meeting, or allow directors to participate in a meeting, through any 
means of communication that allows all of the directors to 
simultaneously hear each other, and a director participating in that 
fashion is deemed to be present in person at the meeting.238  
                                                                                                             
 233. Unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise, a 
regular meeting of the board may be held without notice. Id. § 12:1-822(A). 
 234. Unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide a longer or 
shorter period, a special meeting must be preceded by at least 48 hours’ notice 
of the date, time, place, and, unless the articles or bylaws say otherwise, the 
purpose of a special meeting. Id. § 12:1-822(B). Directors may waive notice in 
writing, either before or after a meeting. Id. § 12:1-823(A). Directors are 
generally deemed to waive notice of a meeting if they attend the meeting. Id. § 
12:1-823(B). Under the LBCL, a director’s physical presence at a meeting (a 
different rule applied to presence through telephone) waived notice without 
exception. See former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:81(C)(6)(b)–(10) (repealed 
2015). The new Act allows a director to preserve an objection as to notice, 
despite attendance, if he objects properly. The objection (and notice) is deemed 
to be waived, however, with respect to any item of business that the director 
votes to approve. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-823(B)–(C) (Supp. 2015).  
 235. A quorum ordinarily consists of a majority of the board of directors, 
subject to provisions in the articles of incorporation or bylaws that increase the 
number required for a quorum, or reduce it to as few as one-third of the 
directors. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-824(A)–(B). Different quorum rules 
apply, however, for such things dealing with decisions in which some members 
have some conflicting interest that disqualifies them from participating in the 
decision. See, e.g., id. § 12:1-853(C)(1)(a) (requiring a vote to authorize advance 
expense payment to a director). If a quorum is present when a meeting is 
convened, the board may continue to act, despite the withdrawal of some directors 
from the meeting, if the action is approved by a number of affirmative votes not 
fewer than the number that would have been required had the quorum not been 
lost (in effect, the minimum number of votes required at which a minimal 
quorum is present). See id. § 12:1-824(C)(2).  
 236. Id. § 12:1-824(C)(1). The quorum rule may be relaxed by specific rules 
in the Act. See, e.g., id. § 12:1-810(A)(3) (filling vacancies by vote of remaining 
directors even if not a quorum). 
 237. Id. § 12:1-821. The LBCL could have been interpreted to allow 
directors to act by written consent that was less than unanimous if so permitted 
by the articles of incorporation or bylaws. See former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
12:81(C) (repealed 2015) (unanimous written consents covered by item 9 in a 
list introduced by the phrase “[e]xcept as otherwise prescribed in the articles or 
bylaws”). The language of the new Act is not susceptible of that interpretation. 
To act by written consent, the delivery to the corporation of a written consent 
from “each” director is required to authorize an action by written consent. LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-821(A) (Supp. 2015).  
 238. Id. § 12:1-820(B). 
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Louisiana’s unusual rule, permitting directors to vote by proxy if 
permitted by the articles of incorporation, was retained in the new 
Act through a new, non-model provision. The new provision allows 
the appointment only of other directors as proxies239 (changing the 
former rule that allowed either shareholders or directors to serve as 
proxies for directors240) and provides a one-meeting default term 
limitation for the appointment of a director’s proxy.241  
A board may establish committees242 as before,243 but the 
creation, appointment of members, and the authority of committees 
is regulated in new ways.244 Committees may now be created, and 
committee members appointed,245 only with the approval of a 
majority of all directors in office at the time of the creation and 
appointment.246 Moreover, a committee may no longer be used to 
authorize distributions (except under formulas or limits prescribed 
by the board), approve or propose actions that require shareholder 
approval, fill vacancies on the board or its committees, or change 
the bylaws.247  
OFFICERS 
The LBCL required all corporations to appoint three officers—
a president, secretary, and treasurer.248 However, except for some 
litigation-related authority,249 the LBCL provided no description of 
the role or authority of any of the required officers. All officers and 
agents had only such duties and authority as prescribed in the bylaws 
or by the board.250 In contrast, the new Act requires the appointment 
of just one officer, the corporate secretary,251 and provides that the 
                                                                                                             
 239. Id. § 12:1-812(B). 
 240. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:81(E) (repealed 2015). 
 241. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-812(C) (Supp. 2015). 
 242. Id. § 12:1-825(A). The power to appoint committees is subject to 
contrary provisions in the articles of incorporation or bylaws. Id. 
 243. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:81(C)(8) (repealed 2015). 
 244. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-825 (Supp. 2015). 
 245. Louisiana added a non-model second sentence to section 1-825(A) to 
make it clear that any non-directors appointed to a committee serve in an 
advisory capacity only. The sentence was added to deal with the potentially 
ambiguous status of a corporate officer or employee who is asked to participate 
in some way in the work of a board committee. 
 246. Id. § 12:1-825(B)(1). If an even greater number than that which is 
required under the corporation’s own articles or bylaws, then that greater 
number controls over the statutory minimum. Id. §§ 12:1-824, 1-825(B)(2). 
 247. Id. § 12:1-825(E). 
 248. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:82(A) (repealed 2015). 
 249. Id. § 12:82(G). 
 250. Id. § 12:82(D). 
 251. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-840(A) (Supp. 2015). 
2015] MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT 1025 
 
 
 
secretary has the authority and responsibility for preparing minutes of 
meetings and for maintaining and authenticating the statutorily 
required records of the corporation.252 With respect to other officers, 
however, the new Act takes much the same approach as the LBCL, 
except that it does not require the appointment of any particular 
officers, other than the secretary. It is up to the corporation’s bylaws 
or board of directors to say both what officers are to be appointed253 
and what duties and authority they are to hold.254 The same individual 
may simultaneously hold more than one office.255 
Unlike the LBCL, which required all officers to be elected or 
appointed by the board of directors,256 the new Act allows the 
appointment of officers either by the board or by another officer who 
is given the necessary authority by the board.257 In other respects, 
however, the appointment and removal rules are much the same. The 
appointment of an officer does not by itself create contract rights;258 
an officer may be removed by the board (or by an authorized officer) 
with or without cause,259 but the removal of an officer does not affect 
any contract rights the officer may have with the corporation.260 
DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS 
For many years, a tension has existed in corporation law 
between the ostensibly demanding, statutorily described standards of 
conduct for directors, on the one hand, and the far more lenient and 
deferential “business judgment” standards that were used by courts 
to determine whether a director could actually be held liable for 
                                                                                                             
 252. Id. § 12:1-840(C). 
 253. Id. § 12:1-840(A). 
 254. Id. § 12:1-841. 
 255. Id. § 12:1-840(D). The LBCL allowed two (but implicitly not three) of 
the required three offices to be held by the same person, and did not permit a 
person holding two offices to sign a document twice, in two different capacities, 
when the law required the signature of two officers. Former LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 12:82(A) (repealed 2015). The new Act contains neither of these 
restrictions. The dual-signature restriction would be irrelevant under the new 
Act for filings with the secretary of state, as those required just a single 
signature. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-120(F) (Supp. 2015). Share certificates 
do still require two signatures. Id. § 12:1-625(D). The better practice would be 
to follow the former rule prohibiting dual signatures by the same person on 
those certificates, as the dual-signature requirement would otherwise be 
rendered meaningless. 
 256. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:82(A)(1), (B) (repealed 2015). 
 257. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-840(A) (Supp. 2015). 
 258. Id. § 12:1-844(A). 
 259. Id. § 12:1-843(B). The LBCL allowed removal only by the board. See 
former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:82(E) (repealed 2015). 
 260. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-844(B) (Supp. 2015). 
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damages, on the other. The LBCL reflected this tension in former 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 12:91. 
The original, demanding form of standards was expressed in 
the first part of subsection (A), which was enacted as part of the 
original statute in 1968. It said that directors are required to act “in 
good faith, and with that diligence, care, judgment, and skill which 
ordinary prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances 
in like positions.”261 But after a Louisiana First Circuit Court of 
Appeal decision took this language seriously and interpreted it to 
say what it indeed appeared to say—that directors could be held 
liable for simple negligence in their corporate decisions262—the 
Legislature responded quickly with extensive additions to section 
12:91. The additions adopted a version of the business judgment 
rule263 and protected directors against monetary liability for all but 
reckless breaches of the duty of care.264  
The new Act accepts the Model Act approach265 to this historic 
tension between demanding duties and forgiving liability standards, 
but the new Act then takes a few steps farther in providing 
protection to directors and officers against liability. The protection 
against liability—sometimes called “exculpation”—that is available 
                                                                                                             
 261. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:91(A) (repealed 2015). 
 262. Theriot v. Bourg, 691 So. 2d 213, 222 (La. Ct. App. 1998). The 
corporation in Theriot had not adopted the type of exculpatory provision in its 
articles that had been permitted in Louisiana beginning in 1987. Act No. 261, § 1, 
1987 La. Acts 260 (enacting former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:24(C)(4) (repealed 
2015)). Had it done so, its directors would have been protected under a standard 
even more protective than that adopted through the later legislation. The new Act 
takes a step beyond, making that kind of even greater protection available 
automatically under Louisiana Revised Statutes section 12:1-832.  
 263. Act No. 1253, 1999 La. Acts 3301 (adding new subsections (B), (C), 
(E), and (F), and the portion of (A) following the semi-colon in the first 
sentence, to former Revised Statutes section 12:91). 
 264. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:91(A), (B) (repealed 2015). 
Nominally, directors could be held liable for “gross negligence,” but that term 
was defined to mean a reckless disregard of the best interests of the corporation. 
Id. § 12:91(B). A director could also be held monetarily liable for breaching his 
or her duty of loyalty.  
 265. The Model Act provides standards of conduct in one section, a breach of 
which is necessary, but not sufficient, to result in liability. MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT § 8.30 (2011). The imposition of liability for a breach of the duties is 
covered by a separate section, which conditions liability on, among other things, 
the absence of exculpation for the relevant conduct under the “opt in” 
exculpation permitted by the Act. Id. § 8.31(a)(1). If exculpation is provided, the 
remaining requirements imposed by the section become moot. If exculpation is 
not provided, the plaintiff is required to establish that the challenged conduct fit 
one of the listed grounds for liability under subsection (a)(2) and that the breach 
of duty proximately caused harm to the corporation or its shareholders, or 
otherwise justifies the remedy being sought. Id. § 8.31(a)(2), (b).  
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under the Model Act only if the articles of incorporation provide 
it266 is provided automatically by the new Louisiana Act.267 A 
corporation that wishes to provide less protection must modify or 
reject the default rules in its articles of incorporation.268 Louisiana 
also applies the same exculpatory rules to officers that it applies to 
directors,269 while the Model Act limits its opt-in version of 
exculpation to the protection of directors.270 Finally, Louisiana 
rejects a Delaware jurisprudential rule that makes the exculpation 
provided by statute unavailable to breaches of the duty of care so 
severe that, in the view of the Delaware courts, the carelessness is 
transformed into disloyalty.271 
Unlike the LBCL, which covered the fiduciary duties of 
officers and directors in the same provision, using a single standard 
for both,272 the new Act accepts the Model Act’s separate treatment 
of the two related, yet distinct, subjects. The standards of conduct 
for directors are expressed in more limited terms that reflect the 
distinctive and often part-time, supervisory, outsider roles that 
directors are expected to play in the management of the corporation. 
The duty of care owed by directors, for example, is limited to 
becoming informed in connection with their decision-making 
function and in devoting attention to their oversight function.273 In 
                                                                                                             
 266. Id. § 2.02(b)(4). 
 267. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-832 (Supp. 2015). Because exculpation is 
provided automatically under Louisiana law, unless the articles of incorporation 
say otherwise, the first issue in most breach-of-duty actions under Louisiana law 
will be whether the conduct is covered by the statutory exculpation provision. If 
so, the remainder of section 12:1-831 becomes moot. No liability may be 
imposed even if the remaining standards are satisfied. The prior provision that 
protected officers and directors against monetary liability (former section 12:91 
(A), (B)) was dropped from the new Act because the default exculpatory rule in 
the new Act provides even greater protection than the prior law, and because the 
prior law provided no mechanism for shareholders to change the protective rule. 
If shareholders do wish to expose their officers and directors to liability on less-
forgiving terms than those provided automatically by the statute (and they can 
find individuals willing to take positions in the corporation under those terms), 
they are entitled under the new Act to change the default statutory rules through 
appropriate provisions in the articles of incorporation. 
 268. Id. §§ 12:1-202(A)(5), (B)(4), 1-832(A). 
 269. Id. § 12:1-832(A). Because most Louisiana corporations are closely 
held, informally managed, and commonly have the same individuals serving as 
officers and directors, the practical value of the statutory protective rules would 
be sharply diminished—perhaps to the vanishing point—if they applied only to 
conduct that an active owner/manager could prove was carried out in his 
capacity as a director rather than officer.  
 270. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4) (2011).  
 271. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-832(C) cmt. d (Supp. 2015). 
 272. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:91 (repealed 2015). 
 273. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-830(B) (Supp. 2015). 
1028 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
 
 
 
contrast, the standards of conduct for officers are expressed in a 
much more generalized and potentially demanding way, similar to 
that imposed on officers and directors under the LBCL. Officers 
owe a general duty to act with the care that a person in a similar 
position would reasonably exercise under similar circumstances.274 
Less distinction is drawn between directors and officers when it 
comes to the rules governing the imposition of liability. Indeed, no 
separate rule is provided. The liability rule that is applicable to 
directors is simply made applicable to officers also, to the extent 
that the principles of that rule “have relevance” to an officer’s 
liability.275 But the more important similarity under the Louisiana 
Act is the fact that officers are covered by precisely the same 
exculpatory provision as directors.276 That provision will protect 
officers against monetary liability for all breaches of duty not 
excluded by the terms of the rule—principally, breaches of the duty 
of loyalty.277  
CONFLICTING INTEREST & BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY TRANSACTIONS 
The new Act, like the Model Act, makes major changes in the 
statutory approach to what used to be called “self-dealing” or 
“interested director” transactions. However, the practical importance 
of those changes will probably be limited in the context of most 
closely held corporations.  
The interested-director provision in the LBCL was designed to 
deal with an early jurisprudential rule that made transactions between 
a corporation and one of its directors automatically voidable at the 
option of the corporation.278 For that reason, the LBCL provision 
stated the circumstances under which a transaction of that kind would 
not be void or voidable: when the transaction was fair at the time it 
                                                                                                             
 274. Compare id. § 12:1-842(A)(2), with former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
12:91(A) (repealed 2015) (officers and directors required to discharge the duties 
of their positions “with that diligence, care, judgment, and skill which ordinary 
prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in like positions”). A 
Model Act rule that would have required an officer to inform the officer’s 
superiors or the board of information within the scope of the officer’s functions, 
and of actual or probable material violations of law, was omitted from the 
Louisiana Act as ill-suited to the closely held corporations that dominate 
practice in Louisiana. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-842 cmt. (Supp. 2015). 
 275. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-842(D) (Supp. 2015). 
 276. Id. § 12:1-832. 
 277. Id. § 12:1-832(A)(1). The exception in the exculpation rule for a 
violation of section 12:1-833 is irrelevant to officers, as that provision imposes 
liability strictly on directors for authorizing an unlawful distribution.  
 278. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ch. 8, subch. F, intro. cmt. 1 (2011); MORRIS & 
HOLMES, supra note 9, § 22.03, at 553 n.3. 
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was approved by the board, or when it had been approved 
following full disclosure of all relevant facts, either by 
disinterested members of the board or by the shareholders.279  
This approach created two problems. One is addressed by the 
new Act, while the other, almost unavoidably, is left unchanged. 
The problem that is addressed by the new Act might be called the 
“ineffectual” problem: The old provision did not actually validate 
or invalidate any transaction. If all the proper statutory procedures 
were followed—if disinterested approval of the transaction was 
provided following full disclosure to the approving persons of all 
the relevant facts—the transaction was thereby relieved by the old 
provision only from being automatically voidable. According to 
the Delaware courts, at least, an unfair transaction could be struck 
down under this kind of provision even if the required procedures 
had been followed.280 Conversely, even if the procedures had not 
been followed, a fair transaction could nevertheless be upheld.281  
Although Louisiana courts never addressed the effects of the 
old provision in the same way as the Delaware courts, that was 
                                                                                                             
 279. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:84 (repealed 2015). The statute 
imposed the disinterestedness requirement only in in the director-approval rule, 
not in the shareholder rule, but the courts understandably imposed the 
disinterestedness requirement on shareholder approvals as well, based on the 
requirement that the shareholders approve the transaction “in good faith.” See, 
e.g., Woodstock Enters. v. Int’l Moorings & Marine, Inc., 524 So. 2d 1313, 
1316 (La. Ct. App. 1988). 
 280. Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976). 
 281. Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 404 (Del. 1987). It may seem odd 
that a court would view a decision to uphold a fair transaction as falling outside 
the terms of the statute, given that one of the three statutory tests even in the old 
statute was fairness. But the language of the statute, unfortunately, tied fairness 
to the time that the corporation had formally approved the transaction, through 
action of the board, a board committee, or shareholders. See former LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 12:83(A)(3) (repealed 2015). Although this rule seemed designed 
to serve purely a timing, “no hindsight” function, it could not be satisfied 
literally if no formal board, committee, or shareholder approval had ever been 
provided. So, in the case of a deadlock, as in Marciano, or tacit acquiescence (as 
in many closely held corporations), the statutory fairness test technically could 
not be satisfied. See Marciano, 535 A.2d at 404. The new Act corrects this 
problem by divorcing the concept of fairness from the formality of the methods 
through which the corporation becomes a participant in the transaction. Fairness 
is to be judged “at the relevant time.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-861(B)(3) 
(Supp. 2015). And “relevant time,” for purposes of the fairness test, is defined to 
mean the time when the corporation, or an entity controlled by the corporation, 
became legally obligated to consummate the transaction. Id. § 12:1-860(3). 
Hence, the lack of formal board approval will no longer block resort to the 
protection offered by the statute to fair transactions. Under the new Act, a 
Louisiana court should not have to confront the issue that faced the Delaware 
court in Marciano. 
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because they had little chance to do so. Louisiana courts seldom 
received a case in which they found someone had complied with 
either of the statute’s disinterested-approval tests.282 Hence, all that 
was left for the court to consider was fairness, which is something the 
courts handled through a jurisprudential rule, not the statute. A 
corporate director who was engaged in self-dealing with his or her 
corporation was required to prove the fairness of the self-dealing 
transaction under rigorous judicial scrutiny.283 If the old self-dealing 
provision was cited, it was usually for the simple proposition that a 
fair transaction could be upheld.284 
The new Act does two things to address the ineffectual problem. 
First, it provides a detailed and limiting definition of what it calls a 
“director’s conflicting interest transaction.”285 A transaction that falls 
outside the statutory definition is protected against a conflicting-
interest claim286 automatically, without any need to prove the fairness 
of the transaction or to comply with the statutory approval 
procedures.287 A transaction that does fit the definition can obtain a 
similar level of protection288 if the statutory standards of fairness, or 
of approval by disinterested directors or shareholders (now called 
“qualified” directors or shareholders289), is obtained.290  
                                                                                                             
 282. See, e.g., Woodstock, 524 So. 2d at 1316 (finding statute violated where 
approving shareholders were not disinterested). But see Church Point Wholesale 
Beverage Co. v. Voitier, 706 So. 2d 1015, 1021 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (finding 
compliance with the disinterested approval rule, but court did not appear to 
attach any independent significance to that fact; director was held to have 
satisfied his burden of proving the good faith and fairness of the transaction, the 
same rule that would have applied in the absence of disinterested director 
approval).  
 283. See, e.g., Levy v. Billeud, 443 So. 2d 539, 543 (La. 1983).  
 284. See, e.g., Nalty v. D.H. Holmes Co., 882 So. 2d 1, 10 (La. Ct. App. 
2004); Church Point, 706 So. 2d at 1021 (imposing fairness tests despite 
disinterested director approval); Hingle v. Plaquemine Oil Sales Corp., 399 So. 
2d 646, 651 (La. Ct. App. 1981). 
 285. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-860(2) (Supp. 2015). 
 286. A transaction is protected against challenges only “on the ground that 
the director has an interest respecting the transaction.” Id. § 12:1-861(A). A 
transaction obviously could be vulnerable to attack on other grounds, such as 
lack of proper authorization. 
 287. Id. 
 288. The protection provided is against damages, sanctions, or any form of 
equitable relief, in any proceeding by a shareholder, or by or in the right of the 
corporation (i.e., a derivative suit), on the ground that a director had an interest 
respecting the transaction. Id. § 12:1-861(B). 
 289. The definition of a “qualified director” for purposes of this provision is 
stated in section 12:1-143(A)(3). The definition of “qualified shares” is provided 
in section 12:1-863(C)(2). 
 290. Id. § 12:1-861(B). 
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This basic three-part, disjunctive approach, in which the benefits 
of the statute can be obtained by establishing (1) disinterested 
director approval, (2) disinterested shareholder approval, or (3) 
fairness, is similar to the old approach in the LBCL. But the new 
approach differs from the old one in two complementary ways. On 
the one hand, it provides much greater detail, and greater regulatory 
content, concerning the meaning of critical terms and the procedures 
to be followed in obtaining the required disinterested (or 
“qualified”) approval.291 On the other hand, once those more 
detailed and demanding procedures are followed, the new Act fully 
protects the transaction against any form of legal remedy that is 
based on a director’s conflicting interest in the transaction.292 
The problem that is not addressed by the new Act, and one that 
probably cannot be addressed without skewing the Act too far in 
favor of management and controlling shareholders, is the difficulty 
in the context of closely held corporations of finding enough 
directors or shareholders who qualify to provide the approvals 
needed to obtain the validation offered by the Act. Of course, the 
statute does also protect transactions that are fair, even if they are 
not approved as required by qualified directors or shareholders.293 
However, that places an unavoidable litigation risk on the conflicted 
director: He cannot be sure that the transaction will be upheld if 
attacked because of the conflict. Rather, he will have to be prepared 
to defend the transaction as fair, after it may have turned out badly 
for the corporation,294 before a judge or jury unlikely to be 
experienced in the kind of transaction at issue.  
The value of the advance validation of the transaction is that it 
minimizes that litigation risk.295 Though, it is available only if at 
least two directors of the corporation not only lack any personal 
                                                                                                             
 291. See id. § 12:1-860 (including definitions of “fair to the corporation,” 
“related person,” “relevant time” and “required disclosure”); id. § 12:1-862 
(describing procedures for director approval); id. § 12:1-863 (describing 
procedures for shareholder approval). 
 292. Id. § 12:1-861(B). 
 293. Id. § 12:1-861(B)(3). 
 294. Business transactions typically involve an element of risk and a rate of 
return that is commensurate with the risk. If a conflicting-interest transaction 
turns out to be of great benefit to the corporation—if the risks work out heavily 
in the corporation’s favor—the transaction is unlikely to be attacked. But if the 
risks go the other way, and the transaction causes losses (or substandard profits) 
to the corporation, it is far more likely that the transaction will be attacked, and 
pose the danger that hindsight bias will cause the factfinder to conclude that the 
deal was unfair from the start.  
 295. Obviously, the risk cannot be eliminated entirely, as compliance with 
the statute can be disputed, and a court’s interpretation of the statute may be 
surprising. 
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interest in the transaction but also lack any one of many common 
types of relationship to the directors who have those personal 
interests.296 If the corporation does not have at least two of these 
qualified directors, it would have to turn to the owners of qualified 
shares for approval. Shares held by the conflicted director or by 
any “related person” of the director are not qualified shares.297  
Some transactions in closely held corporations may be subject 
to approval in the required ways, but many will not be. The types 
of familial, employment, and other relationships that are common 
among the directors of closely held corporations make it unlikely 
that corporations of that kind will have two directors who qualify 
to provide the required approvals. And a director may be reluctant 
to place the fate of an important transaction in the hands of 
shareholders who may be passive investors at best and disaffected, 
contentious minority shareholders at worst. In situations of that 
kind, the conflicted director is likely to end up in much the same 
place as he did under the LBCL. He will have to accept the risk, if 
the transaction is carried out and challenged, of proving its fairness 
under rigorous, probably hindsight-affected, judicial scrutiny. 
The new Act addresses the issue of corporate opportunities 
through a provision that piggybacks on the approval provisions 
provided for director conflicting interest transactions. The corporate 
opportunity doctrine holds that a director’s duty of loyalty does not 
allow the director to divert the corporation’s business opportunities 
to himself for his own personal gain.298 The Louisiana Supreme 
Court has recognized the doctrine, but the few Louisiana decisions 
that discuss the doctrine use only the most conservative, director-
favoring approaches to describe the types of opportunities that 
should be covered by the no-diversion rule.299 
Like the Model Act,300 the new Louisiana Act makes no effort to 
define what is meant by a “corporate” opportunity. But it does 
provide a mechanism through which a director can have the 
corporation disclaim any interest in the opportunity and thus protect 
the director against a later claim that the director’s taking the 
opportunity personally was a breach of the director’s duty of 
loyalty.301 The disclaimer of the corporation’s interest in the 
                                                                                                             
 296. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1-862(A), 1-860(1)(A)–(C), (5), 1-
143(A)(3), (B)(1) (Supp. 2015).  
 297. Id. § 12:1-863(C)(2). 
 298. See MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 9, § 22.05, at 562; MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT § 8.70 cmt. (2011). 
 299. See MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 9, § 22.05, at 562; MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT § 8.70 cmt. (2011). 
 300. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (2011). 
 301. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-870(A) (Supp. 2015).  
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transaction is provided in the same way that the directors or the 
shareholders of a corporation would approve a director’s conflicting 
interest transaction.302 However, in contrast with the rules governing 
conflicting interest transactions, in which the approvals may be 
provided either before or after the transaction is consummated, the 
corporate opportunity disclaimer must occur before the director 
becomes legally obligated with respect to the opportunity.303  
INDEMNIFICATION & ADVANCEMENT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES 
Although the new Act retains the basic structure of the 
indemnification and advancement-of-expenses scheme under the 
LBCL, it also makes a number of significant changes. The most 
fundamental of the changes deal with the scope and exclusivity of the 
new provisions. The LBCL contained a non-exclusivity provision that 
allowed a corporation to provide broader forms of indemnification 
than those contemplated by the default statutory rules, subject only to 
a prohibition against the indemnification of someone for the results of 
that person’s “willful or intentional misconduct.”304 The LBCL also 
permitted a corporation to “self-insure” its indemnity payments under 
a provision that lifted all constraints on the terms of this so-called 
“self-insurance” that did not amount to “actual fraud.”305 In sharp 
contrast, the new Act drops the old self-insurance provision306 and 
provides explicitly that a corporation may not indemnify or advance 
expenses to an officer or director except as permitted by the relevant 
subpart of the Act.307  
Conversely, the new Act neither requires indemnification308 nor 
limits a corporation’s power to provide indemnification voluntarily 
to its employees and agents.309 The LBCL, in contrast, had simply 
included employees and agents in the list of persons—directors, 
officers, employees, and agents—to whom its indemnity and 
advancement-of-expense provisions applied, thus making all of 
them subject to the same rules.310 The Official Comments to the 
                                                                                                             
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.70 cmt. 1 (2011).  
 304. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:83(E) (repealed 2015). 
 305. Id. § 12:83(F). 
 306. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-857 cmt. b (Supp. 2015). 
 307. Id. § 12:1-859.  
 308. Id. §§ 12:1-852, 1-856(C). 
 309. Id. § 12:1-858(E). Those employees and agents who are also directors or 
officers do remain subject to the rules applicable to them as directors or officers, 
of course.  
 310. Not all the rules applied in the same way, of course. They placed 
constraints on the power of directors to authorize their own indemnification that 
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Model Act explain that the neutrality of the new Act with respect 
to the indemnity rights of employees and agents is not due to any 
substantive position on whether such rights may or must be 
recognized—that is left to other bodies of law, such as contract and 
agency311 law—but rather to a judgment about the appropriate scope 
of the Act.312 The Act deals with the indemnity rights of directors 
and officers because those rights pose important questions about 
corporate governance.313 Similar rights for employees and agents do 
not pose issues of that kind, so the Act excludes them from its 
coverage.314  
The new Act also permits its nominally mandatory 
indemnification rules to be limited by the articles of incorporation.315 
Otherwise, the mandatory indemnification provision in the new Act316 
differs from that in the LBCL in just two ways. First, like all other 
indemnity provisions in the new Act, it excludes employees and 
agents from its coverage.317 Second, the provision no longer makes 
mandatory indemnification available “to the extent” that a director is 
successful in the defense of a proceeding but, instead, only when the 
director’s defense is “wholly successful.” The latter change is 
designed to avoid the result in a 1974 Delaware decision in which the 
court ordered a corporation to indemnify several directors who were 
successful in defending only some of the counts in a criminal 
                                                                                                             
 
had no relevance to indemnitees that were not directors. See former LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 12:83(C)(1) (repealed 2015).  
 311. The Civil Law analogue to agency is representation, which includes the 
nominal contract of mandate. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2985–3032 (2015). Article 
3013 of the mandate provisions requires a principal to compensate the 
mandatary of loss that the mandatary sustains as a result of the mandate, except 
for loss caused by the fault of the mandatary.  
 312. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ch. 8, subch. E, intro. cmt. 1 (2011); id. § 8.58 
cmt. 
 313. Id. at ch. 8, subch. E, intro. cmt. 1. 
 314. Id. 
 315. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-858(D) (Supp. 2015) (allowing articles to 
limit any rights to indemnification or advance of expenses “created by or under 
this Subpart”). The limitations may not be applied retroactively, however, to 
conduct that occurs before the adoption of the provision that imposes the 
limitation. Id. § 12:1-858(B). 
 316. Id. § 12:1-852. 
 317. Id. Although the language of section 1-852 itself mentions only 
directors, and not officers, another section of the Act gives officers the same 
right to mandatory indemnification as directors. See id. § 12:1-856(C). Note that 
employees and agents could make a claim for indemnification under the 
principle expressed in Civil Code article 3013 or under any contractual 
obligation of the company, if enforceable by the employee or agent, to provide 
that benefit. 
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indictment against them.318 Note that this change in the law affects 
mandatory indemnification only; it does not diminish the power of 
the corporation to provide permissible indemnification if the 
requirements for that form of indemnification are satisfied.  
The rules governing permissible indemnification under the new 
Act are more restrictive toward directors than non-director officers. 
The prospect of the directors’ approval of their own or their fellow 
directors’ indemnification poses conflicting interest and “structural 
bias” issues that are not present in dealing with the indemnification 
of officers who are not also directors.319 So, the new Act allows a 
corporation to indemnify and advance expenses to non-director 
officers not only under the rules applicable to directors but, beyond 
that, to any further extent that the corporation chooses, through a 
contract, board resolution, or provision in the corporation’s articles 
of incorporation or bylaws.320 The only limitations imposed on a 
corporation’s indemnification of its non-officer directors are those 
imposed by the “anti-circularity” rule in connection with derivative 
litigation321 and the prohibition of the indemnification of expenses 
                                                                                                             
 318. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138 (Del. Super. 
Ct. 1974). See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.52 cmt. (2011).  
 319. Louisiana rejected a Model Act provision that would have allowed a 
person who was both a director and an officer to be indemnified under the more 
liberal standards for officers if the conduct being challenged in the proceeding 
was carried out in the indemnitee’s role as an officer. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
12:1-856 cmt. b (Supp. 2015). 
 320. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-856(A) (Supp. 2015). 
 321. The anti-circularity rule prohibits a corporation, without court approval, 
from indemnifying a director or officer for the very amount recovered by the 
corporation from the officer or director in a suit against the officer or director 
that is brought by or in the right of the corporation. Only litigation expenses may 
be reimbursed in connection with that type of proceeding unless a court orders 
otherwise. Id. §§ 12:1-851(D)(1), 1-856(A)(1). Although the rule is not limited 
to derivative suits technically, that is where the rule will nearly always apply as 
a practical matter. Recall that the anti-circularity rule is limiting permissible 
indemnification. Absent some unusual change in control of the indemnifying 
corporation, it is highly unlikely that a board of directors really will vote first to 
direct the corporation to file suit against an officer or director, and then, later, to 
indemnify the officer or director not only for the costs of defending the very suit 
that the corporation itself filed, but also to repay to the defendants any recovery 
the corporation may have received from them as a result of its filing the suit. 
Hence, realistically, it is only in the derivative suit setting that the anti-
circularity rule is likely to matter. In that setting, a shareholder will be pursuing 
an action in the right of the corporation, over the directors’ opposition, so that 
the directors will be disposed to indemnify everything they can—all expenses 
and all liability. There, the function of the anti-circularity rule is to remove the 
board’s power, absent court approval, to indemnify anything more than litigation 
expenses. 
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arising out of the kind of misconduct that would not be subject to 
exculpation under the statutory exculpation rule.322  
The rules governing the permissible indemnification of directors 
allow the corporation to indemnify a director for liability323 incurred 
in a proceeding324 in which the indemnitee is a party because he or 
she is a director,325 provided that an adequately disinterested decision-
maker determines that the indemnitee met the minimum standard of 
conduct set by the statute. An adverse result in the proceeding itself 
does not necessarily mean that the director failed to meet the required 
standard of conduct for indemnification,326 as the grounds for the 
imposition of liability in the proceeding may be quite different from 
those required to authorize the indemnification.327 Instead, that 
determination must be made by the vote of a majority of the 
“qualified”328 members of the board—or of a board committee—if 
                                                                                                             
 322. Id. § 12:1-856(A)(2). The exception provided in the exculpation provision 
for liability arising from the authorization of an unlawful distribution is not 
included in the list of limitations on non-director officer indemnification because 
non-director officers hold no power to authorize a distribution.  
 323. Liability is defined to include both the obligation to pay a judgment, 
settlement, penalty, or fine, and the litigation expenses associated with the 
proceeding. Id. § 12:1-850(3). However, in a proceeding by or in the right of a 
corporation—typically a derivative proceeding—court approval is required for 
the indemnification of anything other than litigation expenses. Id. §§ 12:1-
851(D)(1), 1-856(A)(1).  
 324. Proceeding is defined to mean any kind of action, suit or proceeding, 
including civil, criminal, administrative, arbitrative or investigative proceedings. 
Id. § 12:1-850(6). 
 325. The terms “director” and “officer” (recall that officers may be indemnified 
at least to the same extent as directors) are defined to include service in some 
capacity for another entity or an employee benefit plan at the request of the 
indemnifying corporation. Id. § 12:1-850(2). The Official Comments to the 
Model Act note that it is a good practice to evidence this type of request through 
some kind of writing. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.50(2) cmt. 2 (2011).  
 326. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-851(C) (Supp. 2015).  
 327. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.51 cmt. 3 (2011). If a director’s failure to 
exonerate himself in a proceeding were enough by itself to cut off the director’s 
right to indemnification, it would become impossible to do what the statute 
plainly authorizes: to indemnify a director for liability incurred in a proceeding. 
 328. A director is “qualified” for purposes of the permissible indemnification 
provisions if neither the director nor a person with whom the director has a 
material relationship is either a party to the proceeding of a conflicted or 
disclaimer-seeking director in a conflicting-interest or business-opportunity 
transaction that is being challenged in the proceeding. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
12:1-143(2) (Supp. 2015). Because a director is disqualified automatically if the 
director is a party to the proceeding, it will be rare in the context of most close-
corporation derivative litigation for the corporation to meet the “two qualified 
directors” requirement for a direct determination by the board of the 
indemnitees’ satisfaction of the statutory standards of conduct. That means the 
critical decision must be made either by special legal counsel or by a vote of 
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the corporation has at least two qualified board members;329 by 
“special legal counsel,” preferably selected by the qualified members 
of the board, if at least two members are qualified;330 or by a vote of 
shares not owned or controlled by a non-qualified director.  
The required standards of conduct in the new Act are similar to 
those in the LBCL, but the new Act differs from the LBCL in 
drawing a distinction between the non-criminal331 situations in which 
its higher standard governs—a reasonable belief that the conduct was 
“in the best interests” of the indemnifying corporation332—and those 
in which its more forgiving standard applies—a reasonable belief that 
the relevant conduct was “at least not opposed” to the best interests of 
the indemnifying corporation.333 Under the LBCL, those two 
standards applied indiscriminately.334  
Under the new Act, the higher standard applies to conduct in the 
indemnitee’s capacity as a director or officer for the indemnifying 
                                                                                                             
 
shares not owned or controlled by directors who are parties to the proceeding. 
Faced with this choice, it will be rare for the defendant directors to turn the 
matter over to shareholders, as most or all of the shares eligible to vote on the 
question will be owned by the minority shareholders who brought the suit. 
Hence, the most likely outcome is that the directors, even though not qualified to 
make the decision themselves, will exercise their power under section 1-
855(B)(2)(b) to appoint “special legal counsel” to make the decision for them. 
Only an impossibly unperceptive lawyer could fail to understand in those cases 
that the directors are hiring him to find that they met the statutory standard.  
 329. Id. § 12:1-855(B)(1). 
 330. Id. § 12:1-855(B)(2). If the board does have at least two qualified 
directors, then the qualified directors, rather than the full board, must make the 
selection. Id. § 12:1-855(B)(2)(a). But the full board may make the decision if it 
does not have at least two qualified directors. Id. § 12:1-855(B)(2). Because a 
board with at least two qualified directors could make the required decision 
itself, it seems unlikely that special legal counsel will be hired by qualified 
directors in very many cases. It might occur, however, where the board’s 
qualified directors had at least serious doubt about the wisdom or propriety of 
providing the requested indemnification, and wished to hire someone else to 
take responsibility for that difficult decision. 
 331. For indemnification to be permissible in connection with a criminal 
proceeding, the director or officer must not have had any reasonable cause to 
believe that his or her conduct was unlawful. Id. § 12:1-851(b). The LBCL had 
the same rule. See former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:83(A) (repealed 2015). 
 332. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-851(A)(1)(a)(i) (Supp. 2015). 
 333. Id. § 12:1-851(A)(1)(a)(ii). A third standard applies in a criminal 
proceeding. In that case, the director or officer must have had no reasonable cause 
to believe his or her conduct was unlawful. Id. § 12:1-851(A)(1)(b).  
 334. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:83(A)(1) (repealed 2015). Arguably, 
but paradoxically, an even lower standard may have applied in derivative suits. 
Id. § 12:83(A)(2). That different and lower standard has been dropped by the 
new Act. 
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corporation itself.335 The lower standard applies only where the 
conduct was carried out on behalf of some other entity, such as an 
affiliate of the indemnifying corporation.336 In those cases, the 
director or officer may owe duties to the affiliate to act in that 
entity’s best interests. Hence, the new Act allows the director or 
officer to comply with those duties without forfeiting his eligibility 
for indemnification, subject only to the requirement that he 
reasonably believe that the relevant conduct is at least not opposed 
to the best interests of the indemnifying corporation.  
An even more liberal rule is provided in connection with 
service with respect to an employee benefit plan. A director or 
officer who acts in a way that he reasonably believes serves the 
best interests of the plan beneficiaries is deemed by operation of 
law to satisfy the more liberal of the two standards of conduct,337 
regardless of whether the conduct actually would meet that 
standard in the absence of the special statutory rule. As the Official 
Comments to the Model Act explain, the federal statute governing 
employee benefit plans requires that plan fiduciaries discharge 
their duties “solely” in the interests of plan beneficiaries, which 
may mean that a plan fiduciary may be required to act in some 
situations in a way that would not meet even the more liberal of the 
statutory standards for permissible indemnification.338 Still, in a larger 
sense, the corporation has effectively decided that the establishment 
of such a plan, governed by a federal statute requiring strict fidelity to 
plan beneficiaries, would serve the corporation’s best interests.339 In 
that larger sense, the new Act declares that corporate officers and 
directors who help administer the plan as required by law are, at a 
minimum, not harming the corporation’s best interests.340  
In addition to indemnifying an officer or director, a corporation 
may also voluntarily advance litigation expenses to them, without 
making any determination concerning their compliance with the 
standards of conduct that apply to indemnification itself.341 However, 
the advances must be repaid by the officer or director if it is 
ultimately determined that the officer was not entitled to exculpation 
or indemnification, and the officer or director must provide the 
corporation with a written undertaking to repay the funds in that 
                                                                                                             
 335. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-851(A)(1)(a)(i) (Supp. 2015). 
 336. Id. § 12:1-851(A)(1)(a)(ii). See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.51 cmt. 1 
(2011). 
 337. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-851(C) (Supp. 2015). 
 338. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.50 cmt. 2, 8.51 cmt. 2 (2011). 
 339. Id. § 8.51 cmt. 2. 
 340. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-851(B) (Supp. 2015). 
 341. Id. § 12:1-853(A). 
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event.342 In a change from the LBCL, the director or officer now must 
also provide the corporation with a written affirmation of his good 
faith belief that his conduct met the requirements for exculpation or 
indemnification.343  
An advance of expenses may be authorized by any one of three 
groups: the “qualified” members of the board, if there are at least two; 
by the full board, if the board has fewer than two “qualified” members; 
or by a vote of shares not owned or controlled by a non-qualified 
director.344 The second of those three groups—the full, unqualified 
board—is the one most likely to make the controlling decision in most 
derivative actions filed on behalf of closely held corporations.  
The corporation may change the statutory rules for permissible 
indemnification and advancement of expenses in two ways:345 it may 
limit them through provisions in its articles of incorporation,346 or it 
may effectively make them mandatory by committing in advance to 
make the payments that the rules themselves merely permit.347 Unlike 
the limitations, which must be stated in the articles of incorporation, 
the advance commitments may be made in a variety of ways: in the 
articles of incorporation, in the bylaws, or in a resolution or contract 
approved by the board.348 Once adopted, the commitments may not be 
eliminated or impaired with respect to conduct that occurs before the 
change in the commitment is made.349 
AMENDMENTS OF THE ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION AND BYLAWS 
The most important change made by the new Act with respect 
to amending the articles of incorporation is the one that alters the 
vote of shares required to approve an amendment. The LBCL 
                                                                                                             
 342. Id. § 12:1-853(A)(2). The undertaking need not be secured, and the 
corporation may accept it as satisfying the statutory requirement without regard 
to the ability of the officer or director to make the contemplated repayment. Id. § 
12:1-853(B). 
 343. Compare former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:83(D) (repealed 2015) 
(requiring only undertaking to repay), with LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-853(A) 
(Supp. 2015) (requiring both undertaking to pay and written affirmation).  
 344. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-853(C) (Supp. 2015). 
 345. The corporation may also purchase insurance for its officers and 
directors that provides indemnification-like coverage for conduct that does not 
meet the statutory standards for exculpation, indemnification or advancement of 
expenses. An LBCL provision that allowed a corporation to provide this type of 
coverage through “self insurance” was not carried over into the new Act. Id. § 
12:1-857 cmt. b.  
 346. Id. § 12:1-858(D). 
 347. Id. § 12:1-858(A). 
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. § 12:1-858(B). 
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required, as a default rule, the vote of two-thirds of the shares 
present at a lawful meeting at which a quorum of shares—normally 
a majority—was present in person or by proxy.350 The new Act 
requires a majority of the shares entitled to vote on the amendment, 
unless the articles of incorporation require a greater vote.351  
Depending on the number of shares represented at a meeting, 
this change in the required number of votes could amount to either a 
decrease or an increase in the vote required to approve an 
amendment. If the holders of most or all of a corporation’s shares 
were present or represented at a meeting, a majority of the shares 
entitled to vote would be fewer than two-thirds of the shares present. 
But if a bare quorum of shares were present at a meeting, say just 
one share more than 50%, then a majority of all shares entitled to 
vote, 50% plus one, would represent a considerably larger number 
of shares than the 34% or so that would have satisfied the two-
thirds-of-shares-present standard under the LBCL.  
The voting requirement in the Louisiana Act is more demanding 
than that in the Model Act. The Model Act would have permitted a 
vote of a majority of the shares cast to approve an amendment, 
provided that a quorum of at least a majority of shares was present 
or represented at the meeting.352 The Louisiana drafting committee 
                                                                                                             
 350. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:31(B) (repealed 2015). If the change 
had an adverse effect on the rights of a particular class or series of shares, the 
approval of that class or series was separately required in addition to the overall 
two-thirds vote. Id. § 12:31(C). For an amendment to have an adverse effect, it 
had to be included in a list of six statutorily defined effects. Id.  
 351. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-1003(A)(3) (Supp. 2015). If an amendment 
would affect a class or series of shares in any of the ways listed in section 12:1-
1004(A) (a list comparable to the LBCL’s exclusive listing of what it called an 
adverse effect), the separate approval of each of the voting groups that would be 
affected in such a way is required in addition to the approval of all shares 
entitled to vote on the amendment. Id. If several classes or series would be 
affected in substantially the same way, however, all of those classes and series 
would constitute just one separate voting group. Each similarly-affected class or 
series would not be treated as its own separate voting group, with a separate veto 
power over the amendment. Id. § 12:1-1004(C). The new Act also authorizes the 
board of directors, without shareholder approval, to restate the articles of 
incorporation (without any new amendment), id. § 12:1-1007, or to amend the 
articles of incorporation in connection with a reorganization ordered by a federal 
court under federal law (i.e., a bankruptcy reorganization), id. § 12:1-1008, or to 
make certain technical or routine types of changes, such as deleting the 
provisions that provided the names and addresses of the corporation’s initial 
directors and initial registered agent and office.  
 352. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 7.25(c), 10.03(e) (2011). This default rule, 
like the one in Louisiana, is subject to a provision in the articles of incorporation 
that requires a greater vote. Unfortunately, Louisiana’s drafting committee 
retained the rule that allowed the articles of incorporation to provide only for a 
greater, not a lesser vote, failing to consider that a different rule was probably 
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agreed with the spirit behind the Model Act’s rejection of a super-
majority requirement for an amendment of the articles of 
incorporation, but the committee believed that the majority-of-votes 
cast standard was more appropriate for public corporations than for 
the more typical, closely held Louisiana corporation.  
In a closely held corporation, the proponents of an amendment 
should find it relatively easy to muster at least a majority of shares 
entitled to vote on any amendment that does not face substantial 
opposition. However, when substantial opposition to an amendment 
does exist, the voting requirements of the statute should not create 
incentives, as the Model Act standard would have done, to arrange 
the meeting in a way that makes it difficult for opponents of the 
amendment to participate.353 Although the Louisiana Committee did 
agree that a simple majority of shares should be able to approve an 
amendment of the articles of incorporation, it also believed that the 
required majority in a closely held corporation should be a true 
majority of shares and not the fairly small minority of shares that 
could approve an amendment under the Model Act approach.354  
The new Act makes one other change in the Model Act 
amendment rules to take account of the closely held nature of most 
Louisiana corporations. Under the Model Act, an amendment of the 
articles of incorporation may not be approved by shareholders until it 
is first approved and recommended for shareholder approval by the 
board of directors.355 Under the Louisiana Act, that rule applies only 
to public corporations.356  
                                                                                                             
 
justified in light of the more demanding default standard that was adopted. The 
author plans to seek an amendment of the new Act to permit the articles of 
incorporation either to increase the required vote, or to decrease it, down to a 
statutory minimum of a majority of the votes cast.  
 353. If a bare majority of shares were present or represented at the relevant 
meeting, and five or ten percent of those present abstained from voting, a 
majority of shares actually cast in favor of an amendment could be considerably 
less than 25% of the shares entitled to vote on the amendment. 
 354. As indicated in note 352, supra, the Committee did not consciously 
decide that no corporation should ever be permitted to reduce the required 
majority to that provided by the Model Act. It simply failed to consider the 
possibility that the enlarge-only form of customization permitted by the Model 
Act might not be the appropriate rule once the default standard was increased 
from the minimal Model Act level to the more demanding level adopted in 
Louisiana.  
 355. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03(a), (b) (2011). The requirement that the 
board recommend shareholder approval of an amendment is subject to an 
exception for cases in which the board has conflicting interests or the 
corporation has agreed to submit a matter for shareholder approval even if the 
board of directors has determined that it can no longer recommend that the 
matter be approved. The latter exception permits corporations to include so-
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For closely held corporations, the new Act retains the LBCL 
approach357 by allowing amendments of the articles of incorporation 
with shareholder approval alone.358 As a practical matter, if there is a 
genuine and substantial difference in identity between the members 
of the board and the shareholders of a closely held corporation, it 
will be difficult for shareholders, without the board’s cooperation, 
to draft an amendment and then call and provide the required 
notice of the meeting of shareholders—or to obtain sufficient written 
consents—necessary to approve an amendment. But in many closely 
held corporations, particularly those owned by just one person, a 
requirement that the board approve an amendment before the 
shareholders do would amount to nothing more than a requirement 
that the same individuals provide the same approval twice, once as 
directors and then again as shareholders. 
The rules of the new Act concerning bylaws are similar in most 
respects to both the Model Act and the LBCL. The new Act does 
retain the LBCL rule that bylaws are optional, rejecting the Model 
Act mandate that bylaws always be adopted.359 But like the Model 
Act360 and the LBCL,361 it permits the board to adopt bylaws362 and 
for either the board or the shareholders to change or repeal them.363 
The main differences between the LBCL and the new Act with 
respect to bylaws are found in several Model Act provisions that were 
included in the new Act to deal with issues that have arisen in the 
context of public corporations. In that setting a board may seem less 
responsive to shareholder concerns than some shareholder activists 
believe it ought to be. To address those issues, the Model Act, and 
                                                                                                             
 
called “force the vote” provisions in merger and acquisition agreements. 
Louisiana adopted those exceptions, along with the normal requirement of board 
approval and recommendation, for public corporations. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
12:1-1004(B)(1), (2) (Supp. 2015).  
 356. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-1003(A)–(B) (Supp. 2015). A public 
corporation is defined as a corporation that has shares listed on a national 
securities exchange or regularly traded in a market maintained by one or more 
members of a national securities association.  
 357. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:31(B) (repealed 2015). 
 358. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-1003(A) (Supp. 2015). 
 359. Id. §§ 12:1-206(A), 1-1020(B). The Model Act requires that bylaws be 
adopted, but does not specify any required content for the required document. 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.06 (2011). Louisiana’s drafting committee saw no 
point in changing existing law to require the adoption of a document that would 
have an entirely optional content.  
 360. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.06(a) (2011). The Model Act would also 
allow incorporators to adopt initial bylaws for a corporation. 
 361. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:28(A) (repealed 2015). 
 362. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1-206(A), 1-1020(B) (Supp. 2015). 
 363. Id. § 12:1-1020(A), (B). 
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now the Louisiana Act, includes provisions that empower 
shareholders to adopt bylaw amendments that may not be changed by 
the board,364 or to vote against the election of a director in a binding 
way, as distinguished from voting in favor of a competing 
candidate.365 Those provisions are unlikely to be important in most 
closely held corporations, where the shareholders who have the 
voting power to adopt such director-disabling bylaws really do not 
need them, as they already have the votes to fill the board with 
candidates of their choice.  
MERGERS AND MERGER-SUBSTITUTES 
Traditionally, corporation statutes provided for three types of 
business combination transactions: mergers, consolidations, and sales 
of substantially all assets.366 However, modern statutes, including 
the LBCL as amended in its later years, have added a variety of 
other similar transactions that can be used to achieve objectives 
that were formerly accomplished through mergers. For example, 
the acquisition of a target company as a wholly-owned subsidiary 
could be carried out through a transaction known as a reverse 
triangular merger.367 However, modern law invented a new form of 
transaction, called a share exchange, that allows an acquirer to 
achieve the same end result without a merger.368 Similarly, a 
corporation that wished to change its state of incorporation could 
create a new shell corporation in the target state, and then merge 
the existing corporation into the new corporation. Modern law has 
created a new type of transaction, called a “domestication” under 
the Model Act, that may be used to accomplish the same thing, 
without a merger and without any change in the legal identity of 
the corporation involved.369  
Following the Model Act structure,370 the new Act deals with 
the more recently invented merger substitute transactions, such as 
                                                                                                             
 364. Id. §§ 12:1-1020(b)(1)–(2), 1-1021(A)–(B). 
 365. Id. § 12:1-1022.  
 366. As originally enacted, the LBCL recognized only those three forms of 
business combination transactions. Act No. 105, § 1, 1968 La. Acts 266 
(enacting former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:111–121 (1969) (repealed 2015)). 
The first alternative form of transaction, the share exchange, was enacted in 
1990. See Act No. 849, § 1, 1990 La. Acts 1983. See also MORRIS & HOLMES, 
supra note 9, § 36.01, at 235 n.12. 
 367. See MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 9, § 36.01, at 234–35. 
 368. Id. 
 369. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1-920 to 12:1-924 (Supp. 2015). 
 370. For some reason, probably based on accidents of placement in earlier 
versions of the law, the Model Act places Chapter 10, on amending the articles 
of incorporation and bylaws in between Chapter 9, dealing with merger-
1044 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
 
 
 
domestications and entity conversions, in Part 9; mergers and share 
exchanges, in Part 11; sales of substantially all assets, in Part 12; 
and appraisal rights, in Part 13. This Article will compare and 
contrast the various forms of transaction in a more historically 
organized way, beginning with the traditional forms of merger and 
similar transactions and then moving to the more recently invented 
substitutes. It will then take up appraisal rights, which are available 
if certain requirements are met, in connection with both the 
traditional and more recently created forms of transaction.  
All of the merger and merger-substitute transactions are subject 
to similar approval and filing requirements. With one exception,371 
all must be approved first by the board of directors and then by the 
shareholders of at least one of the affected corporations.372 If the 
transaction would result in the equivalent of an amendment of the 
articles of incorporation, which would require separate voting 
group approval if proposed as an amendment, similar separate 
voting group approval would be required of the transaction. 373 
Two types of the transactions, an entity conversion and a nonprofit 
conversion, require separate approval by each class or series of shares 
in every case.374 And if shareholders are to incur personal liability 
                                                                                                             
 
substitute transactions, and Chapters 11, 12, and 13, dealing with mergers, share 
exchanges, sales of substantially all assets, and appraisal rights. Logically, the 
chapter concerning amendments would precede all of the merger-related 
chapters. The chapter on mergers and share exchanges would come next, then 
the merger-substitute transactions, then sales of assets, and, finally, appraisal 
rights. See generally MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (2011). 
 371. The exception is known as a “short form merger,” in which a parent 
company that owns at least 90% of a subsidiary merges with the subsidiary, or 
causes one or more of the 90%-or-greater subsidiaries to merge with one 
another. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-1105 (Supp. 2015).  
 372. See id. § 12:1-1104 (mergers—board and shareholders of all merging 
corporations except certain survivor corporations and share exchanges—by 
board and shareholders of classes of shares being acquired); id. § 12:1-1202 
(sale of substantially all assets not exempted by section 1-1201–board and shares 
of selling corporation); id. § 12:1-921 (board and shareholders of Louisiana 
corporation becoming a foreign corporation; approved as required by foreign law 
for foreign corporation to become Louisiana corporation); id. § 12:1-931 
(conversion of Louisiana business corporation into a Louisiana or foreign 
nonprofit corporation–board and shareholders); id. § 12:1-941 (conversion of 
foreign nonprofit corporation into domestic business corporation–approval as 
required under the law governing the foreign nonprofit corporation); id. § 12:1-
952 (entity conversion–board and shareholders of converting domestic business 
corporation); id. § 12:1-953(B) (unincorporated entity conversion–approval as 
required by the law governing another form of domestic entity that is converting 
into another form of domestic entity or into a domestic business corporation).  
 373. Id. §§ 12:1-921(6)(b)–(c), 1-1104(6)(a)(ii). 
 374. Id. §§ 12:1-931(5), 1-952(5). 
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based simply on their ownership position in the entity that survives or 
results from the transaction—if, for example, a corporation is 
proposing to merge or convert into a general partnership—each 
shareholder who would bear this so-called “owner liability”375 must 
consent in writing to the transaction.376  
The transactions differ from one another primarily in the effects 
they create. In a merger, one or more existing corporations or other 
“eligible entities”—i.e., non-corporate business entities377—combine 
into a single surviving firm. All but one of the combining firms is 
extinguished, and the assets and liabilities of all of the combining 
firms are owned or owed by the surviving entity.378  
In a share exchange, all of the shares of one or more classes of 
shares are exchanged by operation of law for whatever consideration 
is specified in the plan of exchange.379 In most cases, the shares to 
be acquired will be the common shares of an acquisition target, 
which results in the target company’s becoming a wholly owned 
subsidiary of the other party to the transaction. Unlike a merger, a 
share exchange does not create or extinguish the existence or 
juridical personality of any of the parties to the transaction.380  
A sale of assets does not require any special approvals if it 
occurs in the corporation’s usual and ordinary course of business 
or if it fits one of three other excluded types of transaction.381 A 
sale of assets triggers merger-like approval requirements if it is 
outside the ordinary course of business and leaves the corporation 
“without a significant continuing business activity.”382 In that type 
of transaction, the corporation typically sells all or substantially all 
of its operating assets to another entity for some agreed 
consideration.383 Like the share exchange, a sale of assets has no 
direct effect on the juridical personalities of the parties, although 
                                                                                                             
 375. Id. § 12:1-140(15C). 
 376. Id. §§ 12:1-952(7), 1-1104(9). 
 377. Id. § 12:1-140(7D). 
 378. Id. § 12:1-1107(A). 
 379. Id. § 12:1-1107(B). 
 380. Compare id. § 12:1-1105, with id. § 12:1-1107(A)–(B). 
 381. Id. § 12:1-1201. The three excluded transactions are (1) a mortgage, 
pledge, or dedication of assets to the repayment of indebtedness; (2) a transfer of 
assets to a wholly owned subsidiary; and (3) a pro rata distribution of assets to 
the holders of one or more classes or series of the corporation’s shares. Id. 
 382. Id. § 12:1-1202(A). A corporation is deemed to retain a significant 
business activity if it retains assets that represented at least 25% of its total 
assets at the end of the most recent fiscal year and 25% of either operating 
revenues or pre-tax income. Id. 
 383. In theory, the assets could be sold to an individual, but that virtually 
never happens as a practical matter. The buyer is not going to want to operate 
the acquired business as a sole proprietor. 
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the selling corporation may choose to dissolve and wind up its 
affairs after the asset sale.384  
A domestication is a transaction through which a corporation 
changes its state of incorporation.385 And despite the name, a 
domestication transaction can be either incoming—a foreign 
corporation becomes a Louisiana corporation—or an outgoing—a 
Louisiana corporation becomes a foreign corporation.386 Like a 
merger, a domestication has its effects at the level of the entity—
changing the juridical entity in some way—but, unlike a merger, a 
domestication involves only one corporation and does not result in 
the termination of any juridical personality.  
When a domestication takes effect, the subject corporation is 
deemed to be the very same corporation as before, just one that has 
changed its state of incorporation.387 Indeed, the chief difference 
between a domestication and a merger into a new shell entity in the 
target state lies precisely in the fact that a merger extinguishes the 
existence of the “old” corporation,388 but a domestication is viewed 
as one continuing corporation simply changing its state of 
incorporation.389 That approach to the transaction allows the 
domesticating corporation to avoid any argument that any transfer or 
assignment of personal or other nonassignable assets has occurred as 
a result of the transaction.  
A nonprofit conversion is a transaction through which a 
domestic business corporation becomes a domestic or foreign 
nonprofit corporation.390 As with a domestication, the theory is that 
the corporate personality of the corporation engaged in the 
transaction is not extinguished and replaced by that of a new 
corporation. Rather, the old business corporation continues in 
existence, with the same juridical personality after the transaction as 
before but as a nonprofit rather than business corporation.391 Note 
that a nonprofit conversion changes a business corporation into a 
nonprofit. It cannot be used to do the reverse, i.e., convert a 
nonprofit corporation into a business corporation.392  
                                                                                                             
 384. But it may also stay in existence and reinvest the proceeds of the sale 
into a new business or, if it received other assets in exchange for the sold assets, 
may utilize those assets in new business operations. 
 385. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1-920(A)–(B), 1-924(A)(6) (Supp. 2015).  
 386. Id. § 12:1-920(A)–(B). 
 387. Id. § 12:1-924(A)(6). 
 388. Id. § 12:1-1107(A)(2). 
 389. Compare id. § 12:1-1105, with id. § 12:1-924(A)(6). 
 390. Id. § 12:1-930(A)(B). 
 391. Id. § 12:1-934(A)(6). 
 392. See id. § 12:1-930. The nonprofit conversion can be used only to carry 
out the types of transactions contemplated by section 12:1-930(A)–(B). 
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In contrast, in a transaction called a “foreign nonprofit 
domestication and conversion,” the new Act leaves it to the law of the 
foreign jurisdiction to decide whether393 and how394 that jurisdiction’s 
nonprofit corporations may be converted into a Louisiana business 
corporation. If such a transaction is permitted by the foreign 
jurisdiction, the new Act provides recognition for such a transaction as 
a matter of Louisiana law and treats the converted and domesticated 
business corporation as being the same corporation as the formerly 
foreign nonprofit corporation that carried out the transaction.395  
In an entity conversion, a domestic business corporation may 
become a domestic or foreign unincorporated entity, a domestic 
unincorporated entity may become another kind of domestic 
unincorporated entity, or a foreign unincorporated entity may become 
a domestic business corporation.396 Like the other kinds of merger-
substitute transactions, an entity conversion differs from the merger of 
one kind of entity into another in its treatment of the surviving entity 
as the same entity as the one that initiated the transaction as the 
converting entity.397  
The Model Act limits entity conversions to transactions in 
which a domestic business corporation is either the converting or 
surviving entity.398 But Louisiana law already provided a set of 
entity conversion rules that covered not only conversions from or 
into a Louisiana business corporation but also conversions from 
one form of domestic unincorporated entity into another.399 The 
drafting committee decided that it did not make sense to provide 
different rules for similar transactions, so it broadened the entity 
conversion provisions in the new Act to include both the 
conversions covered by the Model Act, and those covered by the 
earlier Louisiana law.400  
APPRAISAL RIGHTS 
“Appraisal rights” is the term used in the new Act to refer to 
what used to be called “dissenters’ rights.”401 The basic idea 
behind appraisal rights is the same as that behind dissenters’ rights: 
                                                                                                             
 393. Id. § 12:1-940. 
 394. Id. § 12:1-941(A). 
 395. Id. § 12:1-942(A)(6). 
 396. Id. § 12:1-950(A)–(D). 
 397. Id. § 12:1-955. 
 398. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ch. 9, intro. cmt. (2011); id. § 9.50. 
 399. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-950 cmt. a (Supp. 2015). 
 400. Id. 
 401. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:131 (repealed 2015). See also 
MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 9, § 38.01, at 296.  
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A shareholder who objects to the terms of certain transactions, 
such as a merger or merger-substitute, is entitled, if the statutory 
procedures for the exercise of the rights are followed, to require the 
corporation to buy all of the objecting shareholder’s shares for 
their fair value, paid in cash.402 
The traditional form of statutory appraisal rights has been 
criticized as too widely available by corporate management and as 
both procedurally and substantively unfair by dissenting 
shareholders.403 The new Act changes the traditional rules in ways that 
are designed to address both concerns. The overbreadth concern is 
addressed by restricting appraisal rights to shares that are exchanged, 
or whose rights are changed,404 by some transaction either outside a 
public market for the shares405 (which provides liquidity and price 
competition406) or in an “interested transaction”407 in which normal 
price competition may not occur.408 This narrowing of the scope of 
appraisal rights will not affect the availability of those rights in what 
may be the most common form of triggering transaction in Louisiana 
corporations: a merger that forces dissident minority shareholders out 
of a closely held corporation. Those kinds of transactions will continue 
to trigger appraisal rights because they do force the minority 
shareholders to exchange their shares for something else (typically 
cash), the shares involved are not traded in a public securities market, 
and the merger will constitute an “interested transaction” as defined in 
the new Act.  
So, the truly important changes made by the new Act with respect 
to appraisal rights are those that improve the applicable procedures 
and the valuation principles from the perspective of the minority 
shareholder. Under the LBCL, it was possible to carry out a short 
form, cash-out merger without even notifying the cashed-out 
shareholder that appraisal rights were available.409 The shareholder 
then had only 20 days from the date that an unexplained copy of the 
certificate of merger was mailed to him—the 20-day period ran 
from mailing, not receipt—to make demand for what the 
shareholder believed was the fair value of the shares that had been 
                                                                                                             
 402. MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 9, § 38.01, at 296–97. 
 403. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.01 cmt. 1 (2011). 
 404. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-1302(A) (Supp. 2015) (denying appraisal 
rights with respect to shares that are not exchanged or remain outstanding after 
the transaction); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 13.01 cmt. 1, 13.02 cmt. 1 (2011).  
 405. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-1302(B) (Supp. 2015). 
 406. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02 cmt. 2 (2011). 
 407. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1-1301(5.2), 1-1302(B)(3) (Supp. 2015). 
 408. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02 cmt. 3 (2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
12:1-1301 cmt. (Supp. 2015). 
 409. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:131(C)(4) (repealed 2015).  
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expropriated from him through the merger.410 The shareholder was 
also required during that period to find a bank, located in the same 
parish as that of the corporation’s registered office, that would be 
willing to act as an escrow agent for the certificates representing the 
affected shares, deposit the certificates with the bank, get the bank to 
provide a letter that acknowledged that the certificates had been placed 
in escrow, and then deliver the escrow acknowledgement letter, along 
with the demand for fair value, to the corporation.411  
If by some miracle the shareholder managed to jump through all of 
those hoops in the 20 days after the mailing of the unexplained 
certificate of merger, the corporation could simply reject the 
shareholder’s demand.412 That put the onus back on the shareholder to 
file an appraisal suit within 60 days after the corporation’s rejection of 
the shareholder’s demand.413 While this litigation was pending, the 
corporation could withhold all compensation for the expropriated 
shares, even the compensation that the corporation itself had set 
through the terms of the plan of merger.414 Finally, the valuation of the 
shares was likely to be reduced by minority and marketability 
discounts.415  
The new Act changes every one of those rules.416 The Act requires 
a statutory form of notice to shareholders concerning their appraisal 
rights in all transactions in which the appraisal rights may be 
available.417 The notice summarizes what the shareholder must do, and 
refrain from doing, to preserve the shareholder’s appraisal rights.418 
                                                                                                             
 410. Id.  
 411. Id. 
 412. The corporation had 20 days after its receipt of the demand (not its 
mailing) to send a written notice to the shareholder rejecting the demand. Id. § 
12:131(D). 
 413. Id. § 12:131(E). 
 414. The corporation could place the amount it contended was due into the 
registry of the court and thereby shift the costs of the proceeding to the 
shareholder if the court determined that the fair value of the shares was not greater 
than the amount deposited. Id. § 12:131(G). The shareholder relinquished all his 
rights as a shareholder upon his demand for payment, even though he received no 
payment until the litigation was concluded. Id. § 12:13(H). 
 415. McMillan v. Bank of the S., 514 So. 2d 227 (La. Ct. App. 1987); 
MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 9, § 38.08, at 327–31. 
 416. The new Act also eliminates the old rule that made dissenters’ rights 
unavailable (except in a short form merger) if the transaction to which the 
shareholder was dissenting was approved by at 80% of the voting power in the 
corporation. See former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:131(A) (repealed 2015). 
 417. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-1320 (Supp. 2015). 
 418. The requirements vary depending on whether the transaction is to be 
approved at a shareholders’ meeting, id. § 12:1-1320(A)(1), through the 
solicitation of written consents of shareholders, id. § 12:1-1320(C)(1), or has 
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The corporation, not the shareholder, is then required to make 
suitable arrangements for the deposit of the relevant share 
certificates, tell the shareholder how to submit the certificates, and 
send the shareholder a simple form that is to be completed and 
returned to the corporation to initiate the appraisal process.419 The 
corporation is also required to send specified financial information 
to the shareholder to assist the shareholder in calculating the 
amount that the shareholder should demand for his shares.420 
Within 30 days of the corporation’s receipt of the appraisal form, it 
must pay to the shareholder the amount that the corporation 
calculates to be the fair value of the affected shares.421 This up-
front payment rule means that any appraisal litigation will delay 
only the payment of the difference, if any, between the amount that 
the corporation concedes to be fair and a higher amount that a 
court may determine in the appraisal proceeding to be fair.  
If the corporation rejects the shareholder’s valuation figure, it 
is the corporation, not the shareholder, that must initiate the 
judicial appraisal action within 60 days of receiving a demand for 
payment that remains unresolved.422 The corporation must join in 
the proceeding all other shareholders whose demands for payment 
remain unresolved.423 The court may appoint an appraiser to file a 
written report on the fair value of the shares,424 and the costs of the 
proceeding, including the compensation and expenses of the 
appraiser, are to be assessed against the corporation. Costs may be 
                                                                                                             
 
instead already been approved through written consents, followed by a notice of 
the fait accompli to the minority shareholders, id. § 12:1-1320(C)(2).  
 419. Id. § 12:1-1322. 
 420. Id. § 12:1-1320(D). 
 421. Id. § 12:1-1324(A). An exception is provided that permits the 
corporation not to make this kind of advance payment for what are called “after-
acquired shares.” Id. § 12:1-1325(A). Those are shares that have been purchased 
after the public announcement of the transaction that gives rise to the appraisal 
rights. After-acquired shares are relevant only in the context of public 
corporations, where someone can buy into an appraisal rights suit by purchasing 
shares after an appraisal-triggering transaction is publicly announced. Id. § 12:1-
1322(C)(1) cmt. The payment rule stated in the text is the one that will almost 
always apply in the typical cash-out merger transaction in a closely held 
corporation. 
 422. Id. § 12:1-1330(A). 
 423. Id. § 12:1-1330(C). 
 424. Id. § 12:1-1330(D). Under the Model Act, the appraiser functions 
something like a hearing officer for the court. The appraiser is empowered to 
receive evidence and to make a recommendation on fair value to the court. 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.30(d)(2) (2011). Under the Louisiana Act, the 
appraiser is treated as an expert witness who may be deposed, examined, and 
cross-examined. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-1330(D) (Supp. 2015).  
2015] MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT 1051 
 
 
 
assessed against the shareholders only to the extent that the court 
finds it equitable to do so, on grounds that the shareholders have 
acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or not in good faith in connection with 
their assertion of appraisal rights.425 Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, the shares are to be valued using customary and current 
valuation techniques for similar businesses in similar transactions, 
without discounting for lack of marketability or minority status.426 
The new Act does make one change that is favorable to 
management in connection with a cash-out merger. It makes appraisal 
rights the exclusive remedy in connection with transactions in which 
the remedy is available, but only if the corporation allows the 
shareholder to assert appraisal rights without an advance notice to the 
corporation of his intent to do so.427 This change was not considered 
by the Louisiana State Law Institute. Rather, it was drafted it in 
response to a legislator’s request after the Law Institute had 
completed its work.428  
                                                                                                             
 425. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-1331(A) (Supp. 2015). 
 426. Id. § 12:1-1301(4). 
 427. Id. § 12:1-1340(B)–(D). 
 428. I was willing to support the change only if I could remove what I saw as 
the one remaining trap in the appraisal process: the requirement that a 
shareholder provide advance notification to the corporation of his intention to 
assert appraisal rights in connection with any appraisal-triggering transaction 
that is to be voted upon at a meeting of the corporation’s shareholders. This 
notification requirement was first placed into statutory appraisal proceedings 
back when the triggering transaction was imagined to be a share-for-share 
merger in which the complaining shareholder had the same opportunity to 
participate as every other shareholder. In those kinds of transactions, the 
requirement of advance notification served the function of letting management 
know what kind of cash-payment obligations the corporation would face if the 
transaction were approved over the objections of the shareholders who had 
provided the required notifications. But in modern practice, particularly in 
closely held corporations, a share-for-share merger is seldom the kind of 
transaction that gives rise to appraisal rights. Rather, the typical triggering 
transaction is a cash-out merger in which a minority shareholder is forced to 
relinquish his shares in the corporation for whatever price the board and 
majority shareholders decide to insert into their self-approved plan of merger.  
 In that kind of transaction, the corporation is perfectly aware of the number 
of shares that will be receiving cash rather than stock in the surviving 
corporation, as it is the corporation’s management and controlling shareholders 
who make that very determination as part of the plan of merger they themselves 
decide to adopt. The entire purpose of the transaction is to force the disfavored 
minority shareholders to exchange their shares for cash (or for other less 
valuable consideration that will almost surely trigger an assertion of appraisal 
rights), and it is the minority shareholder, not the corporation, who is kept in the 
dark until the trigger is pulled on the transaction.  
 The rule of exclusivity would work unfairly if the only remedy available 
for a freezeout merger could be lost easily, simply by failing to notify the 
corporation of something that the corporation already knew. But if appraisal 
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DISSOLUTION AND TERMINATION 
The new Act takes a middle position between the LBCL and 
Model Act approaches to corporate dissolution. Under the LBCL, a 
corporation that chose to dissolve had to appoint a liquidator, who 
then assumed control over the winding up of the corporation’s 
affairs.429 After the liquidator completed the liquidation of the 
corporation, he was required to file a certificate to that effect with 
the secretary of state.430 The secretary of state was then required to 
notify two or three state agencies about the certificate of liquidation 
and dissolution431 and subsequently wait for certification from the 
agencies that the corporation had paid all amounts owed to them.432 
When those certifications were received, the secretary of state issued 
a certificate of dissolution433—a document that sounded confusingly 
like the certificate that initiated the dissolution process and the one 
                                                                                                             
 
rights truly are available, the remaining procedures and valuation principles in 
the appraisal rights part of the new Act provide a fair way of resolving the 
conflicts between the majority and minority shareholders that motivated the 
majority shareholders to engage in the cash-out merger. The Act provides a 
similar, partition-like remedy to a minority shareholder who proves oppression, 
and that remedy, too, is exclusive. Id. § 12:1-1435(L). I do plan to raise the issue 
with the Louisiana State Law Institute and to follow its direction in connection 
with any future amendment or repeal of the exclusivity rule. 
 429. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:141(B)–(C) (repealed 2015). 
Involuntary dissolutions were possible, too, id. §§ 12:141(B)(2), 12:143, but for 
the sake of simplicity in drawing comparisons between the two laws, the text is 
discussing only voluntary dissolutions.  
 430. Id. § 12:148(A)–(B). 
 431. Id. § 12:148(B). Two agencies always had to be notified: the 
Department of Revenue and the administrator of Louisiana Employment 
Security Law. A third one, the Department of Environmental Quality, had to be 
notified only if the activities of the liquidated corporation were subject to 
regulation by that agency. Id. It was not clear how the employees in the 
secretary of state’s office were supposed to tell whether a corporation was 
subject to regulation by the environmental agency, so it seems likely that that 
agency was routinely notified. The notifications made little sense, as they were 
provided only after the corporation had already been fully liquidated. Had any of 
the agencies discovered any unpaid bills, they would have been asserting their 
claims against a corporation that no longer had any assets. Theoretically, they 
could have pursued unlawful distribution claims against any shareholders who 
had received liquidating distributions that were in excess of the amount that 
could have been distributed lawfully, but those claims were related to unlawful 
distributions themselves, not to the existence of the corporation. Keeping the 
empty corporate shell in existence did nothing to strengthen any such claim. 
 432. Note that the agencies were notified about the liquidation and asked 
about any unpaid debts owed to them only when it was too late to do much 
good—after all corporate assets had already been distributed by the liquidator. 
 433. Id. § 12:148(B)(1). 
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filed by the liquidator that declared the process to have been 
completed. When that certificate was issued, the existence of the 
corporation was terminated,434 and any assets that may have been 
overlooked in the liquidation process were vested in the liquidator 
for the benefit of the persons entitled to those assets.435 An 
alternative form of simplified dissolution was also made available—
dissolution by affidavit—but it operated largely as a trap for the 
unwary, as it resulted in the imposition of personal liability on 
shareholders for the liquidated corporation’s debts.436  
Given this choice between a complicated, control-divesting 
form of dissolution in which three state agencies could hold up the 
final dissolution indefinitely, and a simplified form of dissolution 
that imposed personal liability on shareholders for any overlooked 
corporate debts, many well-advised corporations opted out of both 
forms of dissolution. When the owners of an incorporated business 
wished to shut it down, they could simply pay the corporation’s 
remaining debts, distribute the remaining assets to themselves, and 
then stop filing their annual reports. The secretary of state was then 
required by law to revoke the corporation’s charter after three years’ 
failure to file.437 In contrast with a dissolution, the charter revocation 
was simple, free of charge, and did not impose personal liability on 
the shareholders for any unpaid, pre-revocation corporate debts. 
Moreover, if the shareholders came to regret their decision to trigger 
the charter revocation, they were entitled to reinstate the 
corporation, with retroactive effect, for an indefinite period after the 
revocation of the corporation’s charter.438 Reinstatement was 
available for a corporation dissolved by affidavit only by court 
order, and no grounds for the issuance of such an order were 
specified.439 All things considered, the LBCL practically punished 
owners who tried to comply with the law’s formal dissolution 
requirements, while rewarding those who ignored them and instead 
dissolved by deliberately violating the law’s annual reporting 
requirements.  
The Model Act’s dissolution provisions could hardly be more 
different from those in the LBCL. Under the Model Act, a 
                                                                                                             
 434. Id. § 12:148(C). 
 435. Id. § 12:148(D). 
 436. Id. § 12:142.1. The shareholders became liable in proportion to their 
ownership of shares in the dissolved corporation. Id. § 12:142.1(A). 
 437. Id. § 12:163(A). 
 438. Id. § 12:163(E). The name of the revoked corporation was reserved for 
three years, so the corporation took the risk that it would have to change its 
name if it reinstated after three years. But the statute permitted a reinstatement 
under a new name with no apparent time limitation. Id. § 12:163(E)(3). 
 439. Id. § 12:142.1(B). 
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corporation dissolves by filing articles of dissolution.440 However, 
the effect of filing the articles of dissolution under the Model Act is 
simply to change the object of corporate management from the 
continued operation of the corporation’s business to the winding up 
of the corporation’s affairs.441 The corporation’s existing managerial 
personnel remain in charge of the corporation, and the same 
corporate governance rules continue to apply, except for the 
change in the object and purpose of the corporation’s managerial 
decisions.442 Moreover, those limited effects remain in place 
perpetually. The corporation’s existence is never ended as a result 
of a dissolution under the Model Act, and no mechanism exists for 
the corporation to file a document that declares its liquidation to be 
complete or for its existence as a juridical person to be terminated.  
Louisiana’s new Act embraces two key features of the Model 
Act scheme: the elimination of the required transfer of managerial 
authority to a liquidator, and the perpetual existence of the 
dissolved corporation for the limited purpose of conceptualizing 
the person who owns or owes any corporate assets or debts that 
may be overlooked during a corporation’s liquidation. Unlike the 
Model Act, though, the new Louisiana Act rejects the idea that 
ordinary rules of corporate governance should continue to apply 
forever to a dissolved corporation. Louisiana agrees that those are 
the appropriate rules to apply during the period in which the 
corporation is actively engaged in winding up its affairs. But once 
management believes that the liquidation has been completed, all 
debts paid or provided for, and all remaining assets distributed to 
shareholders, no further acts of management are really going to 
take place. Shareholders are not going to meet, directors are not 
going to be elected, and officers are not going to be appointed or 
continue to go to work at the corporate offices.  
As a practical matter, then, a fully liquidated, dissolved 
corporation really is not going to continue to exist as a functional 
business organization. If someone should discover years later that 
the dissolved corporation failed to deal with some of its assets or 
liabilities in the process of liquidating, it does make sense to think 
of those assets and liabilities as still being vested in the liquidated 
corporation itself, rather than in the liquidator as under the LBCL. 
But it does not make sense to rely on ordinary rules of corporate 
governance to identify the persons who have power to deal with 
those overlooked items, perhaps many years after anyone last held a 
managerial position in the liquidated company.  
                                                                                                             
 440. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.03 (2011). 
 441. Id. § 14.05(a). 
 442. Id. § 14.05(b) cmt. 
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For those reasons, the Louisiana Act adds a new subpart to deal 
with what it calls the “termination” of a corporation.443 A termination, 
unlike a dissolution, does not merely initiate the process of winding 
up a corporation’s affairs. Instead, it marks the point at which the 
existence of the corporation ends, except for the limited purposes of 
dealing with matters, such as the distribution of overlooked assets, 
that the liquidation process, if any, left unresolved.444  
If a corporation decides to go through a formal liquidation 
process, it initiates the process by filing articles of dissolution.445 The 
filing of the articles of dissolution under the Louisiana Act has the 
same effect as under the Model Act: it leaves existing management in 
place and simply changes the object of management from normal 
operations to a winding up of the corporation’s affairs.446 The filing of 
the articles of dissolution also has the benefit of enabling the 
corporation to establish deadlines for the submission of claims against 
it447 by sending written notices to its known creditors448 and by 
publishing a notification in a newspaper to deal with unknown 
creditors.449 
The claims of the properly notified, known creditors are 
perempted if they are not submitted to the corporation by the 
deadline stated in the notice, which must be at least 120 days after 
the effective date of the notice.450 If the claim is submitted timely, 
but the claim is rejected by the corporation, the claim is perempted 
unless the claimant commences a proceeding to enforce the claim 
by the deadline stated in the rejection notice, which must be at 
least 90 days after the effective date of the corporation’s notice of 
                                                                                                             
 443. Introductory Comments to Subpart D, Part 14 of LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 12, ch. 1 (Supp. 2015).  
 444. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-1443 (Supp. 2015). 
 445. Id. § 12:1-1403(A). The LBCL rule that the secretary of state notify 
three state agencies about a corporation’s filing a document that declared the 
corporation’s liquidation complete, and then await their certification that the 
empty corporate shell owed them no money before ending the corporation’s 
existence, has been changed by the new Act into a required notification at the 
beginning of the dissolution process. The agencies need no longer certify no 
amounts are owed, however. What steps the agencies choose to take to identify 
and enforce any debts owed to them by the dissolved corporation are left to the 
discretion of the state agencies. Id. § 12:1-1403(D) cmts. b–c. 
 446. Id. § 12:1-1405. 
 447. Only a “dissolved” corporation may take advantage of these provisions, 
id. §§ 12:1-1406(A), 1-1407(A), 1-1408(A), and a corporation is not “dissolved” 
until the secretary of state files its articles of dissolution. Id. § 12:1-1403(B)–
(C). 
 448. Id. § 12:1-1406.  
 449. Id. § 12:1-1407. 
 450. Id. § 12:1-1406(B)(3), (C)(1). 
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rejection.451 The corporation is permitted to cut off the claims of 
unknown creditors, and other creditors not actually notified 
through the 120-day notice process, by publishing a newspaper ad 
that states the required information concerning the dissolution of 
the corporation and the method for submitting claims. The effect of 
the newspaper ad is to perempt any claim not already perempted if 
a proceeding to enforce the claim is not commenced within three 
years after the date that the ad is published.452 Claims that are not 
perempted by any of the claim-peremption rules are enforceable 
against the corporation, to the extent of its undistributed assets, and 
against shareholders who have received assets in the liquidation, to the 
extent of their pro-rata share of the claim or of the distributed assets, 
whichever is less.453  
The new Act, like the Model Act,454 adds a new procedure for 
dealing with claims that are contingent, based on post-dissolution 
events, or otherwise reasonably estimated by the corporation to arise 
after the effective date of its dissolution.455 The new procedure allows 
a corporation to obtain a court’s determination of the amount and form 
of security that should be provided to satisfy any contingent or post-
dissolution claims that are expected to arise between the date of 
dissolution and the end of the three-year peremptive period that is 
triggered by the publication of a newspaper notice of dissolution.456 
The corporation’s provision of the amount and form of security 
ordered by the court at the conclusion of the proceeding satisfies the 
corporation’s obligations with respect to those claims.457 As a result, 
the claims may not be enforced either against the undistributed assets 
of the dissolved corporation or against the shareholders to whom the 
assets of the dissolved corporation have been distributed.458  
The dissolution and winding up procedures in the new Act are 
substantially the same as those in the Model Act. The differences 
arise after the active dissolution process has ended. Under the 
Model Act, nothing happens at that point; the corporation simply 
continues to exist perpetually as a dissolved corporation. Under the 
Louisiana Act, in contrast, the corporation is permitted to deliver to 
the secretary of state for filing articles of termination that declare 
                                                                                                             
 451. Id. § 12:1-1406(C)(2). 
 452. Id. § 12:1-1407(C). 
 453. Id. § 12:1-1407(D)(2). A shareholder’s total liability for all such claims 
may not exceed the total amount assets distributed to that shareholder. Id. 
 454. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.08 (2011). 
 455. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-1408(A) (Supp. 2015). 
 456. No provision is required for claims that are anticipated to arise after the 
end of the three-year peremptive period. Id. § 12:1-1408(A).  
 457. Id. § 12:1-1408(D). 
 458. Id.  
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the liquidation of the corporation to be complete.459 The filing of 
the articles of termination by the secretary of state then terminates 
the legal existence of the corporation460 for all purposes other than 
those listed in the statute.461  
The statutory exceptions to the general rule of non-existence for 
a terminated corporation all involve the treatment of the terminated 
corporation as the person that continues to own or owe unresolved 
assets or debts and to act as the proper party to any unresolved claim 
or litigation. The Act makes it clear that shareholders do not 
automatically succeed to the ownership of undistributed corporate 
assets, assume liability for unpaid corporate debts, or become 
substitute plaintiffs or defendants in corporate litigation as a result of 
a corporation’s termination.462 Rather, it is the corporation itself that 
continues to occupy those positions. Hence, the problem posed by 
the corporation’s termination with respect to unresolved matters is 
not one of finding appropriate substitutes for the corporation in 
connection with those matters but rather that of finding someone 
with authority to act for the corporation in its continuing role.463 
The new Act includes two mechanisms for providing managerial 
authority for a terminated corporation. First, the retroactive 
reinstatement mechanism that used to be available following a 
charter revocation under the LBCL is now available for three years 
following any form of corporate termination other than one resulting 
from a judicially ordered dissolution.464 So, if the owners and 
managers of the terminated corporation are still available and wish 
to resume their former roles, they may cause the corporation to be 
fully reinstated and then deal with the unresolved matter in accordance 
with the normal rules of corporate governance. If, on the other hand, 
this form of full-blown reinstatement is either not desired or not 
possible, then the second mechanism for providing managerial 
authority for the terminated corporation is to appoint a liquidator.465 
In addition to the termination that is available following the 
completion of a formal dissolution process, the new Act provides two 
other forms of termination. The first is called a simplified termination. 
                                                                                                             
 459. Id. § 12:1-1440(A). The corporation is permitted, but not required, to 
file articles of termination. If a dissolved corporation completes its liquidation 
and then simply stops filing any further documents with the secretary of state, it 
soon will be terminated administratively for the failure to file its annual report. 
Id. § 12:1-1442. 
 460. Id. § 12:1-1443(A). 
 461. Id. § 12:1-1443(B)–(C). 
 462. Id. § 12:1-1443(C), cmts. b, c, f–h. 
 463. Id. § 12:1-1443 cmt. f. 
 464. Id. § 12:1-1444. 
 465. Id. § 12:1-1445. 
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It replaces the old dissolution by affidavit under the LBCL. The 
requirements for a simplified termination are essentially the same as 
for a dissolution by affidavit,466 but the new form of termination 
does not impose personal liability on shareholders for the debts of 
a corporation that utilizes this method of termination. The legal 
effects of a simplified termination are exactly the same as those of 
the termination that is available to a corporation that has gone 
through a more formal liquidation process after filing articles of 
dissolution.467 The same rights of reinstatement are available as 
well.468 In effect, the new Act eliminates most of the reasons that 
shareholders saw under the LBCL to terminate their corporations 
through charter revocations, rather than the filing of a simple 
statement of termination.469 
The final form of termination provided by the new Act is called 
an “administrative termination.”470 It replaces the old charter 
revocation under the LBCL.471 The existence of a corporation may 
be terminated administratively if the corporation fails for 90 
consecutive days either to maintain a registered agent and 
registered office as required by the Act or to file its annual report 
by the date the report is due.472 The new 90-day grace period for 
                                                                                                             
 466. Compare former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-142.1(A) (repealed 2015), 
with LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-1441 (Supp. 2015). The new provision adds 
one disjunctive qualifier that was borrowed from the Model Act’s provision on 
the dissolution of a corporation that has not issued shares or begun to engage in 
business. Compare MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.01 (2011), with LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 12:1-1441(C)(4) cmt. a (Supp. 2015). The effect is to allow the 
simplified termination procedure to be used in the same situations in which the 
Model Act would permit the dissolution of an incompletely organized 
corporation. But the real importance of the simplified termination will be in its 
application to corporations that have indeed engaged in business, but have since 
shut down the business and informally liquidated. Corporations that liquidate in 
that informal fashion do not obtain the benefits of the peremption and claims-
satisfaction rules in sections 12:1-1406 through 12:1-1408, but if they know 
what debts they owe, and simply pay them, the simplified form of termination 
allows the legal existence of the corporation to be ended, subject to 
reinstatement, in a simple and inexpensive manner.  
 467. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-1443 (Supp. 2015). 
 468. Id. § 12:1-1444. 
 469. The one incentive that still exists to use the charter revocation (which is 
now called an “administrative termination”) is the filing fee that is charged to 
file articles of termination. The termination resulting from a corporation’s 
failure to file its annual reports is still free (although the missed annual report 
fees must be paid if reinstatement is sought). Id. § 12:1-1444(F)(2). 
 470. Id. § 12:1-1442. 
 471. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:163 (repealed 2015). 
 472. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-1442(A) (Supp. 2015). The secretary of 
state must provide at least 30 days’ advance notice of the secretary’s intention to 
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the filing of an annual report replaces what amounted to a three-
year grace period under the LBCL.473 The change was made to 
eliminate the widespread practice of filing what were supposed to 
be annual reports only every third year—or even less frequently if 
the reinstatement period was utilized on top of the three-year grace 
period.474 The new, shorter period is likely to result in the 
administrative termination of many corporations that have grown 
accustomed to ignoring their annual reporting obligations. However, 
reinstatement475 is available to those corporations while they adjust 
to the new 90-day rule.  
SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION 
The LBCL provided little protection to the interests of minority 
shareholders in closely held corporations. The majority shareholders 
in the company were capable of compensating themselves in the 
form of salaries and other benefits of employment by the 
corporation, without ever declaring a dividend or otherwise making 
any financial benefit of share ownership available to the minority 
shareholders. Minority shareholders caught in that kind of position 
would find it virtually impossible to sell their shares, as no rational 
investors would be willing to pay good money for shares that had 
virtually no prospect of ever generating any financial return. 
Moreover, the corporation had no obligation to buy back the 
minority investor’s shares.  
The minority shareholders were left to sue the controlling 
shareholders not for what they really wanted—some payment to 
themselves—but rather for alleged overpayments to the majority 
shareholders. The excessive compensation cases did raise issues of 
self-dealing that were not subject to the highly deferential business 
judgment rule. But they did still involve the kinds of routine, private 
business decisions that most courts were reluctant to usurp to 
themselves. And even if a court did find the challenged compensation 
to exceed permissible amounts, the minority shareholder held no 
personal right to recover the excessive amount for himself. Rather, it 
would have to be returned to a corporation that was still controlled by 
the majority-shareholder defendants, who were unlikely to share the 
benefits of the recovery that they were forced to pay with the person 
                                                                                                             
 
terminate the corporation, and may not terminate the corporation if the cause of 
termination is eliminated by the end of that 30-day period. Id. § 12:1-1442(B). 
 473. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-163(A) (repealed 2015). 
 474. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-1442 cmt. (Supp. 2015). 
 475. Id. § 12:1-1444. 
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who had forced them to pay it. The only thing the minority 
shareholder could really hope to achieve through the excessive 
compensation suit was to give the majority shareholders an incentive 
to buy out his interest in the corporation, which would eliminate his 
standing to file such suit.  
The Model Act provides a direct remedy to a minority 
shareholder who is treated so badly that it amounts to what the Act 
calls “oppression.” The Model Act does not define the term, but the 
oppression remedy is a judicially ordered dissolution of the 
corporation, unless within 90 days of the filing of the action for 
judicial dissolution, the corporation or other shareholders elect 
irrevocably to buy all of the complaining shareholders’ shares in 
the corporation at their fair value.476  
The Committee that drafted Louisiana’s version of the Model 
Act agreed that a remedy should be provided for oppression. But the 
Committee believed that the term “oppression” should be defined, 
and that the order of oppression remedies should be reversed.477 The 
Committee believed that the corporation should be able to contest 
the complaining shareholders’ allegations of oppression without 
risking the involuntary dissolution of the corporation and that the 
statutory remedy for oppression should fit the nature of the remedy 
that most courts dealing with oppression cases have actually 
ordered, namely, a buyout of the oppressed shareholder.478  
The statutory buyout remedy (unless the corporation chooses to 
dissolve) is the exclusive remedy available under the new Act on 
grounds of oppression itself.479 The exclusivity rule concerning 
oppression does not affect a shareholder’s right to obtain other 
remedies for other breaches of duties if the requirements for those 
remedies are satisfied.480 However, a corporation is not required to 
fight on multiple fronts when a shareholder has initiated an 
oppression proceeding, while also pursuing one or more derivative 
or direct claims that allege managerial breaches of duty to the 
corporation or to the shareholder, as a shareholder. After a 
shareholder sends the corporation a notice that he is withdrawing 
from the corporation on grounds of oppression, the corporation is 
entitled to obtain a stay of any other litigation of that kind.481 If the 
shareholder succeeds in his oppression action, he will lose his 
standing to continue the other litigation after the corporation buys 
                                                                                                             
 476. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 14.30(a)(2), 14.34(a)–(b) (2011). 
 477. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-1435 cmts. a, d (Supp. 2015). 
 478. Id. § 12:1-1435 cmt. b. 
 479. Id. § 12:1-1435(L). 
 480. Id. § 12:1-1435 cmt. l. 
 481. Id. § 12:1-1437. 
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his shares.482 If the shareholder loses the oppression action, he is 
entitled to have the stay lifted and to continue to pursue the other 
suits.483  
Oppression is defined in the new Act in a way that combines 
the two leading tests of oppression that is used in the case law of 
other states: the “reasonable expectations” test and the “departure 
from the standards of fair dealing” test.484 The use of these tests is 
designed to permit Louisiana courts to utilize oppression cases in 
other states as persuasive authority in interpreting that term under 
Louisiana law.485 However, as the Revision Comments to the 
relevant provision explain, the Louisiana Act defines the term in a 
way that rejects several features of the oppression doctrine that 
have been adopted by some of the decisions in other states.486  
Louisiana defines “oppression” as practices by the corporation 
that, taken as a whole over an appropriate period of time, are 
“plainly incompatible with a genuine effort on the part of the 
corporation to deal fairly and in good faith” with the shareholder 
who is alleging oppression.487 But to avoid a focus wholly on the 
alleged mistreatment of the complaining shareholder, without also 
considering the legitimate interests of other shareholders, the Act 
provides that both the conduct of the complaining shareholder and 
the reasonable expectations of all shareholders in the corporation 
are relevant in assessing whether the corporation has acted fairly 
and in good faith toward the shareholder who is seeking to 
withdraw.488  
The Revision Comments explain that a failure by the majority 
shareholders over an extended period of time to provide a minority 
owner with any reasonable level of participation in the financial 
benefits of a successful business will be difficult to reconcile with the 
required effort to treat the minority shareholder fairly.489 However, 
the Comments also say that the majority shareholders owe no duty to 
sacrifice their own legitimate interests or to make payments or 
provide benefits to a minority owner that are out of proportion to the 
value of the contributions made to the business by that owner (or by 
those who originally purchased the relevant shares).490 The guiding 
principles are those appropriate to the interpretation of a contract that 
                                                                                                             
 482. Id. § 12:1-1437 cmt. b. 
 483. Id. § 12:1-1437(A). 
 484. Id. § 12:1-1435 cmt. d. 
 485. Id.  
 486. Id.  
 487. Id. § 12:1-1435(B). 
 488. Id. § 12:1-1435(B)(1), (2), cmt. d(3). 
 489. Id. § 12:1-1435 cmt. d(2). 
 490. Id.  
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calls for cooperation and fair dealing among all parties in the 
operation of a business that entails uncertainty and risk.491  
A shareholder who wishes to withdraw from the corporation on 
grounds of oppression initiates the process by sending the corporation 
a notice that the shareholder is withdrawing from the corporation on 
grounds of oppression.492 The notice operates as an offer by the 
shareholder to the corporation, irrevocable for 60 days, to sell all of the 
shareholder’s shares to the corporation at their fair value. 493 The 
shareholder may state a proposed price in the notice but is not required 
to do so.494  
The corporation may accept the shareholder’s offer by giving the 
shareholder notice of its acceptance during the 60-day period that the 
offer is irrevocable.495 The acceptance of the offer does not operate as 
an admission or as evidence that the corporation actually did engage in 
oppression of the shareholder.496 It simply obligates the corporation to 
buy the shares at their fair value or, if a shareholder’s proposed price 
was also accepted, at the price proposed.497 If the corporation accepts 
the offer to sell at a stated price, a contract of sale is formed and 
terminates the shareholder’s ownership of the shares.498 The 
corporation is then obligated to pay the agreed price in cash, and the 
former shareholder is bound by the warranties of a seller of 
investment securities and must deliver any certificates issued by the 
corporation for the sold shares or a certificate that the certificates 
have been lost, stolen, or destroyed.499 If the former shareholder fails 
to deliver the certificate representing the purchased shares, he is 
required to indemnify the corporation if it is later obliged to recognize 
the ownership interests of someone who presents the formerly missing 
certificate.500 
If the corporation accepts only the offer to sell, but not the price, 
another delay of 60 days is provided to allow the parties to negotiate 
an agreed price or other settlement of their dispute.501 If no agreement 
is reached, either party may commence a summary proceeding after 
the expiration of the 60-day period to determine the fair value of the 
                                                                                                             
 491. Id.  
 492. Id. § 12:1-1435(D). The rules that govern the notice, and that determine 
when it takes effect, are provided in section 12:1-141. 
 493. Id. 
 494. Id. 
 495. Id. § 12:1-1435(E). 
 496. Id.  
 497. Id. 
 498. Id. § 12:1-1435(F), cmt. j. 
 499. Id.  
 500. Id. §§ 12:1-1435(F), 1-1436(F). 
 501. Id. § 12:1-1436(A)(1). 
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shares and to order their sale at that price.502 The same definition of 
fair value applies in an oppression proceeding as in an appraisal 
proceeding,503 which means the shares must be valued without the 
imposition of marketability or minority discounts.504 
If the corporation fails to accept the shareholder’s offer to sell 
within the 60-day period of irrevocability, the shareholder is entitled 
to file an action to prove that he is entitled to withdraw on grounds 
of oppression.505 This action is treated as an ordinary action,506 and a 
judgment in that action that recognizes the shareholder’s right to 
withdraw is treated as a partial judgment under Louisiana Code of 
Civil Procedure article 1915(B).507 
If the partial judgment is not appealed, the oppression 
proceeding is stayed for at least 60 days to allow the parties to 
negotiate a price and payment terms or other settlement of their 
dispute.508 After that stay is lifted or expires, either party may file a 
motion to initiate the same kind of summary proceeding as that 
available when the corporation voluntarily accepts the shareholder’s 
offer to sell, in which the court determines the fair value and terms of 
the purchase of the oppressed shareholder’s shares.509  
One of two judgments is available at the conclusion of the 
valuation proceeding, regardless of whether that proceeding follows 
the corporation’s voluntary acceptance of the shareholder’s offer to 
sell or the court’s partial judgment establishing that the shareholder is 
entitled to withdraw from the corporation on grounds of oppression. 
The normal judgment is an ordinary money judgment against the 
corporation, enforceable in the usual way, for the full amount of the 
fair value of the oppressed shareholder’s shares.510 However, if the 
corporation proves that an immediate payment of that amount in full 
would either violate the statutory restrictions on shareholder 
distributions or would cause undue harm to the corporation or its 
creditors, the court may instead order the corporation to pay for the 
                                                                                                             
 502. Id. The right to file such an action expires one year after the expiration 
of the 60-day period. Id. If neither party files a valuation action within that 
period, the effects of the shareholder’s notice of withdrawal, and the 
corporation’s acceptance of the offer to sell made through that notice, are 
terminated. But the shareholder may initiate the same process again by sending 
another notice of withdrawal on grounds of oppression. Id.  
 503. Id. § 12:1-1435(C). 
 504. Id. § 12:1-1301(4). 
 505. Id. § 12:1-1435(G). 
 506. Id. 
 507. Id.  
 508. Id. § 12:1-1436(B). 
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 510. Id. § 12:1-1436(D). 
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shares through delivery of a negotiable promissory note with a term 
of up to 10 years.511 
At any time before the final valuation and payment judgment is 
rendered in the suit,512 the corporation may convert the oppression 
proceeding into a court-supervised dissolution.513 The court may 
appoint a liquidator to carry out the liquidation, or it may approve 
a plan under which the corporation’s management would do so.514 
Because a corporation ordinarily dissolves by filing shareholder-
approved articles of dissolution,515 it is possible that the corporation’s 
management would attempt to circumvent the requirement that the 
dissolution be court-supervised. However, the corporation would be 
required to provide notice to the minority shareholder either of the 
meeting at which the dissolution was to be approved516 or of its 
approval by less than unanimous written consent, if that form of 
consent is authorized in the corporation’s articles of incorporation.517 
A shareholder who learned of the attempted dissolution without 
court supervision is entitled to obtain court supervision of the 
dissolution by filing an appropriate motion in the oppression 
proceeding.518  
It is also possible for the board and majority shareholders of the 
corporation to approve a cash-out merger to force the shareholder 
out of the corporation while an oppression action is pending.519 
However, such a tactic would result in the shareholder’s receiving 
appraisal rights that would provide the same fair value judgment as 
in an oppression proceeding520 but without the prospect of a 10-year 
promissory note in lieu of a money judgment.521 A corporation that 
wished to force out a shareholder who was claiming oppression 
would be wiser to simply accept the shareholder’s offer to sell at the 
beginning of the oppression process.  
                                                                                                             
 511. Id. § 12:1-1436(E). 
 512. Id. § 12:1-1438(B). 
 513. Id. § 12:1-1438(A). 
 514. Id. § 12:1-1438(A)(4). 
 515. Id. § 12:1-1403. 
 516. Id. § 12:1-1402(D). 
 517. Id. § 12:1-704(B), (F). The failure to provide the required notice does 
not automatically invalidate the action taken, but a court may fashion any 
appropriate remedy in favor of a shareholder adversely affected by the lack of 
notice. Id. § 12:1-704(G). 
 518. Id. § 12:1-1438(C). 
 519. See id. §§ 12:1-1102, 1-1104. 
 520. Id. §§ 12:1-1302(a)(1), 1-1301(4). 
 521. Compare id. § 12:1-1330(E) (shareholder entitled to judgment for fair 
value of shares in appraisal proceeding), with id. § 12:1-1436(E) (permitting sale 
of oppressed shareholder’s shares for promissory note with term up to ten 
years). 
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QUALIFICATION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 
Chapter 15 of the Model Act deals with the qualification of 
foreign business corporations but not nonprofit corporations. Existing 
Chapter 3 of Title 12 deals with that subject for both business and 
nonprofit corporations in much the same way as the Model Act and 
in a way with which practitioners and the secretary of state’s office 
are already familiar. For those reasons, Louisiana did not adopt 
Chapter 15. Hence, the qualification of foreign corporations to do 
business in this state continues to be governed by the same law as 
before.522 
RECORDS AND RECORDS INSPECTION 
Much like the LBCL, the new Act requires a corporation to 
maintain three types of records: accounting records;523 records of the 
actions taken by its board of directors and shareholders, either through 
meetings or through written consents;524 and a record of its 
shareholders.525 The new Act rejects a Model Act rule that requires a 
corporation to send financial statements to its shareholders 
                                                                                                             
 522. The new Act does contain a name reservation provision that has some 
connection with the prospective qualification of a foreign corporation. It permits 
a foreign corporation to register its name (if the name is available) on an 
annually renewable basis, so that the name will be available if it does choose to 
qualify in Louisiana. Id. § 12:1-403. This type of name registration is different 
from the shorter-term name reservation that was available under the LBCL 
(former section 12:23(G)), and that continues to be available under the new Act. 
Id. § 12:1-402. The shorter-term name provision allows anyone to register any 
name that is currently available for a period of 120 days. Id. The annually 
renewable name registration is available only to foreign corporations and only 
for the foreign corporation’s own name (or that name with added distinguishing 
characteristics if the name alone is not distinguishable from other names already 
in use). Id. § 12:1-403(A). The annually renewable registration of the foreign 
corporation’s name allows the foreign corporation to keep the name available 
for possible future use, without having to create a new, shell corporation just to 
hold the name.  
 523. The LBCL described the types of accounting records required, while the 
new Act says simply that a corporation must maintain “appropriate accounting 
records.” Compare former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:103(A)(1) (repealed 2015) 
(“books and accounts showing the amounts of its assets and liabilities, receipts 
and disbursements, and gains and losses”), with LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-
1601(B) (Supp. 2015) (“appropriate accounting records”). 
 524. Compare former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:103(A)(2) (repealed 2015), 
with LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-1601(A) (Supp. 2015). 
 525. Compare former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:103(B) (repealed 2015), 
with LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-1601(C) (Supp. 2015). 
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annually,526 and instead retains the rule in the LBCL527 that permits 
a shareholder to obtain those statements on request once per year.528  
The records-inspection provisions of the new Act are an amalgam 
of the Model Act and LBCL rules on the subject. The Model Act lists 
certain basic corporate governance documents and records, such as 
the articles, bylaws, and minutes of shareholders’ meetings, and 
makes those records freely available for inspection by any 
shareholder during regular business hours and on proper notice.529 
It then lists other records, such as minutes of board and committee 
actions and accounting records, that are available for inspection by 
any shareholder only if the shareholder’s demand for inspection is 
made in good faith, for a proper purpose described with particularity in 
the demand, and if the records to be inspected are “directly connected” 
with that stated purpose.530  
The LBCL, in contrast, did not distinguish one type of record from 
another (except for shareholder lists that were available for inspection 
at a shareholders’ meeting531). It gave much broader inspection rights 
to “any and all” records and accounts, but only to shareholders who 
had met the percentage ownership provisions stated in the statute for at 
least six months.532 The required percentages were 5% for most 
shareholders533 and 25% for competitors of the corporation.534 Those 
inspection rights were limited to purposes that were “reasonable and 
proper,”535 and a court could deny the right to inspect with respect to 
“confidential matters.”536 
The new Act accepts the Model Act approach to the basic 
corporate governance records,537 but it rejects the Model Act’s 
restrictions on other records subject to inspection. It continues to 
                                                                                                             
 526. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 16.20(a) (2011). 
 527. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:102(B) (repealed 2015). 
 528. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-1620(A) (Supp. 2015). 
 529. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 16.01(e), 16.02(a) (2011). 
 530. Id. § 16.02(c), (d). 
 531. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:73(E) (repealed 2015). 
 532. Id. § 12:103(D). The ownership of several shareholders acting together 
could be combined to reach the 5% level. Id. 
 533. Id. § 12:103(D)(1)(a). 
 534. Id. § 12:103(D)(2). 
 535. Id. § 12:103(D).  
 536. Id. § 12:103(D)(3)(a). 
 537. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1-1601(E), 1-1602(A) (Supp. 2015). The 
new Act also adopts a Model Act provision that deals properly with a situation 
that is unlikely to actually arise in Louisiana practice: someone who becomes a 
shareholder of record for purposes of voting at a shareholders’ meeting after the 
record date for the sending of notices for that meeting. That type of shareholder 
is entitled under this provision to obtain from the corporation on request a copy 
of the notice of the meeting and of any other information sent by the corporation 
to the shareholders in connection with the meeting. Id. § 12:1-1602(B).  
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make “any and all” records of the corporation subject to inspection 
but only by shareholders who meet the 5%-for-6-months minimum 
ownership test.538 Because the new Act also retained the rule that 
allowed a court to deny inspection rights as to confidential matters, 
the old 25% test for inspection of records by shareholders who were 
also competitors was eliminated.539 The new Act did adopt the 
Model Act’s requirements that the shareholder’s inspection request 
under the “any and all” provision be made in good faith and for a 
proper purpose described with reasonable particularity in the 
demand for inspection.540 And like the LBCL541 and the Model 
Act,542 the new Act also provides that the records inspection rights 
of shareholders do not affect the discovery rights of shareholders 
who are engaged in litigation with the corporation.543 
In addition to its rules concerning the inspection of corporate 
records by shareholders, the new Act provides explicit new 
records-inspection rights to the directors of a corporation.544 A 
director is entitled to inspect and copy the books, records, and 
documents of the corporation at any reasonable time to the extent 
reasonably related to the performance of the director’s duties.545 The 
director may not inspect books and records for any other reason or 
in any manner that would violate any duty owed by the director to 
the corporation.546  
REPORTING OBLIGATION OF CORPORATION CONTRACTING 
WITH THE STATE  
The LBCL required a corporation that contracted with the state 
to file a statement acknowledging that fact and disclosing the names 
and addresses of all persons or corporate entities that held an 
ownership interest or voting power of 5% or more.547 The old 
requirement was stated as part of the rules governing the 
incorporation process,548 as if the statement were connected in some 
way with that process. The new Act retains the substance of that 
                                                                                                             
 538. Id. § 12:1-1602(C). It remains possible to aggregate the ownership 
percentages of several shareholders to satisfy the 5% threshold. Id.  
 539. Id. § 12:1-1602 cmt. b. 
 540. Id. § 12:1-1602(D). The shareholder may inspect only those records 
“directly connected” with the shareholder’s stated purpose. Id. 
 541. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:103(D)(3)(b) (repealed 2015). 
 542. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 16.02(f)(1) (2011). 
 543. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-1602(F)(1) (Supp. 2015). 
 544. The LBCL was silent on the subject. 
 545. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-1605(A) (Supp. 2015). 
 546. Id.  
 547. Former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:25(E) (repealed 2015). 
 548. Id.  
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requirement but moves it from the incorporation provisions of the 
statute to Part 16, which concerns records and reports.549  
The new provision550 changes the wording of the requirement 
slightly, eliminating the word “corporate” from the phrase “persons 
or corporate entities,” as used to describe the ownership or voting 
percentages that trigger a reporting obligation. The qualifying 
adjective is eliminated because it is not relevant to the indirect 
ownership information that the statute is designed to collect. The 
entire reference to ownership through other entities could have been 
eliminated as a technical matter, as the term “person” is defined 
broadly enough under the new Act to include both natural persons 
and all forms of business entities.551 But the separate reference to 
ownership through entities was retained to avoid any suggestion that 
the statute had been amended to eliminate the reporting obligation 
associated with that form of ownership.  
TRANSITION AND APPLICABILITY 
The new Act applies to all domestic corporations in existence 
on its effective date that were incorporated under Louisiana law for 
a purpose or purposes for which a corporation could be formed 
under the new Act.552 That means the new Act will apply only to 
Louisiana business corporations553 and not to nonprofit, insurance, 
or banking corporations, as those are not the types of corporations 
that may be formed under the new Act. Each of those other forms of 
corporation is governed by a separate statute. However, because 
professional corporations, such as professional medical corporations 
and professional law corporations, are themselves specialized forms 
of business corporations, the new Act applies to those corporations 
as well.  
The new Act contains a savings provision that is based on a 
provision of the Uniform Statutory Construction Act.554 Under that 
provision, the repeal of the LBCL does not affect the operation of the 
LBCL, or any action taken or right, remedy, privilege, obligation, or 
                                                                                                             
 549. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-1622 cmt. (Supp. 2015). 
 550. Id. § 12:1-1622. 
 551. Id. § 12:1-140(9), (13), (16). 
 552. Id. § 12:1-1701. 
 553. The new Act does not apply to foreign corporations except where it 
makes express reference to that form of corporation. Id. § 12:1-1702. Examples 
of such references include the provision that permits a foreign corporation to 
register its name, id. § 12:1-403, and the various forms of merger and merger-
substitute transactions governed by Parts 9 and 11 of the Act.  
 554. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 17.03 cmt. (2011). 
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liability created under it, before its repeal.555 Moreover, any 
proceeding, reorganization, or dissolution that was commenced under 
the LBCL before its repeal may be completed in accordance with the 
LBCL as if it had not been repealed. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article could not have covered all of the many interpretive 
issues that may arise under the new Act. However, the author 
hopes that the summary provided will help lawyers, judges, and 
business owners familiarize themselves with the key points of the 
new law. 
                                                                                                             
 555. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-1703(A)(1), (2) (Supp. 2015). Similarly, 
the repeal of the LBCL does not affect any violation of the LBCL that occurred 
before its repeal, or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred before its 
repeal. But if the new Act reduces a penalty or punishment, and the penalty or 
punishment has not yet been imposed, the newer, reduced punishment is to be 
applied. Id. § 12:1-1703(A)(3), (B).  

